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THE LUTHERAN LITERARY BOARD, Publishers 
P. O. Box 573, Burlington, Iowa 



A SYSTEM OF 
GENERAL ETHICS 



LEANDER S. KEYSER, D. D. 

PROFESSOR OF ETHICS, THEISM AND CHRISTIAN EVIDENCE IN WITTENBERG COLLEGE 

AND OF SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY IN HAMMA DIVINITY SCHOOL, 

SPRINGFnXD, OHIO. 

AUTHOR OF "A SYSTEM OF NATURAL THEISM," 

"A SYSTEM OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS," "THE RATIONAL TEST," 

"ELECTION AND CONVERSION," ETC. 



BURLINGTON, IOWA 
THE LUTHERAN LITERARY BOARD 

1918 






COPYKIOHT 1918 
T R. NEUMANN 
BURLINGTON, IOWA 



JAN "3 1919 



©(&A508839 




PREFATORY NOTE 

HIS work aims to present a system of robust 
Ethics. Its purpose is to inculcate virile moral 
principles, produce stalwart moral character, 
and lead to the practice of uncompromising 
virtue. While the author is interested — deeply interested, 
indeed — in the philosophical and scientific aspects of the 
ethical scheme, he is frank to acknowledge that his interest 
has not been only, nor even chiefly, academic, but largely 
practical and earnest. 

A robust ethic does not mean a stern, unbending and 
ascetic system of rigorism. Far from it! True morality 
is surcharged with joy in contemplating ethical excellence 
and in trying to incarnate it in human life. It has Spartan 
sterlingness without Spartan austerity. 

By a robust ethical system the author has several distinct 
things in mind. He firmly believes that the Law of Right 
is the Law of God, and therefore that the Right is eternally 
and fundamentally Right. He also holds that the Right is 
inherently opposed to the Wrong; therefore he does not, 
will not, dare not blur or efface Moral Distinctions. He 
has no sympathy with those writers who make an apology 
or a semi-apology for wrong being and wrong doing. He 
regards the wrong as actual sin and guilt, and frankly calls 
it by those terms, whether they have a euphonious sound to 
modern ears or not. 



4 A System of General Ethics 

He also believes that Conscience is a divinely implanted 
functioning power of the mind, a specialized faculty for 
perceiving and sensing Moral Distinctions. No less firmly 
does he advocate the freedom of the Will over against the 
Determinists of the day of whatever school or cult. Just 
as earnestly does he believe that man is in the world to per- 
form, willingly and gladly, a definite moral task, and to 
achieve a moral destiny which is eternal. 

Thus it will be seen that the author does not advocate a 
weak or emasculated morality — one that minimizes or ob- 
literates Moral Distinctions, or denies the supremacy of the 
Conscience, or teaches a namby-pamby doctrine of the Will. 
He feels very keenly that there is need today of sound and 
thorough-going moral teaching in the home, the school, the 
college, the university, and likewise in the civil and social 
relations of life. If we shall rear good, upright and incor- 
ruptible citizens for our country, we must instil clear and 
virile moral principles in the minds of the young. While 
they are in school and college is the psychological moment 
to do this. 

Therefore the author hopes that the present work will 
find its way as a text-book into the curricula of many of 
our colleges, alike those of the Church and those of the 
State; and this hope he cherishes out of the disinterested 
motive of real concern for the moral and spiritual welfare 
of the future citizenship of our country. He believes that 
the reader or student who masters the contents of this book 
will have a heightened appreciation of the Right and an in- 
creased abhorrence of the Wrong. 

Educators in some of our church colleges have expressed 
to the author a desire for a work on General Ethics, written 
in a simple and lucid style, that would not undermine the 
principles of Christian morality. The author has done his 



Prefatory Note 5 

utmost to write such a work, and herewith submits it. He 
believes the Christian instructor will find that it prepares 
the way for Christian Ethics and Christian Practice. At 
the same time, teachers in other academic institutions will, 
the author sincerely hopes, find the work adapted to the 
preparation of their students for the highest and noblest 
service to their country and their age. 

The systematic arrangement of the ethical material, the 
articulated heads and subheads, and the various fonts of 
type will surely not mar the work for the intelligent gen- 
eral reader, and will be of much service, as the author 
knows by experience, to both teacher and student when the 
work is used for pedagogical purposes. 

If this book shall do some good in the world, shall give 
its readers clear conceptions of moral reality, shall help to 
make them more stalwart in virtue, and shall cheer them in 
the use of their ethical privileges and in the performance 
of their ethical tasks, the author will feel that his labor has 
achieved its greatest reward. 

Wittenberg College, The Author. 

Springfield, Ohio. 



CONTENTS 

Chapter Page 

Prefatory Note 3 

General Outline of the System 9 

An Articulated Outline 9 

I. Introductory Data 17 

II. Introductory Data (continued) 34 

III. The Ground of Right 42 

IV. The Ground of Right (continued) 50 

V. The Law of Right 73 

VI. The Law of Right (continued) 79 

VII. The Law of Right (continued) 101 

VIII. The Antithesis of Right 121 

IX. The Antithesis of Right (continued) 139 

X. The Antithesis of Right (continued) 154 

XL Introductory Data (Practical Ethics) 161 

XII. Man's Chief Duties (to himself) 168 

XIII. Man's Chief Duties (to himself, continued) .. 180 

XIV. Man's Chief Duties (to himself, continued) . .196 
XV. Man's Chief Duties (to himself, continued) . .202 

XVI. Man's Chief Duties (continued — to nature).. 2 16 

XVII. Man's Chief Duties (ctd. — to his fellowmen) 224 

XVIII. Man's Chief Duties (to his fellowmen, ctd.) 237 

XIX. Man's Chief Duties (to his fellowmen, ctd.) 247 

XX. Man's Chief Duties (to his fellowmen, ctd.) 258 

XXL Man's Chief Duties ( continued— to God) 268 

A Selected Bibliography 276 

Index 279 



A General Outline of the System 

PART I 
THEORETICAL ETHICS 

I. INTRODUCTORY DATA. 

II. THE GROUND OF RIGHT. 

III. THE LAW OF RIGHT. 

IV. THE ANTITHESIS OF RIGHT. 

PART II 
PRACTICAL ETHICS 



I. 


INTRODUCTORY DATA. 


II. 


MAN'S CHIEF DUTIES. 




1. To Himself. 

2. To Nature. 

3. To His Fellowmen. 

4. To God. 



An Articulated Outline 

PART I 
THEORETICAL ETHICS 

DIVISION I 
INTRODUCTORY DATA 

DEFINITIONS. 

1. Importance of a correct definition. 

2. Definition of General Ethics. 

3. Definition of Theoretical Ethics. 

4. Definition of Practical Ethics. 

5. Defective definitions. 

6. Definition of the text justified. 



10 A System of General Ethics 

II. TERMS AND THEIR DERIVATION. 

1. The term "Ethics/ 

2. The terms "Moral Science" and "Moral Philosophy. 

3. Deontology. 

III. THE ETHICAL SPHERE. 

1. Its distinctive data. 

2. Its distinctive question. 

3. Its distinctive vocabulary. 

IV. ETHICS AS A SCIENCE. 

1. It deals with observed facts. 

2. It assembles them into a system. 

3. It makes legitimate inductions from them. 

V. METHODOLOGY OF ETHICS. 

1. Definition. 

2. Application to Ethics. 

VI. HISTORICAL SKETCH. 

1. Moral intuitions innate. 

2. Hebrew Ethics. 

3. Heathen Ethics. 

4. Earliest scientific efforts. 

5. Later attempts. 

6. From the first to the seventeenth centuries. 

7. From the seventeenth century to the present time. 

VII. RELATION OF ETHICS TO OTHER SCIENCES. 

1. To Psychology. 

2. To Philosophy. 

3. To Natural Science. 

4. To Sociology. 

5. To Natural Theism. 

6. To Christian Theology and Ethics. 



DIVISION II 
THE GROUND OF RIGHT 

I. DEFINITION. 
II. THE TRUE VIEW. 

1. Statement. 

2. Rationale and argument (eight sub-divisions), 

3. The Highest Good (Summum Bonum). 

(1) What it is. 

(2) Other views. 



An Articulated Outline 11 

III. VARIOUS THEORIES EXAMINED AND ANALYZED. 

1. The Sophists. 

2. Socrates. 

3. Plato. 

4. Aristotle. 

5. Hedonism (including Epicureanism and Eudemonism). 

6. Stoicism. 

7. Divine Absolutism. 

8. Civil Authority. 

9. Altruism. 

10. Utilitarianism. 

11. Opportunism. 

12. Naturalistic Evolution. 

13. Theistic Evolution. 

DIVISION III 
THE LAW OF RIGHT 

I. CONNECTING LINKS. 

1. God created a cosmos. 

2. He created it a moral economy. 

II. PROOFS OF MORAL ORDER IN NATURE. 

1. The reign of law. 

2. Design in nature. 

3. Nature affords a moral arena for man. 

III. MORAL AGENTS. 

1. Definitions. 

(1) Of moral agency. 

(2) Of a moral agent. 

2. Man as a moral agent. 

(1) The only moral agent in the cosmos (known to 

Natural Ethics). 

(2) Source of man's moral character. 

(3) Man a unique figure in the cosmos. 

3. Constituents of moral agency. 

(1) Rational intelligence. 

(2) Conscience. 

a. Definition. 

b. Other terms for conscience. 

c. Etymology of the term. 

d. Psychology of the conscience. 

(a) A perception. 

(b) A feeling. 

(c) Its relation to other psychical powers. 



12 A System of General Ethics 

e. Origin of the Conscience. 

f. Conscience a distinct mental faculty. 

g. The supremacy of Conscience. 

(a) Definition. 

(b) Nature of its authority. 

(c) Why Conscience should be supreme. 

(d) Though supreme, Conscience is not 

infallible. 

(e) Conscience, though fallible, is man's 

ethical guide. 
(3) The Will. 

a. Definition of the Will. 

b. Its unique powers. 

(a) Of attention. 

(b) Of originating motion and action. 

(c) Of alternate choice. 

(d) Of execution. 

c. Freedom of Will a sine qua non of morality. 

d. Proofs of the freedom of the Will. 

(a) The testimony of consciousness. 

(b) The test of experiment. 

(c) The demands of man's environment. 

(d) The mind's intuitive distinction be- 

tween free and forced acts. 

(e) Determinism inconsistent with itself. 

(f) Experience versus speculation. 

(g) Harmful results of Determinism, 
(h) Objections stated and confuted, 
(i) Limitations of freedom. 

4. Motives or Intentions. 

(1) Definition. 

(2) Motives essential to moral agency. 

(3) Varied relations of motives. 

a. To the Will. 

b. To the actor. 

c. To the action. 



DIVISION IV 
THE ANTITHESIS OF RIGHT 

I. CONNECTING LINKS. 
II. DEFINITION AND TERM. 

1. Definition of Sin. 

2. The term Sin. 



An Articulated Outline 13 

III. THE FACT OF SIN. 

1. Universal experience. 

2. Moral Distinctions. 

(1) Definition. 

(2) Proofs. 

a. Universal consciousness. 

b. A postulate of human society. 

c. A postulate of human government. 

d. Argument from the constitution of the hu- 

man body. 

e. Difficulties considered. 

(3) The morally indifferent sphere (so-called). 

(4) A higher and a lower good. 

(5) Questions of casuistry. 

IV. THE GENESIS OF SIN. 

1. Nature of the problem. 

2. The true view. 

(1) Sin the act of a free moral agent. 

(2) Sin an eternal possibility, but not a necessity. 

(3) An adequate test necessary to moral agency. 

3. Erroneous views. 

(1) God not the author of sin. 

(2) Sin not eternal. 

(3) Sin not posited in matter. 

(4) Sin not a lapse of the Infinite. 

(5) Sin not due to man's primitive animalism. 

(6) Agnosticism not satisfactory. 

V. THE CURE OF SIN. 

1. The answer of Natural Ethics. 

(1) An enigma. 

(2) God might forgive sin. 

(3) God might help man morally. 

(4) Man may strive morally. 

(5) But assurance is lacking. 

2. The answer of Christian Ethics. 

(1) God is loving and merciful. 

(2) God is also just. 

(3) The moral antimony adjusted through vicarious 

atonement. 

(4) God regenerates and sanctifies. 

(5) Assurance of the moral victory and goal. 

(6) The inner witness of the Spirit. 



14 A System of General Ethics 

PART II 
PRACTICAL ETHICS 

DIVISION I 
INTRODUCTORY DATA 

I. DEFINITION OF PRACTICAL ETHICS. 

II. ITS RELATION TO THEORETICAL ETHICS. 

1. A vital relation. 

2. A vitally important relation. 

III. ITS SUBJECT-MATTER: MAN'S CHIEF DUTIES. 

1. Duties classified. 

2. The term duty. 

3. Duties and rights. 

DIVISION II 
MAN'S CHIEF DUTIES 

I. MAN'S DUTIES TO HIMSELF (Individual Ethics). 

1. To his body. 

(1) He should not despise his body. 

(2) He should preserve it in health. 

(3) He should control and regulate its passions. 

(4) He should remember its dignity. 

2. To his mind. 

(1) The process of culture. 

a. The Intellect. 

b. The Sensibilities. 

c. The Will. 

(2) Motives for culture. 

a. Wrong motives. 

b. Right motives. 

3. To his whole personality. 

(1) A strong personality. 

(2) A symmetrical personality. 

(3) A virtuous personality. 

a. Relation of virtue to character. 

b. Definition of virtue and virtues. 

c. Classification of virtues. 

d. List of virtues. 

(a) Positive content. 

(b) Antithesis. 

(c) Perversion. 



An Articulated Outline 15 

II. MAN'S DUTIES TO NATURE (Nature Ethics). 

1. To trace the divine purpose in her phenomena. 

2. To study her scientifically. 

3. To preserve, mould and develop her. 

4. To show mercy to all her sentient creatures. 

III. MAN' 
1. 



5 DUTIES TO HIS FELLOWMEN 


(Social Ethics) 


General relation. 




(1) 


Love. 






a. 


Neighbor love. 






b. 


Patriotic love. 






c. 


Philanthropic love. 






d. 


Love for enemies. 






e. 


Other graces flowing from 


love. 


(2) 


Justice. 






a. 


In the industrial sphere. 






b. 


In the civic sphere. 




Specific relation. 




(1) 


The 


: family. 






a. 


Husband and wife. 






b. 


Parents and children. 





(2) The social organism. 

(3) The State. 

a. Duties of private citizens. 

b. Duties of public officials. 

(4) The Church. 

a. General Ethics and the Church. 

b. The duty of church membership. 

c. Duties of church members. 

d. Duties of ministers. 

IV. MAN'S DUTIES TO GOD (Theistic Ethics). 

1. To believe in His existence. 

2. To recognize Him in the affairs of life. 

3. To trust and serve Him. 

5. To anticipate eternal fellowship with Him. 



Summary and concluding observations. 



A System of General Ethics 

PART I 

THEORETICAL ETHICS 



DIVISION I 
INTRODUCTORY DATA 



CHAPTER I 



I. DEFINITIONS. 

1. Importance of a correct definition. 

2. Definition of General Ethics. 

3. Definition of Theoretical Ethics. 

4. Definition of Practical Ethics. 

5. Defective definitions. 

6. Definition of the text justified. 

II. TERMS AND THEIR DERIVATION. 

1. The term Ethics. 

2. Moral Science and Moral Philosophy. 

3. Deontology. 

III. THE ETHICAL SPHERE. 

1. Its distinctive data. 

2. Its distinctive question. 

3. Its distinctive vocabulary. 

IV. ETHICS AS A SCIENCE. 

1. It deals with observed facts. 

2. It assembles them into a system. 

3. It makes legitimate inductions from them. 

V. METHODOLOGY OF ETHICS. 

1. Definition. 

2. Application to Ethics. 



18 A System of General Ethics 

I. DEFINITIONS. 

1. Importance of a correct definition: 

At the beginning of the study of any theme a clear-cut 
and comprehensive definition is all-important. It may be 
compared to getting a proper general view of a landscape 
which is subsequently to be investigated in detail. It is get- 
ting the true geography of a subject. Not only at the be- 
ginning of our discipline, but also all along the way, a de- 
cided advantage will be gained if we can agree on a correct 
and lucid definition. 

2. Definition of General Ethics: 

GENERALi ETHICS IS THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT AND 
WRONG IN PRINCIPLE, CHARACTER AND CONDUCT. 

3. Definition of Theoretical Ethics. 

Theoretical Ethics is the scientific treatment of the fun- 
damental principles of morality. It deals with the ground, 
nature and laws of right and wrong, and may therefore be 
called the profounder part of our science. 

4. Definition of Practical Ethics: 

Practical Ethics is the systematic treatment of the appli- 
cation of moral principles to human life. It deals with life, 
duty and conduct, and thus may be called the plainer part 
of our science. 

5. Defective Definitions: 

(1) "Ethics is the science of conduct; it considers the 
actions of human beings in reference to their Tightness or 
wrongness, their tendency to good or evil" (Mackenzie). 2 



1. The word "General" is used in the title of this work, not to 
distinguish our science from Special Ethics, but from Christian 
Ethics. For reasons that are satisfactory to the author he prefers 
the adjective "General" in the title to either of the adjectives 
"Natural" or "Rational." 

2. "Manual of Ethics," page 1. 



Introductory Data 19 

First, this definition is defective because it limits Ethics 
to the sphere of conduct, whereas, in reality, our science 
deals primarily with principles, motives and character, and 
secondarily with outward deportment. "As a man thinketh 
in his heart, so is he," says a great ethical writer. "Blessed 
are the pure in heart : for they shall see God." The inside 
of the platter, and not merely the outside, should be made 
clean. A man's external conduct might be correct accord- 
ing to all the canons of Practical Ethics, and yet he might 
be a very immoral man, because his heart, his motives, were 
evil. It is, in fact, the intention that determines the mor- 
ality of the actor. The hypocrite, as soon as his true char- 
acter becomes known, is universally despised. "Ethics is 
quite as much a study of character as it is of conduct'*' 
(Hyslop). 3 

In the second place, the above definition is defective be- 
cause it lacks philosophical foundation; it deals only with 
man, and does not go back to find the ultimate principle and 
home of the right and the good. 

(2) Ethics is "the science of the phenomena of human 
character and conduct, and the art of directing the human 
will toward the ideal order of life"' (Hyslop). 4 

Acute and analytical as Dr. Hyslop is, we think this defi- 
nition, which is his formal one, lacks definiteness and proper 
limitation ; for every definition of Ethics ought to point 
out specifically, and in so many words, that it deals with 
moral realities and phenomena. Therefore it ought to 
contain the word "moral" or the phrase "right and wrong/' 
The phrase, "the ideal order of life," sounds well, but it is 
not specific enough, and itself needs explication. Besides, 



3. "The Elements of Ethics," p. 3. 

4. "The Elements of Ethics," p. 1. 



20 A System of General Ethics 

as we shall try to show further on in this book, morality is 
not limited to the human world; it must also be sought in 
its ultimate philosophical basis. 

(3) "Ethics, or Moral Science, is the science of man's 
life of duty, or what man ought to do in the present world" 
(Gregory). 5 

No! the noble science of Ethics does not deal only, or 
even chiefly, with what man ought to do, but with what 
man ought to be. Nor is it limited merely to the human 
realm; it must go back to the Primal Moral Personality. 
Moreover, to say that it treats only of duty and ought puts 
such a strain upon the moral life as to rob it of all joy and 
rebound. There is a realm of moral privilege and blessed- 
ness as well as a realm of duty. Neither is there good 
reason for believing that the uplifting principles of ethical 
science should be limited to "the present world ;" well may 
it have an outlook into futurity. 

6. Definition of the text justified: 

We think the definition given under 2 above will be found 
to be the simplest and most inclusive that can well be 
framed, and that for a number of reasons : ( 1 ) It clearly 
determines and marks off the ethical sphere, namely, the 
realm of the right, and its opposite, the wrong, the concep- 
tion of which is easily grasped by human intuition. (2) 
It goes to the root of the matter by seeking the ultimate 
principle and the objective law of right, and also of it anti- 
thesis, the wrong. (3) The truly ethical must have its 
dwelling in the character of the moral agent, and must not 
be limited to the external deportment. (4) Yet the ethical 
in character must blossom out in true conduct in order to 
verify itself as genuine and prove of benefit to the world. 



5. "Christian Ethics," p. 13. 



Introductory Data 21 

Men are to "let their light shine," and not "hide it under 
a bushel." 

An objection must be dealt with at this point. There are 
persons who question whether a science of the wrong can 
be formulated. The objection is not valid for these rea- 
sons: First, we are able to investigate the ultimate prin- 
ciple and source of wrong, and in doing so we are obliged 
to use scientific and philosophical methods ; second, although 
wrong is per se the principle of moral anarchy, yet, on 
account of the superior power of God and the right, evil 
has not succeeded in throwing the world into chaos ; third, 
for this reason wrong — or sin — is capable of scientific treat- 
ment and classification ; thus the theologian is able to di- 
vide sins into various genera and species, as, for example, 
original sin and actual sin, sins of omission and sins of 
commission, inner sins and overt sins, etc. Therefore we 
conclude logically that the definition of Ethics ought to in- 
clude the word "wrong" as well as the word "right." 6 



6. We do not wish to confuse the reader with definitions ; yet we 
believe it will be instructive to give a few others that are almost, if 
not quite, adequate from recent standard works : "Ethics is the sci- 
ence of rectitude and duty; it treats of the right and its obliga- 
tions" (Valentine: "Theoretical Ethics," p. 15). "The subject-matter 
of Ethics is morality, the phenomenon of right and wrong" (Thilly: 
"Introduction to Ethics," p. 5). "Ethics may be defined as the 
science of morality, or the science of moral distinctions" (DeLa- 
guna: "Introduction to the Science of Ethics," pp. 3, 4). "Ethics 
. . . the science of moral personality and of moral good" (Hyslop: 
"The Elements of Ethics," p. 4). The virtue of Dr. Hyslop's defi- 
nition is that it defines the science both concretely ("moral person- 
ality") and abstractly ("moral good"). It must be said, however, 
that the above definition is given incidentally by Dr. Hyslop, where- 
as his formal definition, given on page 1 of his book, is not so good, 
and therefore we have ventured to criticise it in a preceding section. 

We frankly admit that we have more than once been almost on 
the point of adopting the following definition as the formal one in 
this book: Ethics is the scientific treatment of the sources, prin- 
ciples and practice of right and wrong. At all events, this defini- 
tion would include all the topics treated in our ethical system. 



22 A System of General Ethics 

II. TERMS AND THEIR DERIVATION. 

1. The term Ethics: 

The term "Ethics" is derived from the Greek, r\0ixct, 
moral, which comes from n^oc;, character, which, accord- 
ing to Aristotle, grew from the root, e$oc„ meaning cus- 
tom or habit. However, the noble science of Ethics, as it 
is now developed, should not be judged by the etymology 
of the term, for it means far more than merely the habits 
or customs of the people. As we shall have occasion to 
show again and again in our work, the right and the wrong 
have a real and distinctive basis and place in the economy 
of the universe, and are not rooted in the shallow soil of 
mere social and civil convenances. 

2. Moral Science and Moral Philosophy: 

Ethics used to be called Moral Science or Moral Philos- 
ophy. The word "moral" is derived from the Latin mos 
(adjective, moralis), which also means custom or usage. 
Here again it will be seen that the word "moral" has come 
to have a higher meaning than its derivation would indicate. 
The same is true of many other words in modern use, as, 
for example, virtue and conscience, as will be shown fur- 
ther on. 

The terms "Moral Science" and "Moral Philosophy" are 
seldom used at present to designate our discipline, but 
have given way to the briefer and more descriptive term 
"Ethics." 

3. Deontology : 

This word has been suggested as a name for our science. 7 
Its derivation is, to beov, what is due, and, Xoyoc;, dis- 



7. See the remarks of Valentine in his "Theoretical Ethics," p. 
16, footnote. Also Davis : "Elements of Ethics," p. 36. 



Introductory Data 23 

course ; therefore a discourse about duty. The term, how- 
ever, has never come into vogue, and it would not be a good 
name, because Ethics deals with rights, privileges and 
moral joy, as well as with duties. 

III. THE ETHICAL SPHERE. 
1. Its distinctive data: 

The science of Ethics deals with a specific and well-de- 
fined body of facts. Its data are not something nebulous, 
far-away, hard to define, and difficult to grasp with the 
mental faculties, as some men seem to think, but stand out 
clear and distinct. What are some of these outstanding 
phenomena? They are morality itself, the right and the 
wrong, the law of righteousness, moral distinctions, the 
conscience and its imperative, moral obligation, moral ap- 
proval, moral aversion, rewards and penalties, moral free- 
dom, the choice between good and evil. These are plain, 
every-day facts with which all rational men are familiar, 
and by which their lives are largely controlled and their 
characters largely moulded. Many of these data are known 
intuitively, just as men know themselves and outward real- 
ities by intuition rather than by rational processes. 

A few simple differentiations may be profitable at this 
point. Physical science deals with matter, its laws and 
varied phenomena ; Psychology deals with mind and its 
functioning powers ; Philosophy searches after the nature 
and essence of being itself, and tries to formulate a world- 
view ; but our science of Ethics treats solely of moral re- 
alities and phenomena, of the principles and practice of 
right and wrong. 

It should be observed, too, that ethical data are just as 
clearly recognizable in human life and experience as are 



24 A System of General Ethics 

those of Physics, Chemistry, Astronomy, Psychology, or 
any other science. A little thought will make this thesis 
plain. You and I are just as vividly conscious that we 
ought to be true to our highest moral ideals ; that we ought 
to treat our fellowmen justly and kindly, — we are just as 
clearly conscious of these facts as we are that a tree is 
growing on the campus, that a bird is singing in the tree, 
and that the sun is shining in the sky. That we have a 
moral nature — a conscience and a will — is just as patent 
and persistent a fact of consciousness as that we have 
bodies and cognition and feeling. Indeed, long before 
many — or perhaps we should say, any — of the physical sci- 
ences were known, men obeyed the moral imperative within 
them; they recognized the authority of the Ought in their 
souls and above them. 

Besides, moral data are just as open for study and scien- 
tific classification as are those of botany and geology. Also, 
in formulating definitions we are able to delimit the ethical 
sphere just as clearly as the physical and psychical fields. 

Perhaps the reason some scholars have made so much of 
a "problem" of ethical phenomena is this : They have been 
too speculative; they have wanted to know ethical reality 
in its very essence — what it is in its inmost nature. Such 
an achievement, however, is impossible in any sphere of 
study and knowledge. Elementally we do not know any 
more about the substance of matter than we do about the 
substance of mind or spirit. What is matter? is just as 
much of a "problem" as is, What is morality? In the last 
analysis we know only phenomena in both the physical and 
psychical realms. The noumena, or the essence of things, 
we do not know. If it is an unsolved problem as to how 
the mind functions ethically, it is no less an unsolved prob- 
lem how the mind functions in other ways — in sense-per- 



Introductory Data 25 

ception, in self-consciousness, in feeling, in volition. In all 
these matters we must simply fall back on consciousness 
and intuition. To deny the validity of human conscious- 
ness when it reports moral content and experience, and yet 
accept its testimony in other matters, is manifestly so incon- 
sistent and ex parte as to be irrational; and to doubt its 
witness altogether is to nullify the very basis of knowledge, 
render all thought abortive, make all science impossible, and 
land us in the mist and bog of absolute agnosticism. Still 
more, it would be perilous to the well-being of individuals, 
society and government. 

A concrete example will show how vividly ethical reality 
impinges on human experience. The author of this book 
has made the following test a number of times with his 
classes in the college and seminary in which he is engaged 
as a teacher of ethics : Suppose a member of this class 
should commit a mental error during the session, and should 
also tell a wilful falsehood ; now suppose both lapses should 
be exposed before the entire class — in which case would he 
feel the greater shame and humiliation? Every time the 
answer was prompt and emphatic : In the case of the false- 
hood. Could a more convincing proof be given that ethical 
facts stand out in human consciousness with unique dis- 
tinctness and power? The ethical "problem" is a problem 
only to the man who has left the sphere of plain, every-day 
experience, and has lost himself in the mistland of meta- 
physical speculation. 

2. Its distinctive question: 

The distinctive question of Ethics is this : "Is it right ?" 
implying, of course, its obverse, "Is it wrong?" Whenever 
the student is in doubt as to whether a proposition belongs 
to the ethical sphere or not, let him test it with the simple 



26 A System of General Ethics 

question, "Is it right?" In that way much confusion will 
be avoided. 

To impress the matter, let us differentiate between the 
fundamental question of Psychology and Ethics. In the 
former the primary question is, "Is it mental ?" This ques- 
tion may be expanded thus : What is mind ? What is the 
relation of mind to matter, or of mind to the brain ? What 
are the various faculties or functioning powers of the mind ? 
Thus all propositions that belong to mentality per se belong 
to the science of Psychology. Now, while the ethical prin- 
ciple runs through all psychic acts and relations, its funda- 
mental question is different, for here we must put the in- 
terrogation, "Is it right?" before every proposition. Thus: 
Is it right to use the mind in this way or that? Is it right 
to cultivate and employ the Intellect, the Sensibilities and 
the Will in the way I am doing? Is it right to make con- 
science supreme in all mental functioning? What is the 
highest good to be attained by human culture? 

Compare the fundamental question of Philosophy with 
that of ethical science? In Philosophy the elemental ques- 
tion is, "Is it ultimate ?" This means, Is it the ultimate re- 
ality? What is the essence of things, their inner nature 
and composition, their ontology, their very being? What 
is matter? What is mind? What is God? What is the 
ultimate unifying principle of the universe? 8 True, Ethics 
is also concerned with ultimate questions, but only insofar 
as they bear upon moral reality. In its own right it enters 
the field of philosophical inquiry, not to solve all problems, 
but only its own special problem of the ultimate ground of 
right. In the philosophical province Ethics will consider 
such questions as these: What is the moral status of the 



8. Philosophy deals with experience as a whole (Cf. Jevons : 
'Philosophy: What is it?"). 



Introductory Data 27 

ultimate reality? Is it good or bad? Is the ultimate re- 
ality a moral personality or not? What is the law of right 
that holds its "categorical imperative" over the human con- 
science? Has the mind an innate moral constitution, and, 
if so, whence has it been derived ? Is the law of moral dis- 
tinctions based upon ultimate reality, or is it merely an il- 
lusory or arbitrary distinction? Thus Theoretical Ethics 
invades the sphere of Philosophy, but only to determine its 
own problem, that of moral reality. The ultimate question 
of Ethics is, therefore, sui generis. 

3. Its distinctive vocabulary: 

It is interesting to observe that our science has a nomen- 
clature all its own. The more advanced a people become, 
the larger and richer will be their ethical terminology. A 
good discipline for the student would be to make as long a 
list of ethical words as he can; then, if he were to think 
of eliminating them from the language, under the notion 
that they do not stand for realities, but only for illusions, 
he would see how sadly human speech would be impover- 
ished. Indeed, it would lose most of its dignity, distinction 
and worth. 

We shall note a few of the more important ethical words. 
There is the word "moral." What a clear-cut conception 
it at once conveys to the mind! We speak of moral prin- 
ciple, a moral cause, a moral reform, a moral man, and 
every person of ordinary intelligence intuitively grasps the 
peculiar idea conveyed by the term. 

Note the interesting differentiation to be made among 
words formed from the word "moral" by means of prefixes 
— "unmoral," "non-moral," "immoral." The first two mod- 
ify objects or principles that have no moral quality at all, 
while the last signifies something that is positively evil. 



28 A System of General Ethics 

You would say of a plant or an animal that it is unmoral 
or non-moral, but not that it is immoral. However, you 
would apply the word "immoral*' to a man of bad character 
and life. 

Again, the word "moral" is used in two different senses, 
a narrower and a wider; sometimes it means that which is 
good, as when we say a moral man or a moral cause; at 
other times it is used to designate the whole sphere of 
Ethics, as when, like the word "Ethics" itself, it includes a 
treatment of the wrong as well as the right. For instance, 
when we say, "Ethics is the science of morals or of moral- 
ity," the terms embrace both the right and the wrong. As 
a rule, we instinctively sense the correct meaning by the 
context in which the terms are used. 

The word "ought" is a most potent ethical word; one 
of the regal words of our language. It bears the scepter 
of the moral imperative over the human conscience. It is 
the word by which Immanuel Kant designated his well- 
known "categorical imperative," because, when the ought 
commands, it must be obeyed, or the offender must bear the 
condign punishment. If we know we ought to do a thing, 
that is, or at least should be, the end of all argument. A 
number of years ago an effective lecturer was wont to illus- 
trate the potency of the word "ought" in this way: Place 
the whole material world on one end of the scales, and the 
word "ought" on the other, and the word will outweigh the 
world ; again, place the whole material universe on one end 
of the balance, and the word "ought" on the other, and 
the mighty little word will tip the scales. This was simply 
a striking way of saying that the moral imperative out- 
weighs all other considerations. We may even speak with- 
out irreverence of what God ought to do. 

Observe the many ethical particles of every-day speech: 



Introductory Data 29 

"should," "would," "must," "will," "shall," "can," each of 
which conveys its peculiar shade of meaning in the ethical 
realm. The word "should" is only a milder term for 
"ought." Other distinctively ethical terms are: "right," 
"righteousness," "good," "rectitude," "virtue," "purity," 
"chastity," "holiness," "sanctity," "uprightness," "veracity," 
"probity," "honesty," "courage" (moral), "conscientious- 
ness;" and their antitheses: "wrong," "evil," "sin," "un- 
righteousness," "wickedness," "vileness," "cowardice," 
"obliquity," "meanness," "mendacity," "perfidy," "two- 
facedness," etc. Besides, all the words that involve the 
action of the will bear a moral significance, like "freedom," 
"liberty," "choice," "volition," "decision," "steadfastness," 
"determination," "firmness," and many more. Even their 
opposites, like "thralldom," "bondage," "indecision," "vac- 
illation," and the like, connote an abuse of man's moral 
powers, and therefore have their ethical implications. 

A good many words belong to the moral sphere or the 
non-moral, according to their use. When we speak of a 
good apple, we refer only to a material quality, and thus 
use the word in its non-moral sense ; but when we speak of 
a good man, we predicate a moral attribute, and use the 
word in a moral sense. 9 

In this connection the word "virtue" is an interesting one. 
Derived from the Latin vir, man, it originally meant manli- 
ness or masculinity. Today it has almost, if not quite, lost 



9. In dealing with the word "good" Herbert Spencer revealed his 
lack of clear ethical discernment; for he seems to think that, when 
we speak of a good or bad knife, gun or house, we mean the same 
thing as when we speak of a good or bad man ! This is an instance 
in which speculation dulled the native intuitions of a great man's 
mind. Had Mr. Spencer but remembered the simple fact that we 
use many words in different senses, according to the context and 
circumstances, he would have been saved confusion of thought. 
Hyslop (ut supra, pp. 94, 95) criticises Spencer acutely. 



30 A System of General Ethics 

that significance, for we may speak just as appropriately 
of a virtuous woman as of a virtuous man, although 
we would be repelled by the idea of a masculine woman. 
Masculinity is the glory of a man, while feminity is the 
crowning beauty of a woman. However, today the word 
"virtue" may properly be used in both a moral and a non- 
moral sense. We say of a medicine, "It has great virtue" 
— non-moral ; we say of a person, "He is a man of great 
virtue" — moral. The mind intuitively perceives the dis- 
tinction. 

Thus the distinctive ethical sphere has been vindicated ; 
Ethics deal with a distinct and outstanding body of facts in 
the world. It has a field that is all its own. 

IV. ETHICS AS A SCIENCE. 

1. It deals with observed facts. 

2. It assembles them into a system. 

3. It makes legitimate inductions from them. 

All these are marks of a science. This is a good defini- 
tion: "Science is classified and verifiable knowledge." And 
here we maintain, as has been said before, that the data of 
Ethics are just as clearly perceived, just as capable of intel- 
ligent investigation, just as outstanding and dominating in 
their influence and benefit (sometimes much more so), as 
are the data of botany, chemistry, biology, psychology or 
any other of the accepted sciences. 10 Indeed, when seri- 



10. Frank Thilly (''Introduction to Ethics," pp. 5, 6) : "It is a 
fact that men call certain characters and actions moral and im- 
moral, right and wrong, good and bad : that they approve of them 
and disapprove of them, express moral judgments upon them, eval- 
uate them. . . . Now this fact is as capable and as worthy of in- 
vestigation as any other fact in the universe, and we need a science 
that will subject it to careful analysis." Also page 9: 'That we 
place a value upon things, that we call them right or good, wrong 
or bad. is the important fact in Ethics; is what makes a science of 
Ethics possible." 



Introductory Data 31 

ously considered, its facts are of superlative importance; 
for no civilization, however advanced, can long endure un- 
less it is founded on sound ethical principles and practices. 
To add emphasis to this argument, we may well say that a 
man might be a great scholar along scientific lines, but if 
he were an immoral man, his scholastic attainments would 
not make him a good and useful citizen of the community 
or country. On the other hand, a man of little scholarship 
might be a most desirable and useful citizen, providing he 
had a noble and upright character. From these facts we 
see that Ethics not only has a right to rank among the sci- 
ences, but also is a science of signal importance to humanity. 

It is true that our science must sometimes deal with and 
reason from a priori principles ; but even so those prin- 
ciples are first based on the observed or empirical facts of 
nature and thought ; then, having first been established by 
the inductive method, which is the recognized scientific 
method of the day, we have a right to use them in the 
a priori or deductive way. For example, any theory that 
is diametrically opposed to the fundamental laws of thought 
cannot rightly be regarded as a true view. All the sciences 
employ this method, namely : By an induction from a large 
number of carefully observed facts, an hypothesis is de- 
rived ; then this hypothesis is applied to other phenomena, 
and if it adequately and logically accounts for them, it be- 
comes an established theory, a working basis. So in Gen- 
eral Ethics. 

Ethics is called a normative science, 11 in contrast with 
physical science, because it sets forth a standard, rule, or 
norm — that is, the ideal of moral good, by which all actual 
character and conduct are to be tested ; whereas the physi- 

11. Vide Mackenzie: "Manual of Ethics," pp. 4-8, 20-22; Mur- 
ray: "A Handbook of Christian Ethics," pp. 1-3. 



32 A System of General Ethics 

cal sciences are purely empirical — that is, they are con- 
cerned with things simply as they are, and not with things 
as they ought to be. However, it is not correct to say, as 
one author does, that "Ethics is the science of the ideal as 
contrasted with the actual." No; our science also deals 
with actual conditions, and examines, classifies and tries to 
account for them; at the same time it treats as well of 
what ought to be. To put it in an epigram, Ethics deals 
with both moral reality and moral ideality. Its purpose 
as an art is to bring the imperfect up to the ideal or perfect 
standard, but its business as a science is adequately to treat 
both the actual and the ideal in the sphere of morality. 

V. METHODOLOGY OF ETHICS. 

1. Definition: 

Methodology in general is the scientific method of classi- 
fying, co-ordinating and developing any science, either as a 
whole or in any of its branches. It is not often dealt with 
in a separate way, but its processes and results are em- 
ployed whenever an attempt is made to organize and un- 
fold a science. 

2. Application to Ethics: 

Every ethicist uses his own method. An interesting dis- 
cipline would be to study the contents of a number of good 
works on the subject, making a general outline of the 
method of classification and order employed by each author. 
It would be found that some authors deal so fundamentally, 
vitally and logically with their subject that their Method- 
ology is easily mastered and remembered, while others 
have thrown their material together in a more or less cha- 
otic manner, creating only confusion of mind. 

An attempt has been made in this work to be fundamen- 



Introductory Data 33 

tal, systematic, logical and progressive. Whether the effort 
has been successful or not, each reader must judge for him- 
self. Part I treats of the fundamental principles of Ethics, 
such as definitions, relations, the ultimate ground of right, 
the objective law of right, the origin and nature of wrong; 
while Part II seeks to apply these principles to the conduct 
of human life; the two Parts being related to each other 
as the tree to the fruit. An examination of the "general 
outline" and the "articulated outline" on preceding pages 
will indicate the main features to the student and show him 
how the details of the system are wrought out. We know 
of no other work on Ethics that is built up on this plan. 12 



12. We are glad to acknowledge that Dr. Milton Valentine's book, 
"Theoretical Ethics," has been of much suggestive value to us in 
working out our system. To our mind, he treats the ethical prin- 
ciples and data in as fundamental a way as any writer on ethical 
themes with whom we are acquainted. His discussion of what he 
calls the "Proximate Ground" and the "Ultimate Ground" of Right 
is capable and most satisfying. However, he begins with the fact 
of moral distinctions and works down to the foundation. Our 
method is to begin with the foundation, namely, the theistic view 
of the universe, and build thereon the superstructure of the system. 
Moreover, Dr. Valentine deals only with the theory of Ethics, 
whereas we believe a scientific system requires also the inclusion of 
the practical treatment of the subject. How to apply the theoretical 
principles of morality to every-day life is sometimes the most diffi- 
cult problem, and requires scientific, as well as practical, insight. 



CHAPTER II 



VI. HISTORICAL SKETCH. 

1. Moral intuitions. 

2. Hebrew Ethics. 

3. Heathen Ethics. 

4. Earliest scientific efforts. 

5. Later attempts. 

6. From the first to the seventeenth century. 

7. From the seventeenth century to date. 

VII. RELATION OF ETHICS TO OTHER SCIENCES. 

1. To Psychology. 

2. To Philosophy. 

3. To Natural Science. 

4. To Sociology. 

5. To Natural Theism. 

6. To Christian Theology and Ethics. 



VI. HISTORICAL SKETCH. 

1. Moral intuitions: 

Moral intuitions date from man's creation, being innate. 
Both history and reason prove this to be so. As far back 
as any historical records can be found, men were moral be- 
ings, however undeveloped. Reason and science also teach 
us that the moral could not have evolved from the non- 
moral merely by resident forces, for that would have vio- 
lated the principle of casuality, which teaches that no effect 
can be greater than its cause. Hence human morality both 
in character and conduct existed long before any science of 
Ethics was attempted. The same may be said of all the 
other sciences — for example, botany, astronomy, mathe- 
matics, psychology and theology. 

2. Hebrew Ethics: 

Among the Hebrews all men were considered capable of 
virtue, and a very high standard of morality was inculcated 



Introductory Data 35 

by their prophets, although the practice of the people fell 
far below it. If we accept the Old Testament as a record 
of veritable history, man was created a moral agent, able to 
discern between right and wrong and determine himself by 
the use of his will toward them, and was subjected to a 
moral test, which was placed before him in the form of 
"the tree of the knowledge of good and evil," of which he 
was forbidden to eat. Whether the narrative is actual his- 
tory or not, it is evident that the Hebrews believed that 
man was created a moral being, with the power of self- 
determination and choice, and that is surely the highest and 
noblest conception that the human mind has yet reached. 
To many profound minds the exalted character of this eth- 
ical conception is one of the convincing proofs that the 
Bible is a divinely inspired book. 1 The fact is also to be 
noted that there was a progressive development and reve- 
lation of ethical ideals in Hebrew history, culminating in 
the marvellous ethical teachings of Christianity. 

3. Heathen Ethics: 

Among the heathen peoples ethical ideals also prevailed, 
sometimes to a high degree with their leaders; but usually 
only a certain favored class were considered capable of 
virtue, while the rest were regarded as little better than 
animals, fitted only to be slaves. This exclusive, or, we 
might say, aristocratic, kind of ethics was taught even in 
Plato's work, "The Ideal Republic." 

4. Earliest scientific efforts: 

The first attempts at a scientific and philosophic treat- 
ment of morality were made by Socrates, Plato and Aris- 
totle. Earlier sporadic efforts were made by the Sophists, 



1. The author of this work accepts the view stated above. 



36 A System of General Ethics 

but the results were almost negligible, and left little perma- 
nent impress on human history. 

5. Later attempts. 

Later attempts at giving a philosophical and rational 
account of morality were made by the Epicureans (Hedon- 
ists) and Stoics. Among the Greeks we may mention Epi- 
curus and Zeno, and among the Romans, Seneca, Cicero, 
Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. 

6. From the first to the seventeenth centuries: 

From the establishment of Christianity to the seventeenth 
century, Ethics was usually included in Theology, and 
therefore was called Christian or Theological Ethics. 

7. From the seventeenth century to date: 

Since the beginning of the seventeenth century, Ethics 
has taken a prominent place among the so-called normative 
sciences, along with Logic, Esthetics, etc. Christian Ethics 
has become a separate science in distinction from Christian 
Dogmatics, because the moral data were apt to be slighted 
when they were treated in connection with doctrines. Great 
and noble systems of Natural or General Ethics, based 
merely on nature and reason, have been developed by many 
writers in these modern times. 2 

VII. RELATION OF ETHICS TO OTHER SCI- 
ENCES. 

All the sciences are inter-related. None of them can be 
isolated from the rest; they touch, overlap, integrate. It 
might be said that a close fellowship or fraternity exists 
among them. It is the business of science to distinguish 



2. For a number of the facts stated in our historical sketch we 
are indebted to Valentine's "Theoretical Ethics," pp. 17-20. 



Introductory Data 37 

them in thought, but not to separate them in fact and in 
practice. This will be seen as we proceed to show the re- 
lation of Ethics to some of its cognate sciences. 

1. To Psychology: 

In so far as Ethics deals with man's moral constitution 
(the rational intelligence, the conscience and the will), it 
necessarily invades the province of Psychology. Therefore 
it is important that the student of Ethics should have had 
some drill in this discipline ; for the conscience and the will 
and their functioning powers cannot well be understood 
without a knowledge of the whole congeries of mental fac- 
ulties and their inter-relations. However, the chief inter- 
est of Ethics is not in Psychology per se, nor in formulat- 
ing a system of mental science, but only in the moral func- 
tioning of the several faculties and their relation to the 
conscience and the will ; that is, Ethics studies the psychical 
faculties primarily with an ethical interest, and only inci- 
dentally with a psychical interest. In order that the student 
may have before him the position of the conscience and the 
will in the psychical scheme, we subjoin here an outline of 
the functioning powers of the human mind: 

OUTLINE OF THE HUMAN MIND 

(Showing the Psychology of Man's Ethical Nature). 

I. THE INTELLECT. 

1. The Sense: 

(1) Sight; (2) Hearing; (3) Touch; (4) Smell; 
(5) Taste. 

2. The Understanding: 

(1) Reflection. 

(2) Memory. 



38 A System of General Ethics 

(3) Imagination. 

(4) Scientific Faculty. 

(5) Logical Faculty. 

(6) Philosophical Faculty. 

3. The Intuition: 

(1) Cognition of outward reality. 

(2) Cognition of self: self-consciousness. 

(3) Cognition of time and space. 

(4) Cognition of cause and effect. 

(5) Cognition of axioms. 

(6) Cognition of truth and error. 

(7) Cognition of beauty and repulsiveness : Esthetic 

Faculty. 

(8) Cognition of Right and Wrong: Conscience as 

Perception. 

(9) Cognition of God: theistic intuition. 

II. THE SENSIBILITIES (Emotions, Feelings). 

1. The Sentient Emotions. 

2. The Psychical Emotions. 

3. The Intuitional Emotions. 

( 1 ) Aff ectional. 



the Moral Sense. 





(2) 


Esthetic. 






(3) 


Scientific and philosophical. 




(4) 


Ethical : Conscience 


as Feeling 




(5) 


Theistic. 




III. 


THE WILL. 




1 


. The 


i Will in Liberty: 





(1) The power of attention. 

(2) The power of choice. 

(3) The power of execution. 



Introductory Data 39 

2. The Will in Action: 

(1) Through the Sense. 

(2) Through the Understanding. 

(3) Through the Intuition. 

(4) In the Emotions. 

When we come subsequently to treat of man's moral con- 
stitution, we shall make use of the foregoing outline, and 
therefore it should be carefully studied. 

2. To Philosophy: 

Whenever Ethics seeks to find the ultimate ground and 
principle of right and the basis of moral law and the moral 
imperative in man, it enters the sphere of Philosophy, and 
deals with one of its outstanding problems. There is a 
Philosophy of Ethics, and there is an ethical Philosophy. 
The first part of this work must touch on the philosophical 
section of our theme. The difference between Philosophy 
and Theoretical Ethics is this: The former seeks to solve 
the ethical problem, that is, what the good is ; having done 
which, it passes on to the discussion of its other problems, 
the problem of being (Ontology), the problem of knowl- 
edge (Epistemology), etc. 3 On the other hand, Theoretic- 
al Ethics not only tries to solve the problem of right and 
wrong, but also endeavors to assemble and organize all the 
data of morality into a system, making it a science as well 
as a philosophy. For the above reasons the discipline of 
Philosophy is of great value to the student of Ethics; it 
affords him mental training, and also throws much light on 
the profounder problems of our science. 

3. To Natural Science: 

Scientific Ethics gladly accepts the established results of 
research in the realm of nature, which in many ways has 



3. Vide Hibben's "The Problems of Philosophy," which is a 
lucid work. 



40 A System of General Ethics 

proved helpful in solving the problems of Ethics. If our 
science did not willingly recognize truth wherever it finds 
it, it could not properly be called ethical, for one of the 
qualities of true morality is open-mindedness, receptivity 
to the truth. However, Ethics cannot accept mere un- 
proved speculations and theories in any realm of investi- 
gation. When Natural Science tries to account for "the 
data of Ethics" on purely naturalistic grounds, it leaves its 
specific field, that of the material world, and invades the 
realm of Ethics and Philosophy. The right to do this is 
not denied it; but in doing this, it should be thorough- 
going, and should take into account all the ethical phenom- 
ena, and not merely the physical conditions. It should be 
remembered, too, that the ethicist of today is in duty bound 
to deal with the modern scientific hypothesis of evolution. 

4. To Sociology: 

This is a very important practical science, which has also 
its profound elemental principles, and therefore has a phil- 
osophical foundation. What is its relation to Ethics? In 
all sociological problems the question of right and wrong 
should always be a fundamental consideration. Sociology, 
which deals with men in their relations with one another, 
should not become merely utilitarian and economic and ma- 
terialise; it should see to it that all social relations are 
based on the principles of righteousness. Therefore, 
Ethics and Sociology are closely bound together, and should 
walk amicably hand in hand. One study will complement 
the other. Sociology will broaden and deepen the ethical 
insight and interest, and will endeavor to make out a pro- 
gram of social welfare, while Ethics will keep social science 
loyal to the principles of righteousness, and will never allow 
it to wallow in the mire of mere expediency and utilitarian- 
ism. 



Introductory Data 41 

5. To Natural Theism: 

In so far as Ethics seeks for the ultimate ground of right 
in the being of God, it is a theistic science, and depends on 
the validity of the theistic arguments, and thus it is organ- 
ically related to Natural Theism. What is known in 
Theism as the Moral Argument is one of the outstanding 
proofs of the divine existence. 4 

6. To Christian Theology and Ethics: 

In a Christian land Natural Ethics cannot avoid contact 
with Christian teaching, which sheds a radiant light upon 
all the ethical problems. Indeed, it would be unethical as 
well as unscientific for Ethics to ignore the most outstand- 
ing and potent ethical phenomenon in the world, namely, 
Christianity. Thus, while the ethicist may try to work 
only in the light of nature and reason, he may be uncon- 
sciously influenced by the Christian revelation which shines 
all around him. It cannot be denied that the best and clear- 
est systems of Natural Ethics have been wrought out in 
times and countries that have been illumined by Biblical 
teaching. Christian Ethics is broader than Natural Ethics, 
because the former accepts all the light and data that may 
be derived from nature and reason, and then adds to it the 
clearer light that comes from divine revelation. The God 
of the Bible, according to its own teaching, is also the God 
who created the physical cosmos, made man to fit into it, 
and still continues to preserve and care for it. 



4. Readers who may wish to investigate the arguments for the 
divine existence are referred to such works as Flint's "Theism" and 
"Anti - Theistic Theories," Valentine's "Natural Theology," and 
Micou's "Basic Ideas in Religion." For a succint presentation of 
all these arguments the author would venture to call attention to 
his own work, entitled "A System of Natural Theism." 



DIVISION II 
THE GROUND OF RIGHT 



CHAPTER III 



I. 


DEFINITION. 


II. 


THE TRUE VIEW. 




1. Statement. 




2. Rationale and argument. 




3. The Highest Good (Summum Bonum) 




(1) What it is. 




(2) Other views. 



I. DEFINITION. 

By the Ground of Right we mean the ultimate source and 
origin of the Right; in other words, its eternal dwelling 
place. These are the fundamental problems that must be 
considered in this thesis: What is the ultimate source of 
moral good? Why is one thing right and another wrong? 
What is the raison d f etre of moral distinctions P 1 



1. We cannot agree with Dr. Hyslop ("The Elements of Ethics," 
p. 21) that all inquiries into the ultimate reality and nature of the 
ethical is to be relegated to Metaphysics. An ethical system that 
does not seek for a philosophical foundation surely cannot rightly 
be said to be adequate. Dr. Hyslop is inconsistent with himself, 
for he says in one place that such problems as the freedom of the 
will, etc., "must be deferred to Metaphysics ;" yet he devotes 73 
pages to a discussion of the freedom of the will ! Important as 
this thesis is, it is still more important to find the ultimate basis of 
right and wrong. 



The Ground of Right 43 

II. THE TRUE VIEW. 

1. Statement: 

THE ULTIMATE GROUND OF RIGHT IS GOD, THE 
ETERNAL, PERSONAL, SELF-EXISTENT AND ALL-PER- 
FECT CREATOR AND PRESERVER OF ALL FINITE 
BEING.2 

2. Rationale and argument: 

( 1 ) What is known as the Proximate Ground of Right, 3 
or the Moral Law, could not have originated, framed and 
authenticated itself. No other kind of law enacts and exe- 
cutes itself ; then why should the moral law be the sole ex- 
ception to the rule? To the fact that there is a moral law 
almost all nations and individuals bear witness, and they 
instinctively acknowledge its authority. Even those whose 
speculations have brought them mental confusion on this 
point still feel the moral imperative over them and within 
their consciences. The very fact that we have the term, 
"the moral law/' in common usage, recognized everywhere 
in society, proves that it must have objective reality, or else 
our noblest thoughts are only a snare and a delusion. 

Now, as has been said, a law connotes a lawgiver and an 
executor. A law does not belong to that class of realities 
that can originate and administer themselves, but that al- 
ways imply a personal power back of them. A law is sim- 
ply a mode of procedure, a modus operandi, not the power 
itself that operates in the prescribed way. Therefore we 
reason that the moral law must have back of it a personal 
source and administrant — that is, God. 



2. One of the ablest proponents of this view was Dr. Milton Val- 
entine ("Theoretical Ethics," pp. 138-181). His work is sound and 
stimulating. John Fiske ("Cosmic Philosophy," II, p. 470) says 
that Deity is "knowable as the eternal source of a Moral Law which 
is implicated with each action of our lives." 

3. Cf. Valentine, ut supra, pp. 168-178. 



44 A System of General Ethics 

(2) To stop in our quest for the ground of right before 
we get back to the Absolute Being, or God, is superficial. 
For example, to posit the source of good and right in man's 
subjective rational being as Aristotle did, does not satisfy 
the mind, because we intuitively ask, Whence came man's 
rational nature? To say that the ground of right is in the 
objective moral law is also unsatisfactory, because we can- 
not help asking, Who framed the moral law? The dec- 
laration that the good consists merely in a regime of utility 
simply raises the question, Why is the good beneficial and 
why is evil harmful? No; thought can and does go back 
of all these considerations ; it can and does go back at least 
as far as the theistic ground of right — that is, to the abso- 
lute and eternal Moral Personality. To stop our quest be- 
fore we go back as far as thought can go is to adopt a 
superficial hypothesis. 

(3) However, when thought has gone back to God, the 
Absolute Personality, it has reached its limit, its ultima 
thule; for if you try to think farther back than He, you 
lose yourself in an indefinite series of causes and effects 
hanging upon nothing and without an ultimate cause — a 
thought which is intolerable. To ask the question, "Who 
made God ?" is a contradiction, for God is Himself the eter- 
nal Substance and Being; and therefore if some other 
being made Him, He would not be God. We repeat, human 
thought can go back to God, but no further — at least, it can 
go no further and find a rational resting place. Therefore, 
when we say that God is the ultimate source of right, we 
have gone back as far as we can, and have grasped the pro- 
foundest view that is possible to human thought. All else 
is haziness and unreality. 

(4) Morality must have an eternal ground. If there 



The Ground of Rig Jit 45 

ever was a time when the moral was not, it never could 
have come into existence, for the moral never could have 
evolved from or been brought into being by the non-moral. 
That would be the case of an effect being greater than and 
different from its cause, which is absurd. Water cannot 
rise higher than its source by its own weight. But the only 
eternal being is God, as there can be only one eternal and 
absolute Being. 

(5) Morality can be predicated only of rational person- 
alities. You cannot properly attribute morality to mere 
things — to minerals, vegetables and animals. That being 
true, the ultimate ground of the moral must be a Person. 
This argument again leads us back to God. 

(6) Something exists now; therefore something must 
have always existed. If there ever was a time when there 
was nothing, nothing could have ever come into being. 
Ex nihilo nihil fit. But the cosmos, as we see it and study 
it, is found to be finite, contingent and dependent, and 
could not therefore be the ground and source of itself ; so 
it must have had an origin; therefore a Creator. 4 More- 
over, the cosmos is of such a character, especially in view 
of the moral personalities, namely, men, who inhabit it, as 
to indicate that its Creator must be a Moral Personality. 5 
Again the argument leads us back to God, who must be the 
ultimate source of all things, and therefore of the right and 
the good. The universe is a rational one; therefore it 
must have a rational basis ; but only a Rational Personality 
could be a rational basis. A Rational Personality must be 
a Moral Personality — God. 

(7) The moral must be grounded, not only in the will 



4. Cf. the author's "A System of Natural Theism," pp. 49-58. 

5. Same as 4, pp. 64-75. 



46 A System of General Ethics 

of God, but also in His very nature. He is holy in His 
essence, and has been so from eternity; for if He simply 
willed the right to be right, it would not be right per se and 
intrinsically, because then it would simply be His arbitrary 
choice. On the other hand, if He were not free to choose 
the right, He would not be a truly moral Being, for that 
which is determined by necessity cannot be considered 
moral. Morality can subsist only where there is freedom. 
Therefore God must will the right because it is right, and 
it must be right because He wills it. In the Absolute and 
Eternal Personality the ethically necessary and the ethically 
free must subsist in perfect harmony. This is a high and 
noble conception, and difficult to hold clearly in thought, 
but it must be grasped in its depth, reality and beauty, or 
the elemental ethical problem must be given up by the stu- 
dent; he can nowhere find the ultimate source of the good. 
Men who are accustomed to think only in terms of mater- 
ialism and worldly utilitarianism will not perhaps be able 
to lift their minds to this ideal ; hence they must be content 
either with no solution of the ethical problem, or with only 
a superficial one. That which is eternal must be self- 
existent and perfect; it cannot be conceived of as becom- 
ing, unfolding or evolving; only that which is finite, only 
that which had a beginning in time, can be thought of as 
developing. Therefore we maintain that God must have 
been from eternity what He is now; else He never could 
have become what He is now. If there ever was a time 
when He was not holy, He never could have become holy; 
if there ever was a time when He was not free, He never 
could have become free. God cannot evolve. Only what 
is created in time and space can be evolved. Our thesis, 
therefore, is established, that in God's being the ethically 



The Ground of Right 47 

necessary and the ethically free have subsisted from eter- 
nity in perfect harmony, in absolute correlation. 6 

(8) We are now ready to consider the question, What 
is the basis of moral distinctions? In other words, why is 
one thing right and another wrong? Answer: A thing 
is right when it is in conformity with the holy nature and 
will of God. WTien it is contrary to God's nature and will, 
it is wrong. The student should always put it fully — "the 
holy nature and will of God;" for, as was shown in the 
preceding section, God is not good merely by arbitrary 
choice, but is eternally good in His very essence; He is 
also eternally free to choose the good of His own being and 
to create finite beings who bear His own image. 7 With 
this foundation laid, our next theme will not be as difficult 
to treat as many ethical writers have supposed. 

3. The Highest Good: 

(1) What it is: 

What is the Highest Good? That was the perplexing 



6. We venture to think that Muirhead ("The Elements of Eth- 
ics," pp. 24, 25) falls into error in rejecting the theistic ground of 
moral distinctions. He mentions only the divine will as the source 
of right, and from that view-point argues that the doctrine is inade- 
puate. But he stops too soon. The ethical is also grounded in the 
very nature of the Supreme Being, as well as in His will. After- 
ward Dr. Muirhead indicates that the immoral is that which "is in- 
consistent with that system of mutual relations which we call social 
life." Surely that is stopping before the root of the matter is 
reached. What is the ground and source of that "system of mutual 
relations"? Did it come about by pure chance? Is the ethical, 
then, a mere happen-so in the world? No; so great and exalted a 
reality as moral excellence must go back to the Ultimate Source of 
all things ; and that Source must be personal in order to be moral. 

7. Here we must also dissent from Dr. Noah K. Davis ("Ele- 
ments of Ethics," pp. 203-205, with footnotes), who, though much 
profounder than Dr. Muirhead, makes the nature of God alone the 
original ground of moral obligation, without including the divine 
will. For reasons given in the text, we hold that we must say both 
the nature and will of God constitute the ultimate source of right. 



48 A System of General Ethics 

problem for all the Greek and Roman philosophers, espe- 
cially those who were earnest in their thinking and re- 
searches. Among the Greeks it was known as to ctyaOov, 
and among the Romans as Summum Bonum. In the 
light of the preceding discussion, we are justified in 
asserting that, in human thought or conception, the High- 
est Good is God Himself, for He is the Good One from 
eternity and the source of all created goodness. And this 
leads us to ask, What is the Highest Good for man's attain- 
ment ? And the answer must be, it is likeness to God. To 
become more and more like the good and holy God is the 
chief ethical privilege and task of human life. To put it 
more concretely, man's chief duty is to incarnate and culti- 
vate all those moral excellencies which he finds existing in 
ideal form in the character of God. At this point it is 
legitimate to quote from the world's greatest ethical 
Teacher : "Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father in 
heaven is perfect." 8 God is the perfect Prototype ; we are 
to be conformed to His character. No higher good than 
this can be conceived by the human mind. 

(2) Other views: 

Although the problem of the Highest Good is bound up 
in every system of Ethics, and will be considered among 
other problems in the next subdivision, yet so important a 
theme should have some attention at this point. We will 
therefore give the gist of Dr. Noah K. Davis' admirable 
treatment of this topic. 9 

The Hedonists made the passing pleasure of the moment 
the chief end of life; the Epicureans, the maximum pleas- 
ure throughout life; Plato, the greatest possible likeness 



8. Matt. 5:48. 

9. "Elements of Ethics," pp. 192-196. 



The Ground of Right 49 

to God; Aristotle, happiness, based on rational or virtuous 
activity (not very definite) ; the Utilitarians, pleasure or 
profit, "variously and hazily defined;" the Evolutionists, 
especially Spencer, the securing of pleasure and the avoid- 
ance of pain; Wundt, "the continuous improvement of 
mankind;" the Kantian Intuitionalists, "obedience, pure 
and simple, to the objective moral law;" the Perfectionists, 
"excellence of moral character . . . attained by the active 
exercise of the intellect and sensitive nature under the pres- 
idency of reason." Dr. Davis hirrlself defines the Highest 
Good as "the harmonious and complete development of 
man" in his own personality and in loving service. 

All this is edifying ; but, somehow, most of these theories 
fail to go to the root of the matter ; they lack a true ethical 
and philosophical foundation. We believe that to make 
likeness to God the Highest Good will meet the whole situ- 
ation and afford the highest incentive to virtue. If there 
is no good and holy God, morality has no sure and satisfac- 
tory basis ; if there is such a God, He must be the ground 
and source of the good. Therefore, the attainment of like- 
ness to God will include every good that can be conceived 
of — loving and ethical fellowship with Him, pure service 
of Him, the highest development of individual character, 
pure and unselfish treatment of all our fellow-beings and 
of the natural cosmos, and all the blessedness and joy re- 
sulting from such moral achievance. True science de- 
mands that the Summum Bonum shall be all-inclusive; 
shall be, indeed and in truth, the Highest Good. 



CHAPTER IV 



III. VARIOUS THEORIES EXAMINED AND ANALYZED. 

1. The Sophists. 

2. Socrates. 

3. Plato. 

4. Aristotle. 

5. Hedonism. 

6. Stoicism. 

7. Divine Absolutism. 

8. Civil Authority. 

9. Altruism. 

10. Utilitarianism. 

11. Naturalistic Evolution. 

12. Theistic Evolution. 



III. VARIOUS THEORIES EXAMINED AND AN- 
ALYZED. 
1. The Sophists: 

(1) Statement: 

The Sophists flourished during the fifth century B. C, 
at the time of the rise of democracy in Greece. They 
were probably the first to give serious attention to the basis 
of morality. It is somewhat difficult to define the under- 
lying and unifying principle in their moral speculations, 
because they differed so widely in their views. However, 
their chief question was, "If there is a permanent element 
(phusis) in morality, what is it?" Hippias held that there 
are "underlying principles of justice which are everywhere 
tacitly acknowledged, and which are the spontaneous dic- 
tates of human nature" (De Laguna, ut supra, page 108) j 1 



1. A scholarly survey and exposition of the various ethical the- 
ories, from the Sophists to the Modern Schools, is found in De 
Laguna's "Introduction to the Science of Ethics," Part II. Al- 
though we have not found it convenient to follow his classification, 
we call the reader's attention to his valuable work. He classifies the 



The Ground of Right 51 

but he did not make clear what this natural standard was. 
Protagoras maintained that the personal element in mor- 
ality was the moral feelings of shame and justice, which 
are not innate, but are passed from generation to genera- 
tion by tradition and education. This position was rejected 
by the skeptical Sophist, Thrasymachus, who held that "the 
interest of the stronger" is the only element that perdures 
— a kind of "might-makes-right" theory. 

(2) Criticism: 

It will be seen that these views are wavering, vague and 
superficial ; they fail to define the ultimate ground of right, 
to mark clearly and positively the objective moral law, to 
appreciate righteousness for its own sake, and to assert the 
supremacy of conscience. 

2. Socrates. 

(1) Statement: 

In this great philosopher the moral consciousness of the 
Greeks rose to a fair degree of distinctness, and some at- 
tempt was made by him to give a rational account of moral 
phenomena in his philosophy. Dr. Harris E. Kirk (in 
"The Religion of Power") calls Socrates "the first ethical 
thinker among the Greeks." With him the ethical was 



Greek schools as follows : Hedonism, Energism and Rigorism. The 
theories of the first school are sufficiently explained in the text. To 
our mind, De Laguna does not make the distinction between the 
other two schools very clear. They might, we think, be differenti- 
ated in this way: The Energists, as their name would imply, put 
the stress on moral endeavor, true self-realization and the attain- 
ment of the Highest Good, without despising pleasure as a legiti- 
mate result. Plato, Aristotle and their followers were Energists. 
The Rigorists laid more emphasis on sternness, austerity and self- 
denial in order to achieve virtue, and would not permit the desire 
for pleasure in the least to color their motives. Thus their views 
tended toward asceticism. They were the Greek Puritans. The 
Cynics and Stoics were the Rigorists. Antisthenes and Diogenes 
were Cynics, and Zeno was the founder of Stoicism. 



52 A System of General Ethics 

grounded in knowledge. Ignorance is the source of all 
vice. Teach men, enlighten them with rational knowledge, 
and they will be virtuous ipso facto. "A contradiction be- 
tween knowledge and volition is inconceivable," he declared. 
Again he said, "No man errs of his own free will." The 
central principle of his teaching is that "all virtue is knowl- 
edge" (De Laguna). "His remedy for evil is a sort of 
moral intellectualism" (Kirk). True, he tried to distin- 
guish between "knowledge" and "opinion," but his argu- 
ment was not convincing. 

(2) Criticism: 

To identify knowledge and morality, or to make the 
former the sole basis of the latter, is manifestly wrong, for 
experience teaches that mere intellectual culture is not suf- 
ficient to insure a truly ethical life. Most men have a good 
deal more ethical knowledge than they apply and practice. 
The fact is, all of us, it may be said, "know better than we 
do." Some of the greatest rascals in the world are edu- 
cated people; in fact, they use their superior knowledge to 
exploit their less educated fellowment. Said a great ethical 
teacher: "If ye know these things, happy are ye if ye do 
them" (John 13: 17), clearly implying that there may be a 
schism between knowing and doing. Ovid conceded: "I 
see the good and approve it, but deliberately practice the 
wrong." Even Aristotle cirticised Socrates for teaching 
as if "weakness of the will did not exist." As a modern 
writer says, Socrates did not have "a clear conception of 
human perversity" and was "ignorant of the power of a 
lawless will." 

Another defect of the Socratean ethics was that, while 
he recognized the Supreme Being more or less clearly, he 
never seemed to trace righteousness and moral law back to 



The Ground of Right 53 

Him as the source and foundation of all good. Nor did he 
make any clear and positive declarations respecting the 
authority of conscience. 
3. Plato. 

(1) Statement: 

The substance of Plato's philosophy, 2 including his eth- 
ical teaching, was this : The cosmos is the expression of 
the divine ideas ; to realize these divine ideas is the highest 
good to be attained by man. Therefore his system is seen 
to be theistic, and therefore is profoundly based philosoph- 
ically. He gave to the world the famous fourfold classifi- 
cation of the virtues, namely, wisdom, courage, temperance 
and justice. His Ideal Republic represents his highest con- 
ception of ethical principles applied to the practical affairs 
of life. 

(2) Criticisms: 

Though he held to the theistic view of the world, his phi- 
losophy was fundamentally defective in that he regarded 
matter as eternal and evil; therefore as eternally opposed 
to God, or at least as an irreducible burden on his hands. 
Matter cannot be eternal (see any standard work on The- 
ism), because there cannot be two Eternals, two Infinites, 
two Absolutes. Moreover, to make matter the source of 
moral evil is superficial, for moral evil cannot inhere in 
mere impersonal substance, but can be predicated only of 
personal and rational beings. 

In his "Republic" Plato made the State sovereign, con- 
tending that only as a citizen was the individual capable of 
realizing true morality. Even then only the intellectual 
and aristocratic classes, the elite, were capable of virtue, 



2. Plato was the founder of "The Academy," which was the 
name of the grove near Athens where he held his conferences. 



54 A System of General Ethics 

while the rest were little better than chattel, doomed to ser- 
vitude and slavery. This was a serious defect in Plato's 
scheme of practical ethics. 

His classification of the virtues (see above) was also 
lacking in scientific precision and completeness. Not all 
the virtues can be listed under these four heads without 
straining the meaning of the terms. Love is a cardinal 
virtue, indeed, the greatest of the virtues, but it seems to 
find no place in Plato's system. 

4. Aristotle. 

(1) Statement: 

This great philosopher 3 found the source and norm of 
moral ideas in the rational spirit of man. Hence the high- 
est good with him was to think and live in conformity with 
the rational constitution with which man has been endowed. 
He believed in God, but held that He was not the Creator, 
but only the Framer, Mover and Orderer of the cosmos ; 
hence he believed that matter was eternal; but, differing 
from Plato, he did not teach that God and matter were 
antagonistic. Moral evil did not inhere in matter. It came 
from man's irrationality. He and his school taught that 
the best life is that which pursues the via media (the medi- 
um way), avoiding all extremes. 

(2) Criticisms: 

Aristotle's idea of the good was not fundamental enough. 
He posited it in the rational constitution of man, but failed 
to show whence man derived such rationality ; therefore he 



3. Aristotle was a member of "The Academy" until sometime 
after Plato's death, when he partially severed his connection with 
that school and founded a rival school known as "The Lyceum." 
He is also known as the founder of the "Peripatetic" school, the 
word meaning "walking about." 



The Ground of Right 55 

did not trace back to the ultimate ground of right, which, 
as we have shown, is the good and holy God. 

His conception of the eternity of matter, even though it 
was not regarded as the source of evil, was unphilosophical ; 
for there cannot be two Eternals lying side by side. Be- 
sides, if matter were eternal, God could not be the complete 
sovereign, and therefore matter would, after all, be an 
eternal obstacle to His will and power. 

Although less idealistic and more practical than Plato, 
his view of the State really amounted to civil absolutism. 
Man was made for the State rather than the State for man. 
This is not the true ethical conception of man's relation to 
social and civic institutions. The State exists only for the 
individual and collective welfare of its citizens. It is a 
means, not an end. 

5. Hedonism. 

(1) Statement: 

Hedonism (from nbuc;, sweet, pleasant) might be called 
the pleasure theory of life. The Highest Good consists 
in securing pleasure and avoiding pain. "What makes 
the happy life worth living is the pleasure in it." 4 

Some of the Hedonists were crass in their ideas of pleas- 
ure, caring only for the delights' of the passing moment, 
whatever they might be; but many of them distinguished 
between pleasures of a higher and a lower quality. They 
placed social and intellectual pleasures above the indulgence 
of the physical appetites and passions. 

The chief proponents of Hedonism were Aristippus, Ep- 
icurus, and Plato in his earlier years. This ancient theory 
of moral values has been variously classified by different 
writers on Ethics. One method is to call all of them Epi- 



4. De Laguna, ibid, p. 124, interpreting Aristippus. 



56 A System of General Ethics 

cureans (from the main advocate of the theory, Epicurus), 
who are subdivided into Hedonists, those advocating the 
coarse pleasures, and Eudemonists (from eu and bcuucov, 
a good or happy genius), those who make a qualitive 
distinction in pleasures, and teach that the higher ones 
should be pursued. The school established by Aris- 
tippus, of Cyrene, Africa, were called Cyrenaics. The 
latest mode of classification seems to be to include all these 
schools under the one head of Hedonists. 

(2) Criticisms: 

To make pleasure or happiness, whether of a high or low 
quality, the Highest Good is fundamentally wrong; it low- 
ers the standard of morality by making the motive calculat- 
ing, and hence mercenary and selfish. Moral excellence 
itself should be the chief end of life, whether it brings joy 
or sorrow. In the present world we know that good must 
often be purchased at the cost of enjoyment, and sometimes 
even at the price of pain. This proves, ipso facto, that the 
right is above the pleasure-giving, and not per se identical 
with it, and is therefore to be sought in its own behalf. 
"Virtue for virtue's own sake" (the motto of the Stoics) 
is a much higher and purer standard than "virtue for the 
sake of the pleasure it brings." We intuitively sanction 
the adage, "We should do right, though the heavens fall." 
Goodness, even more than beauty, "is its own excuse for 
being." 

The Hedonistic theory reverses the true order; it puts 
pleasure first, whereas moral excellence should have the 
the primacy. Happiness often is, and may ultimately be, 
the result of righteousness, but righteousness can never be 
the result of the mere seeking of happiness. That in the 
final issue, granting that man is immortal, virtue and happi- 



The Ground of Right 57 

ness will dwell together in perfect accord, is simply the re- 
sult of the divinely ordained moral order of the cosmos. 
God did not make a moral chaos, but a moral cosmos, and 
hence one of the blessed consequences of virtue will be 
true joy forever. However, the purity of heaven is not the 
result of its joy, but its joy is the result of its purity. 

The very fact that the Hedonists — at least the best of 
them — made a qualitative difference among the various 
pleasures, calling some higher and some lower in the scale, 
proves that they were not consistent in making pleasure the 
real norm of the Highest Good ; for if some pleasures are 
of a nobler quality than others, then moral quality must be 
the standard, after all, by which the pleasures themselves 
are judged. 

It goes almost without saying, that the Hedonists, not 
recognizing any real moral standard, did not seek for the 
ultimate ground of right ; indeed, they did not even go back 
to find the source and rationale of the enjoyment they mis- 
took for the Highest Good in life. Hence it was a shallow 
as well as a sordid view. It reduced ethics to mere expedi- 
ency. 

6. Stoicism. 

(1) Statement: . 

In Stoicism 5 the Greeks and Romans attained to their 
highest ethical ideals. This theory was the very opposite 
of Hedonism. They were, in fact, opposing schools. Its 
chief advocates were Antisthenes and Zeno among the 
Greeks, and Seneca, Cicero, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius 
among the Romans. Today we often associate Stoicism 
with stolidity, but the two terms are not synonymous when 
the former is used in its scientific sense. 



5. The Cynics (not mentioned in the text, but in footnote 1 above) 
might be called an extreme wing of the Stoical School. 



58 A System of General Ethics 

The maxim of Stoicism was, "Virtue for virtue's sake." 
It made virtuous character and conduct the Highest Good, 
the best achievement, which is to be sought, if need be, at 
the sacrifice of pleasure. Indeed, the Stoics were out- 
spoken opponents of the Epicurean theories, maintaining 
that they were wrong and debasing. Said the Stoics, " Sor- 
row, if it lies in the pathway of duty and rectitude, is to be 
borne with heroic and uncomplaining fortitude." This, it 
must be admitted, is a noble conception. No doubt there 
are people today who try to live by this standard, without 
troubling themselves to think any more profoundly about 
the chief ethical problem. However, in the light of the 
ethical conceptions of today, Stoicism had its defects, which 
must now be pointed out. 

(2) Criticisms: 

Stoicism did not really find, or perhaps did not seek to 
find, the ultimate ethical ground, but simply accepted virtue 
in a general way as the normal order of the rational life. 
It failed to push its quest back to the Absolute Personality, 
who is the eternal source of the Good. In this respect it, 
too, may be said to have been superficial. 

It did not seek with sufficient thoroughness to correlate 
true morality and true happiness. In fact, it made too wide 
a chasm between them. In its opposition to Hedonism, it 
became partisan and ultra, and even taught that men should 
despise pleasure; all desire for pleasure, it held, was in- 
nately selfish, and therefore immoral. Hence it is easy to 
see how this philosohy would degenerate into stoicism in 
the popular sense of the term, that is, into mere stolid en- 
durance, and even contempt of happiness, and accept as its 
motto, "Whatever cannot be avoided must be endured." 
For this reason it easily led to gloom, asceticism, and finally 



The Ground of Right 59 

to pessimism and cynicism. Thus it was cold and stern — 
a system of "rigorism" — lacking the warmth, joy and ex- 
hilaration of the true conception of virtue. The Stoic says, 
"We bear trial because we must." The true ethicist says, 
"We bear trial because all things work together for the 
highest well-being of those who love and follow the good." 
No one should contemn true pleasure, or make a virtue of 
misery. There is no merit in making oneself unhappy 
merely for the sake of being unhappy. Pain should never 
be sought; but when it comes unavoidably in the pathway 
of rectitude, it should be borne without repining, and its re- 
fining and disciplinary purpose should be gladly accepted. 6 
7. Divine Absolutism. 

(1) Statement: 

This theory grounds the ethical entirely in the will of 
God. The Good is good simply because God wills it. It 
is not inherently and eternally good in its character — per se. 
No reason for God's willing one thing to be good and 
another evil is to be sought. This was the view of the 
Scotists (the school of Duns Scotus) in the Middle Ages. 
With it agrees the Mohammedan conception of ,God, which 
regards Him merely as an arbitrary Sovereign, who knows 
no other rule than His own almighty will. 

(2) Criticism: 

We have already dealt with this view — see Chapter III, 
Section II, 2 (7). It needs only to be said here that God 
does not arbitrarily elect what is good and what is evil. 
He is holy and righteous in His very nature, including His 
will, and so He wills freely what is in harmony with His 
moral and spiritual essence. 



6. For an admirable critique on Greek and Roman ethics see 
Harris E. Kirk, "The Religion of Power," pp. 81-143. 



60 A System of General Ethics 

8. Civil Authority. 

(1) Statement: 

This is the theory that the civil authority, or the author- 
ity of the State, is the only standard of ethical conduct. It 
was advocated in modern times by Thomas Hobbes. Dr. 
Valentine thus defines this view : "Duty rested on the legal 
statute, whose direction was final. It knew no higher law/' 

(2) Criticism: 

That men should be law-abiding and patriotic is to be 
taken for granted in Ethics. Christ, the great ethical 
Teacher, said: "Render unto Caesar the things that are 
Caesar's." One of the apostles wrote: "Be subject to the 
powers that be." Under most circumstances citizens should 
not raise insurrections and stir revolutions. "Liberty reg- 
ulated by law," is a great and necessary motto for citizen- 
ship. 

However, devotion to one's country and the civil law 
should not be blind, any more than devotion to one's 
Church. No citizen can make the laws of his country the 
final arbiter in all questions of moral obligation, and that 
for the simple reason that all human enactments are fallible, 
and therefore may be wrong. Even the Church, though 
professing to be guided by the divine Word, has more than 
once committed error. 

So, in the history of the world, the civil authority has 
more than once commanded men to do things that were 
contrary, not only to their consciences, but also to the abso- 
lute law of righteousness. In such cases the higher ethical 
law should be obeyed. Here the saying of the apostles of 
Christ should prevail : "We ought to obey God rather than 
men." Thus we may lay down the rule: Wherever the 
civil law is in agreement with the law of right, it should be 



The Ground of Right 61 

gladly and heartily obeyed; in cases of mere human wis- 
dom and judgment, it is more likely that the civil statutes, 
being the corporate verdict, will be right than the opinion 
of the individual citizen ; in cases of doubt, the citizen 
should give the government the benefit of the doubt; only 
in those cases in which the commands of the State are arbi- 
trary and in evident violation of the law of right, should 
the citizen say, "My conscience will not permit me to obey." 
In this connection we quote with approval Dr. Valentine's 
trenchant criticism on Hobbes' theory of Civil Authority: 
"The theory was a repetition of the travesty of Ethics in 
Plato's 'Republic' It has no following, and needs no con- 
futation." 

9. Altruism. 

(1) Statement: 

Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) was one of the earliest 
advocates of thorough-going Altruism 7 (from the Latin, 
alter, other). It might be defined as "Otherism" — that is, 
the pure seeking of the good of others without any thought 
of oneself. When it is used in the popular sense, that is, 
as opposed to egotism and selfishness, as it usually is, it is 
a noble view, and altogether to be commended; but as a 
scientific theory, and used in the absolute sense, it is right- 
fully subject to the following: 

(2) Criticisms: 

First: It is refined and impossible idealism in the realm 
of Ethics ; if it were carried out universally, no one would 
ever think of himself at all, but would be thinking solely of 
others — a regime under which society could not exist. 

Second : If this theory were to be practiced in the abso- 



7. Cf. Valentine, "Theoretical Ethics," p. 154. 



62 A System of General Ethics 

lute sense by a part of the community, it would encourage 
selfishness and dependence in the rest, who would impose 
on the philanthropy of their indiscriminate helpers. Char- 
ity workers find that they must constantly guard against 
such imposition. It is wrong, of course, to refuse help to 
the deserving poor; it is also wrong, and positively harm- 
ful to society, to pauperize people by injudicious benefac- 
tions. This matter of helping others so as to do them the 
greatest amount of good is a fine art. Sometimes it is bet- 
ter charity to give an able-bodied man work than money. 
Third: Positively stated, we believe that the Scriptural 
rule is the most rational, because it is in accord with the 
constitution of man : "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thy- 
self." This rule does not preclude self-love and self- 
regard, which would be impossible, but makes it the norm 
of our love for others; and this, we believe, is as sane a 
rule as can be laid down. It properly safeguards each 
man's selfhood, and at the same time prevents selfishness. 
The Golden Rule is also a fundamental law of social Ethics : 
"Do unto others as ye would that others should do unto 
you." The apostle Paul strikes a fine ethical balance in 
Galatians VI, where in the first verse he enjoins, "Bear ye 
one another's burdens," and then says in the sixth verse: 
"Every man shall bear his own burden." This is right and 
practical. It is not Utopian and flighty. All men should 
be helpful to all others ; yet there is always a point where 
each man must bear his own burden of responsibiity ; 
where he must act for himself, and where another cannot 
act for him. Here, surely, we have true Egoism and true 
Altruism in their reciprocal and properly balanced rela- 
tions. The very fact that we should have so high a regard 
for other men's personalities proves that we should also 



The Ground of Right 63 

make the proper appraisement of our own personality. If 
other people are of paramount importance, why are not you 
and I as well? 

10. Utilitarianism. 

(1) Statement: 

As the term implies, Utilitarianism in Ethics is the theory 
that the Highest Good is simply and solely the useful, the 
beneficial; therefore, there is no absolute law of right, no 
right per se, and no wrong per se, nor is right to be sought 
and practiced for its own sake. If conduct is beneficial — 
that is the token by which it is known to be right; if it is 
not beneficial, it is wrong. This view is often called "the 
goods theory," because it is always on the alert for some 
good — for some advantage. "What benefit will it be to 
me?" is its primary inquiry. In modern phrase, it is Prag- 
matism in the sphere of Ethics. 

(2) Criticism: 

a. It is superficial; it does not seek or find the ultimate 
ground of right, but is indifferent to it. It does not even 
push back its inquiry far enough to ask why some things 
make for human weal and others for human woe. The 
theory is so shallow as almost to deserve to be called frivo- 
lous. 

b. This theory does not agree with the testimony of con- 
science, which feels the sense of obligation to do the right 
for its own sake and to avoid the wrong because it is 
wrong, apart from the question of mere utility or non- 
utility. Let any person ask himself the two questions re- 
specting a proposed action, "Is it right?" and, "Is it use- 
ful?" and see whether he does not instinctively make a 
sharp distinction between them. Morality and usefulness 



64 A System of General Ethics 

may frequently go together, and in an ideal state they al- 
ways would, but the two ideas are not to be identified. The 
truly enlightened conscience first asks, "Is it right?" and 
then, if it raises the question of utility at all, it makes it 
subordinate. The very fact that the truly ethical man de- 
clares unequivocally, "I will do right, whether my act is 
useful to me or not," proves that he does not identify or 
confuse the issue between righteousness and utility. 

c. Utilitarianism reverses the relative positions of the 
right and the useful; it puts "the cart before the horse;" 
it subverts the law of cause and effect. Ultimately, no 
doubt, the right will be found to be the most useful; but 
even then the proper distinction will be this: A thing is 
useful because it is right, and not, A thing is right because 
it is useful. Its being right is the cause of its being use- 
ful, not the contrary, as the Utilitarians teach. 

d. If utility is the final norm in Ethics, why does the 
universal consciousness of mankind agree in calling certain 
kinds of states and actions right and others wrong ? Why 
use the words "right" and "wrong" at all, if the real truth 
is only that some actions are useful and others harmful? 
How did the human mind ever get the ideas of right and 
wrong, if they do not stand for realities ? Could the ethical 
have evolved, by means of resident forces, from the non- 
ethical? That would be making the effect greater and 
nobler than its cause, which is not only unscientific; it is 
absurd. The very nomenclature used intuitively by the 
human family affords prima facie proof of the reality of 
the objective law of right. It is most significant that al- 
most all men place the moral imperative in the imperial 
position, far above the question of mere utility. Only a 



The Ground of Right 65 

few men, namely, such as have lost themselves in misty 
speculations, confuse the ideas of morality and utility. 

e. Practically considered, the fatal defect of all utilitar- 
ian schemes is this : They are subversive of disinterested 
motives; they are based on the principles of selfishness, 
which is an immoral motive power. A man who will al- 
ways stop to count the advantage that will accrue to him- 
self when he comes face to face with a question of right or 
wrong, will act immorally, whatever course he may pursue. 
True, on account of the sinfulness of the human heart, it 
is difficult for any man to be absolutely single in motive; 
but that is no reason why we should not hold up the ethical 
ideal, and especially no reason for dragging down the noble 
science of Ethics into the mire and mud of selfishness. A 
so-called system of Ethics that is based on calculating, mer- 
cenary and sordid motives is unethical by that very token, 
and is therefore a contradiction of terms. 

11. Opportunism. 

(1) Statement: 

This is a term that is now considerably in vogue, although 
it is not treated in any system of Ethics so far as we are 
aware. It is defined as follows by Webster ("New Inter- 
national Dictionary," latest edition) : "Art, policy or prac- 
tice of taking advantage, as in politics, of opportunities or 
circumstances; or, often, of seeking immediate advantage 
with little regard for principles or ultimate consequences." 

(2) Criticism: 

In the good sense, it is to be commended ; men should al- 
ways be alert to use every opportunity to advance a right- 
eous cause in righteous ways ; but in the bad sense (the sec- 
ond definition given above), it must be condemned. Moral 



66 A System of General Ethics 

principles are eternal, and never should be sacrificed to gain 
a temporary advantage, as has been said in previous sec- 
tions of this book. At heart Opportunism is Hedonistic 
and Utilitarian. 

12. Naturalistic Evolution. 

(1) Statement: 

Naturalistic evolution is atheistic; it denies the existence 
of God, teaches that the material cosmos has always existed, 
and that its present status is the result of development by 
the operation of purely natural forces. This theory, in 
connection with Agnosticism, has given rise to a utilitarian 
scheme of morals, its best known exponent having been 
Herbert Spencer, who developed his view in his well-known 
work, "The Data of Ethics." It may be summed up as 
follows : 

In the evolution of the human race, it was found that 
some kinds of actions were beneficial to society ; others det- 
rimental. To illustrate, experience early proved that hon- 
esty promoted social order and happiness, while dishonesty 
was divisive and harmful. Veracity, chastity, etc., made 
for social welfare, while theft, lying, sensuality, etc., in- 
jured the social structure. By degrees mankind learned to 
call those actions that made for individual and social bet- 
terment right, and those that resulted balefully they called 
wrong. Thus the right is not something that is right per 
se, but only another name for the useful, the expedient, the 
desirable. 

(2) Criticism: 

Since this is a purely utilitarian scheme, the arguments 
set forth in the preceding section should be considered here. 
It should be remembered that all these theories obliterate 
the distinction between the merely useful and the morally 



The Ground of Right 67 

excellent; therefore they destroy the real moral basis and 
standard. Let us pause to ask only one pertinent question 
at this point: Why did the whole human family agree to 
call those actions right and moral that helped to preserve 
human society, instead of calling them mere useful or bene- 
ficial? That was surely adding confusion of thought, for 
it introduced a wholly unique conception. We have plenty 
of words to designate the useful; why add other words, 
and especially such as convey a different meaning, and so 
becloud the issue? If the words "right" and "wrong" do 
not stand for realities, they are superfluous. 

The theory of evolution without an intelligent Involver 
and Evolver has not been scientifically proved, and is irra- 
tional from many viewpoints. It cannot account at all for 
the evolutionary process itself, and especially along intelli- 
gent, progressive and teleological lines. Why should a 
world that is here purely by chance have evolved into a 
world of order, a cosmos? Could mere fortuity pro- 
duce law and order? No; chance could bring forth 
nothing but a welter. No effect can be greater than nor 
different from its cause. One of the chief attributes of the 
world is that it is "a reign of law." How could chance 
produce its precise antithesis? 

However, our only concern here is for the ethical prob- 
lems involved. Suppose for a moment that there is no 
Moral Personality — that is, God — back of the cosmos as its 
Creator and Governor; then how did the moral ever come 
into being? Could the moral evolve from the non-moral? 
Could moral personalities, such as men are, evolve, by 
means of merely resident forces, from mere material sub- 
stance? If so, how? Would not that be contrary to the 
very doctrine of evolution itself? For nothing can be 
evolved that was not previously involved. 



68 A System of General Ethics 

Again, morality can be predicated only of rational per- 
sonalities ; never of mere things. Then how could morality 
have a real basis in mere material substance? If there is 
nothing but the material universe, no other entity whatever, 
then it is not personal, and hence could not have within it 
any moral quality or character; then how could it ever in 
all the endless millenniums have given birth to moral per- 
sounalities with moral ideas and attributes? That surely 
would be a gross violation of the fundamental law of caus- 
ality — that no effect can be greater than its cause. It would 
be a case of "getting something out of nothing;" of water 
rising higher than its source. 

However, if you accept the theistic conception of the 
universe, namely, that a personal God is its Creator and 
Preserver, you have an altogether adequate ground for 
ethical reality from eternity, and an altogether adequate 
explanation of all the ethical phenomena of the cosmos. 
And we maintain with all our might, the only scientific 
hypothesis is the one that affords an adequate account of 
all the facts in the case. Materialistic evolution is both 
unscientific and immoral. It is of the earth, earthy. Crass 
in all its conceptions, it has no wings with which to rise 
into the truly psychical and ethical realms. 

13. Theistic Evolution. 

(1) Statement: 

This view is held in two forms: 

First, in the beginning God created the pristine material ; 
in doing this, He endowed material substance with all the 
potencies needed for its subsequent development, including 
the personal, ethical and spiritual outcome; then He left 
the universe to be controlled and unfolded by secondary 
causes, namely, the "laws of nature." This is practically 



The Ground of Right 69 

the view of Deism, transferred to the theory of modern 
evolution. 

Second, God created the primordial material in its simple 
or homogeneous form; then, instead of deserting it, He 
remained immanent in it; since the original creation, His 
mode of operating in the cosmos has been through the laws 
of progressive evolution. Therefore, according to this 
view, evolution is simply the divine modus operandi. 

(2) Observations: 

a. The theory of Deism first named above is open to 
most serious objections from the ethical view-point. It 
virtually pushes God out of His universe, and gives it up 
to secondary causes ; thus it leaves so little room for free- 
dom that the moral factor diminishes to the minimum, if 
it does not vanish entirely. A God who retires from His 
creation, abdicates His throne in favor of mere laws, and 
takes a long vacation, which He spends in idleness and 
vacuity, while His people are carrying on an unequal 
struggle in the world with elemental forces of evil, surely 
is not a God who would be likely to inspire moral effort and 
enthusiasm in the minds of His far-off, neglected foster 
children. No human father would thus forsake his off- 
spring. It is almost better to believe in no God at all than 
to encumber faith with a God who is indifferent and neg- 
lectful, or who cannot come to the help of His unfortunate 
and needy creatures. 

b. Regarding the second theory, that of theistic evo- 
lution, if it should ultimately be proven to be true scientifi- 
cally, it would not invalidate the ethical reality of the 
world; for the personal God, the Creator, would be its 
source and ground, and, being immanently active in the 
cosmos, would be the personal executor of the law of right- 



70 A System of General Ethics 

eousness implanted therein and in the consciences of men. 
God back of and in the universe would adequately account 
for all the ethical phenomena appearing in the evolutionary 
process, as well as for the initiation and method of the pro- 
cess itself . 

The question, therefore, to be settled is simply this: Is 
it a scientifically established fact that pure evolution is 
God's method of working in the universe ? To put it more 
concretely, is there sufficient empirical evidence to prove 
that life was evolved from material substance by resident 
chemical forces and combinations without the introduction 
of anything new at any point in the process; that all the 
genera and species of the vegetable and animal kingdoms 
have been evolved from a single primordial germ or cell; 
that man has been evolved from the lower animals; that 
consciousness, sentiency, conscience and will have evolved 
in this way ; that in all this process, running through cycles 
and millenniums, God has never added any new force or 
substance to the original act of creation ? Has all this been 
proved, or even if it has not been proved by empirical dis- 
covery and experiment, is it rational to accept it as the 
true explanation of the cosmos and its present status? 

Let it be remembered that if, at any point in the whole 
process, God added any new force or entity, that would be 
an act of creation, or the obtrusion of a supernatural power, 
and therefore the process could not be properly called pure 
evolution; it would be evolution plus every supernatural 
act; it would be evolution, creation and miracle. 8 



8. The author has often felt that the term "theistic evolution" is 
inaccurate and unscientific, connoting an impossibility. After all, 
does not scientific evolution mean a process of unfolding by purely 
resident or immanent forces? But if God carried on the process, 
He must have been constantly infusing new force into it from with- 
out, or there could have been no progress. Would that have been 



The Ground of Right 71 

Our thesis here is especially concerned with the data of 
morality, and so we submit a few considerations. All 
theists agree that God first created the primordial material 
substance. However, it must have been mere impersonal 
substance, mere stuff, mere thing. Now, since morality 
can inhere only in rational personalities, could God have 
endowed mere impersonal stuff with a moral quality? 
Why, we ourselves, limited as our rational powers are, 
never think of attributing morality to slime, or mud, or a 
clod, or a stone, or even an animal. Should it be held that 
God, being all-powerful, could have endowed mere material 
substance with seminal moral qualities, our reply is, would 
it not, after all, have been absurd and even puerile for Him 
to work in so crude a way? A more rational procedure 
would, we think, have been the following: God created the 
material universe, unfolded it according to His own wis- 



evolution in the strictly scientific sense? Would not the word "de- 
velopment" be better when we connect God with the process ? That 
word would not exclude the injection of new energy, but would 
connote only a gradual unfolding, however it was accomplished. 
In a previous work ("A System of Natural Theism," p. 114) the 
author has taken the position that two terms should be used to ac- 
count for the cosmos as it is, namely, "creation" and "evolution." 
This has been criticised by a few persons to whom the very word 
"evolution" is objectionable. The author desires to explain that he 
used the word "evolution" in the sense of a gradually unfolding 
process (carried on, of course, by the divine will and energy), in 
distinction from a sudden and miraculous injection of supernatural 
power. He has never used the term in the sense in which Tyndal 
and Huxley employed it — that is, as a process of unfolding by pure- 
ly natural and resident forces. In many cases in both the natural 
world and the human realm God does use the gradual method, and 
has evidently done so ever since the creation of the primordial ma- 
terial; in other cases He brings in something new abruptly or sud- 
denly, and that we call creation or miracle. If the critics do not 
want to accept the word "evolution" to denote God's gradual way 
of working out certain results, we are willing to substitute the bet- 
ter word, "development." We do not wish to insist on, or higgle 
about, a word that has an ambiguous meaning. Wherever and 
whenever clearness is possible writers should avoid obscurantism. 



72 A System of General Ethics 

dom, adding something new whenever an entity of a higher 
order was to be brought into being, and at last, when the 
world was ready for occupancy by human personalities, He 
created them, enduing them, in that very act, with those 
moral qualities which inhere in beings of so highly organ- 
ized a type. Taking all the facts into consideration, we 
must leave the reader to decide whether this view is not the 
most reasonable. 



Thus we have reviewed the various systems of Ethics, 
both ancient and modern, and have, we think, reached the 
conclusion that the theistic world-view is the only one that 
affords a sufficient rational and scientific basis, ground and 
explanation of the ethical data of the cosmos. 



DIVISION III 
THE LAW OF RIGHT 



CHAPTER V 



I. CONNECTING LINKS. 

1. God created a cosmos. 

2. He created it a moral economy. 

II. PROOFS OF MORAL ORDER IN NATURE. 

1. The reign of law. 

2. Design in nature. 

3. Nature affords a moral arena for man. 



I. CONNECTING LINKS. 

1. God created a cosmos: 

Our last main division of the Ethical System was, "The 
Ultimate Ground of Right," which we found to be the holy 
and free personality of God. Our next logical step will be 
to inquire whether God created a world or universe, or 
found in the riches of His own being alone eternal satis- 
faction and delight. Instantly we find that, for reasons of 
His own, He decided to create a universe having an ob- 
jective, though not an independent, existence; for the uni- 
verse is here, and we behold it, and recognize ourselves as 
part of it. 

2. He created it a moral economy: 

Since God is righteous, since He is the ultimate ground 
of truth and morality, since righteousness and justice are 
the foundation of His throne, it is reasonable to believe that 
He would inscribe the laws of His own being on the uni- 
verse He brought into existence. This is, of course, the 



74 A System of General Ethics 

a priori method of reasoning. Let us now scrutinize the 
cosmos, and see whether the proposition can be proved 
empirically. Did God, who is the ground of right, impress 
the law of righteousness on His creation? 1 Did He in- 
scribe it, first, on the natural realm; second, on the consti- 
tution of man, the moral agent He placed in the midst of 
the natural environment? We shall find that He did. 

II. PROOFS OF MORAL ORDER IN NATURE. 
1. The reign of law: 

Everywhere in the natural realm we perceive the reign 
of law. The world is a cosmos, not a chaos. Modern sci- 
ence has firmly established this as a fact. But law in the 
universe not only implies a Lawgiver and an Executor back 
of and in it, but also connotes that a moral law must be reg- 
nant in its operations; for it is irrational to believe that 
the Creator would have made a world that was controlled 
by natural law and at the same time dominated by moral 
chaos. True, morality per se could not inhere in imper- 
sonal objects, yet a world governed by law would be the 



1. In his profound work on "Theoretical Ethics," Dr. Valentine 
calls the objective moral law the Proximate or Immediate Ground 
of Right in distinction from the Ultimate Ground, which he holds 
is the Personal God, as we hold in this work. The distinction is 
worth making, and for this reason : Men frequently say, "We must 
do right, or we must obey the law of right," without going back in 
thought to God as the Lawgiver; just as in mathematics people 
speak about the mathematical laws of the universe, and solve many 
profound and intricate problems according to those laws, without 
going back in thought to the divine Author of the universe and its 
mathematical laws. Indeed, there are systems of Ethics wrought 
out on this principle; they recognize the law of right, but do not 
raise the question as to the divine Lawgiver. We have not thought 
it wise to emphasize the distinction between the Proximate and 
Ultimate Grounds of Right, because we think it is simpler to speak 
of only one Ground of Right — and there really can be only one — 
and then use the term Law of Right to designate the mode by 
which God governs the moral economy. 



The Law of Right 75 

only kind of a realm that could be made the home of the 
moral beings who were subsequently to be introduced. Had 
the natural world been a chaos, ethical beings could not 
have dwelt therein ; they would not have fitted into it. So 
the reign of law in nature connotes, ipso facto, that the 
natural cosmos is part of a moral economy. 

2. Design in nature: 

What is known in Theism as the teleological argument, 
or the argument from design, 2 is in place here. A few gen- 
eral statements will suffice. In the mineral and vegetable 
worlds there are obvious proofs of wise design. The var- 
ious chemical combinations that form the earth, the air, the 
clouds, the rivers, lakes and seas, display wonderful intelli- 
gence, especially in their fitness for sustaining the life of 
sentient beings. It does not seem possible that they would 
have come together in so marvellous a way merely by acci- 
dent or fortuity. If there was no Designer, how could and 
why should they have combined in an orderly manner? 
Why should mere blind forces produce a cosmos instead 
of chaos? 

Design is clearly shown in the adaptation of plants to 
specific purposes. The processes of cell growth, fertiliza- 
tion and reproduction of species — all afford evidences of 
intelligent design. Yet, since minerals and vegetables are 
not sentient entities, it is reasonable to believe that their 
wonderful adaptations were meant to serve some higher 
purpose than merely existence for their own sake. 

Therefore when we rise to the realm of animal sentiency, 
and note how admirably animal life is fitted into its mineral 
and vegetable environment, and how much delight it has 
in its life thus provided for, we are led to believe that the 



2. Cf. the author's "A System of Natural Theism," pp. 34-48. 



76 A System of General Ethics 

lower plane was wisely planned for the sustenance and 
felicity of sentient creatures. The fact that animals do not 
merely exist, but also have much pleasure in life, evinces 
a kindly purpose in the planning and preparing of the 
world. Such a purpose connotes a moral order, for kindli- 
ness is a moral quality, and moral quality can belong only 
to a moral personality. 

Moving up into the human realm, the evidences of design 
in the natural creation are still more convincing. Every- 
where there is clear proof that nature has been devised for 
the well-being of man, and that man has intentionally been 
constituted to fit into his natural environment. The min- 
eral, vegetable and animal worlds lay their tributes at his 
feet, affording him food, drink, clothing, shelter, and much 
comfort and enjoyment. Endued with his five senses, he 
has a vital and pleasurable connection with the whole nat- 
ural cosmos. A beneficent purpose runs through all this 
regimen. Making due allowance for all the casualties (a 
subject to be dealt with later in this work), man has much 
joy in the world, and there is everywhere a rule of kindli- 
ness, of tender consideration, and of ample provision for 
his needs and satisfaction. Now, beneficence, kindness, 
care — all these connote moral quality. Therefore we see 
distinct proof of moral order and teleology in the natural 
realm, implying a moral Designer back of it and in it. 

3. Nature affords a moral arena for man: 

Nothing can be more striking than the fact that the nat- 
ural cosmos is so constituted as to afford to man an arena 
for moral conduct and achievement. How many times 
nature herself abets moral decisions and choices ! To illus- 
trate, here are two paths leading through a woodland. 
They are alike easy to pursue. But one leads to a place of 



The Law of Right 77 

virtue, the other to a place of vice. So far as nature is 
framed, there are innumerable opportunities for human 
choice. She does not compel you to choose this way or 
that, but whatever your choice may be, she will afford you 
the stage on which to perform your self-elected part in the 
drama of life. 

Here we condense and simplify the language of a great 
ethical writer : 3 The order of the world is a moral order, 
in which nature is appointed to be the instrument and means 
of liberty. The law of nature is, what men sow that shall 
they also reap. Every abuse of liberty sooner or later 
brings its inevitable reaction. The law of the good and of 
conscience is at the same time the law of the universe. In 
it all things must work together for good to those who obey 
the moral law, and all must work together for evil to those 
who disobey. 

We may add, the natural economy might have been so 
constituted as to preclude all freedom of action on man's 
part; but, instead of such a regime of necessity, we find 
that it affords him innumerable opportunities for the exer- 
cise of both physical and moral choice. Still more, even 
the difficulties which nature often imposes, but does not 
make insuperable to human effort, give man a chance for 
moral discipline and schooling that he could not otherwise 
have. This fact may, at least in part, explain why there 
are obstacles, difficulties and afflictions in the natural cos- 
mos. The world really seems to be so framed as to bring 
out the highest and most virile moral qualities in man's 
character. A soft and easy world would not accomplish 
this result, but would make man morally inane. The cos- 
mos is not only a moral arena for man ; it is also a school 



3. Martensen, "Christian Ethics," Vol. I, p. 131. 



78 A System of General Ethics 

of moral discipline. The point is therefore established that 
the natural world bears the stamp of a moral order upon it, 
in that it is admirably adapted to be the dwelling-place and 
stadium of moral agents. This fact is all the more patent 
when we see that moral agents are actually in the world, 
and are working out upon it a moral destiny. We are thus 
led logically to our next division. 



CHAPTER VI 



III. MORAL AGENTS. 

1. Definitions. 

(1) Of moral agency. 

(2) Of a moral agent. 

2. Man a moral agent. 

(1) Man the only moral agent in the cosmos. 

(2) Source of man's moral character. 

(3) Man a unique figure in the cosmos. 

3. Constituents of moral agency. 

(1) Rational intelligence. 

(2) Conscience. 

a. Definition. 

b. Other terms. 

c. Etymology of the term Conscience. 

d. Psychology of the Conscience. 

(a) A perception. 

(b) A feeling. 

(c) Its relation to the other psychical powers. 

e. Origin of the Conscience. 

f. Conscience a distinct mental faculty. 

g. Supremacy of Conscience. 



III. MORAL AGENTS. 

1. Definitions: 

(1) Of moral agency: 

Moral agency is the ability of a personal being to per- 
ceive the right and wrong and to choose between them. 

(2) Of a moral agent: 

A moral agent is a person who is capable of perceiving 
the right and wrong and of choosing between them. 

2. Man as a moral agent: 

(1) Man the only moral agent in the cosmos: 



80 A System of General Ethics 

Considering God as above and immanent in the uni- 
verse, but not a part of it, Natural Ethics knows of only 
one kind of moral agent in the creation, and that is man. 
True, Christian Theology and Ethics uphold the doctrine 
of angels, and represent them as ethical beings, capable of 
choosing between good and evil ; but Natural Theology and 
Ethics can make no assertion for or against this doctrine, 
which is purely a matter of revelation. 

(2) Source of mans moral character: 

In Division II we have already established the fact that 
the Ultimate Ground of Right is God, who is the Creator 
of the cosmos, of which man is a part. Therefore, just as 
nature is God's handiwork, and is in part an expression of 
His character, so man must have come from the creative 
hand of God. Science (physical, psychological and ethical) 
proves that man is the crowning work of creation; the 
highest and most nobly endued being in the world. And 
what is it that distinguishes him from the purely natural 
creation? It is his rational and moral nature. The min- 
eral and vegetable kingdoms exhibit the intelligence and 
ethical character of the Creator, but possess no such qual- 
ities themselves; they are mere automata. Animals pos- 
sess instinct, which is a kind of intelligence, sufficient to fit 
them for their Maker's purpose in the cosmos; but they 
do not attain to that degree of intelligence which amounts 
to actual rationality. Some nature-students think they dis- 
cern hints of a crude, instinctive morality in some of the 
animals; but, after all, this is mere surmise and specula- 
tion, and cannot be established beyond question. However, 
concerning the moral character of man there can be no rea- 
sonable doubt. 

Whence, then, came man's ethical nature — his intelli- 



The Law of Right 81 

gence, conscience and freedom? There can be but one 
answer: In the very act of creating man, God endowed 
him with these moral qualities. They are a part of his 
original constitution. While Christian Theology teaches 
clearly that man was made in the divine image (Gen. 1 : 26- 
30), we believe that this view can also be established by 
reason. If God is the source of righteousness and the 
Creator of man, it is rational to believe that, in the very 
making of a rational being, He would make him like Him- 
self, so that He might hold a personal and moral relation 
to him. On the other hand, it is more than unreasonable, 
it is absurd, to believe that God would have made man 
utterly unlike Himself in psychical and ethical attributes. 
No more reasonable is it to hold that man's moral nature 
is the result of mere natural evolution, for the non-moral 
could never evolve by means of merely resident forces in- 
to the moral. That would be a case of water rising higher 
than its source. It would violate the universal law of 
causality, namely, that no effect can be greater than, nor 
essentially different from, its cause. 

(3) Man a unique figure in the cosmos: 

Man belongs to the cosmos ; is an integral part of the 
creation. The natural realm is fitted to him and he to the 
natural realm. With his body he is organically connected 
with the mineral and vegetable kingdoms; his natural in- 
stincts and appetites, of which he has many, also ally him 
to the animal kingdom. Psychically he is so organized as 
to correlate with the natural world; for, by means of his 
sense organs, his mind is able to perceive and hold vital 
relation to material things. To this end, his mind has been 
so constituted that it can make use of the nervous system 
of the body in dealing with material nature. 



82 A System of General Ethics 

However, these are not the only powers that the mind 
possesses ; it has higher enduements ; it is able to function 
in pure thought ; to transcend the physical realm, the realm 
of mere sensation ; to perceive moral excellence and delight 
in it ; to hold true spiritual communion with God and man. 
No other creatures of the cosmos are able to function in 
these rational and ethical ways. Thus man, though a part 
of the universe, is a unique being in it, and by means of 
his psychical enduements is able to transcend it, and hold 
relations to the infinite and absolute. Therefore,, in the 
next place, we are logically led to consider those nobler 
powers that constitute man an ethical being. 

3. Constituents of moral agency :i 

(1) Rational intelligence: 

This term is used to designate the normal functioning 
power of the mind. The scientific study of the human 
mind proves it to be a unitary entity. It is not made up of 
parts, as is material substance. In all its functioning it 
acts as an integer. In the Intellect it functions by cogni- 
tion, in the Sensibilities by feeling, in the Will by self- 
movement, choice and execution. Therefore, while as a 
quiddity the mind is a unit, it is correct to say that it func- 
tions in a variety of ways. When the word "faculty" is 
used in this work, we mean by it a special functioning 
power of the mind, not a part of the mind. 

Now, when the intellect functions normally and sanely, 
we say it is endowed with rational intelligence. While it 
is true that the conscience is the power of the mind which 
enables it to function morally, it is evident that, at the same 
time, the conscience is dependent on the rational action of 



1. Cf. the excellent discussion on this topic by Valentine: "The- 
oretical Ethics," Chapter IV, pp. 100-118. 



The Law of Right 83 

other faculties of the soul. Hence we never predicate 
morality of an object that is not rationally intelligent, like 
a clod or a plant or an animal. Martineau says: "We 
neither applaud the gold-mine, nor blame the destructive 
storm" (quoted by Thilly). We do not regard an idiot or 
a lunatic as a morally responsible agent. The law does not 
punish demented persons, but takes care of them in asy- 
lums. However, whenever a person is rational, we hold 
him to be a responsible being. 

(2) Conscience: 

a. Definition : 

Conscience is that faculty of the human mind which per- 
ceives and senses the right and wrong and their fundamen- 
tal antagonism. 

b. Other terms : 

Other terms are often used to designate the Conscience: 
the Moral Consciousness; the Moral Faculty; the Moral 
Sense; the Moral Intuition. 

c. Etymology of the term Conscience: 

It is derived from the Latin, con, with, and scire, to 
know. It is plain, though, that its derivation does not give 
a real clue to its meaning. The word "Consciousness" has 
precisely the same derivation; but how different and dis- 
tinct their significance ! Consciousness is that power of 
the mind by which it is aware of itself, of its own processes, 
and of other objects; Conscience is the moral faculty of 
the soul, and that only. If these distinctions seem to be 
arbitrary, yet, to avoid confusion, we must employ these 
terms according to custom. 

d. The psychology of Conscience: 



84 A System of General Ethics 

(a) It is a perception: 

By examining our "Outline of the Human Mind" (Chap- 
ter II, VII, 1) the student will see that Conscience is first 
placed in the Intellect, subdivision 3, the Intuitions (8), 
where it is called "Cognition of right and wrong, or, Con- 
science as perception." That this is the proper order is 
evident from the fact that the mind must first perceive a 
thing to be right or wrong before it can have any feeling 
regarding it. This is true of all men's mental processes: 
first cognition, then emotion. It is so in the Sense, the 
Understanding and the Intuition. At first thought, the 
order might seem to be reversed in the action of the Senses ; 
but such analysis confuses mere physical impressions with 
psychical functioning; for the sense impression must first 
come into the light of the consciousness before any feeling 
can be observed. Suppose the connection between a 
nerve and the brain were destroyed, the nerve might 
be injured and even lacerated, and the mind would not be 
conscious of it. This order — first perception, then feel- 
ing — is more clearly observed in all the higher psychical 
functioning. With this view of the Conscience agrees the 
popular usage of the word, for we often say, "My Con- 
science perceives this action to be right or wrong." 

Ethical perceptions may be thus classified: 2 

First, the perception of right and wrong, or of moral dis- 
tinctions, which is the primary cognition of the Conscience : 
the perception that right and wrong are fundamentally and 
eternally opposed to each other. 

Second, the perception of obligation or of duty: the 
moral imperative; the command of the Ought to the Con- 
science. Whenever Conscience stands, as it were, in the 



2. Cf. Valentine, ibid, pp. 62-72. 



The Law of Right 85 

presence of the right and the wrong, it perceives its obliga- 
tion or duty to choose the right and to reject the wrong. 

Third, the perception of moral quality in principles and 
actions: moral judgments. When there is no doubt about 
the ethical character of a principle or action, the Conscience 
will pronounce a swift and infallible judgment. In this 
world of mixed good and evil, however, there are times 
and circumstances of doubt — when it is not immediately 
clear which course is right and which is wrong. In such 
cases the Conscience no longer operates as a mere Intuition 
(see "Outline of the Human Mind"), but carries its per- 
ceptions over into the Understanding, where, by the use of 
reflection, memory and imagination, logical, scientific and 
perhaps philosophical analysis, it arrives at length at a 
reasoned moral judgment. 

Fourth, a perception of merit and demerit. In this 
action the Conscience perceives that right and wrong are 
not without consequences, and therefore that the right 
should be rewarded and the wrong punished. This is pri- 
marily a clear intuition ; the kind and degree of recompense 
is usually a matter of reasoned judgment. 

(b) Conscience as a feeling: 

Conscience is not a simple, but a complex functioning 
power of the mind. It belongs to the Sensibilities as well 
as to the Intellect. In our "Outline" (Chapter II, as above) 
it is placed under the Intuitional Emotions, Number (4). 
In popular usage we often say, "I feel in my Conscience 
that this is right or wrong." It must be admitted that some- 
times when the perception is hazy, the feeling may be quite 
strong; which simply means that the case is of such a 
nature that the ethical judgment has not yet been able to 
reason the matter through, and thus the emotion seems to 



86 A System of General Ethics 

veer to the safe side. The full complement of moral reality 
is reached only when the perception becomes positively 
clear and the corresponding emotion has been proportion- 
ately aroused. A schism between the ethical perception 
and the ethical feeling is apt to lead to undecided action, to 
hesitancy, and mental distress. It will not be out of place 
to give the advice here that when one feels that a certain 
course is right, he should pursue it, and when he feels that 
a course is wrong, he should avoid it, even though at the 
time he may not be able to give a clear reason for the one 
or the other. 

In the interest of scientific analysis we give here a table 
showing a classification of the ethical emotions : 

1. Classes: 

(1) Moral love: delight in and approval of the right. 

(2) Moral aversion: hatred of the wrong. 

(3) Before an action: feeling of obligation or duty. 

(4) After an action: 

a. If right: approval, satisfaction, ethical joy. 

b. If wrong: disapproval, shame, guilt, remorse. 

2. Degrees of intensity: 

(1) Vary with heredity and temperament. 

(2) Vary with environment and education. 

(3) Vary with ethical effort or neglect. 

3. Feeling as a motive power: 

(1) It furnishes an incentive for right and wrong 
doing; mere cold perception would have no mov- 
ing force. 

(2) Classes of right motives: 

a. Desire for the true benefits of righteousness. 

b. Love of the right for its own sake. 

c. Love of God as the true source of the good. 



The Law of Right 87 

Only a few remarks need to be made on this outline. It 
is evident that all the feelings listed are distinctively ethical 
emotions, and therefore stand out clearly as different from 
all other feelings, proving, as has been previously main- 
tained, that the Conscience is a unique and highly specialized 
faculty, and not merely the sum of other faculties, nor the 
result of an accumulation of experiences. Concerning No. 
2, "Degrees of intensity," every one must admit the facts 
in the case. Some people have a better moral heritage than 
others; some have a natural temperament that is more 
sensitive to the distinction between right and wrong; some 
are born in a better environment and have better opportuni- 
ties for education along moral lines; all these are undeni- 
able facts. However, instead of puzzling our minds over 
them, and growing cynical or disheartened, let us take the 
braver and more sensible position: first, those of us who 
have superior opportunities should give all the aid we can 
to those who are less favorably situated, remembering that 
that may be part of our divinely appointed task in life; 
second, that God, the final Arbiter, will judge all men, not 
according to what they have not, but according to what 
they have, whether it be in the way of heredity, environ- 
ment, education, or any other cirucumstance. We should 
have confidence that, in the final outcome, "the Judge of 
all the earth will do right." Those persons who cannot 
trust the Power in the universe that "makes for righteous- 
ness" certainly must go through life as men "who have no 
hope," and "of all men, they must be the most miserable." 
They will inevitably land in pessimism, and that spells 
gloom, bitterness, weak complaining and resentment against 
the constitution of things, without any incentive to moral 
endeavor. 



88 A System of General Ethics 

(c) Relation of Conscience to the other psychical 
powers : 

First, it is dependent on them in several respects. 

It depends on the Senses for its vital relation with the 
physical world, which is its present sphere of activity. Psy- 
chology and physiology are vitally related branches of 
science. The human mind is so constituted that it is able 
to use the sensory system as a means of communication 
with the outer world ; and the human body is so framed 
that it fits into the original structure of the mind. Without 
this mutual adaptation of the psuche and the soma, man 
would not be an organic part of the cosmos in which he has 
been placed, but would be an alien, a misfit. Conscience 
itself could not have the world for its field of operations, 
but, if it functioned at all, some other sphere would have 
to be provided. 

The moral faculty is also dependent on the Understand- 
ing for reflection, memory, imagination, and logical and 
scientific accuracy (see our "Outline of the Human Mind"). 
It is evident, prima facie, that if the mind did not possess 
these powers, Conscience would be useless and helpless. 
Suppose, for example, the mind could hold no moral per- 
ception in Reflection and Memory, how could Conscience 
function at all? 

So, also, the Conscience must rely on the other Intuitions 
for the cognition of reality. There is the cognition of self, 
or self-consciousness, how could the Conscience operate if 
the Ego were not conscious of itself and its thinking pro- 
cesses ? So all the other Intuitions are necessary, for with- 
out the cognition of outer reality, of material substance, of 
time and space, of cause and effect, etc., our present exist- 
ence would be impossible. Whether any other kind of exist- 



The Law of Right 89 

ence would be possible, human reason has no means of 
knowing, and it would be idle to speculate. If Ethics is to 
have any practical value whatever, men must accept the 
conditions and environments in which they have been 
placed, and must make the most of them. 

It is plain, too, that Conscience is dependent on the Will 
to execute its behests. If the mind had no power to choose 
the right and carry out its choices, Conscience would be 
like a monarch on a throne with no power to execute any 
of its mandates. Every government must have at least 
three fundamental functions — the administrative, the judi- 
cial and the executive. So with the human mind. This 
subject will receive more attention later. 

Second, Conscience transcends the other faculties in 
some very important respects. 

It should regulate and direct them in all their ethical 
functioning. In this respect, therefore, all the other fac- 
ulties are dependent on Conscience, thus reversing the 
order and relation described in the preceding section. 
Whenever the question of right or wrong arises, no matter 
which faculty or faculties are involved, Conscience should 
step forward and assert its authority. Let us illustrate this 
point, taking the sense of sight for an example. Conscience 
does not decide for you whether the object you are looking 
at is a bird, a tree or a mountain; that must be decided by 
the sense of sight, which is regulative in its own sphere; 
but if the question whether it is right or wrong to look at 
an object should come to the fore, then Conscience ought 
to attend promptly and decide for the right use of the eyes. 
Further illustration is not necessary, for the student can 
apply this principle to all the other faculties of the mind. 

Again, Conscience is the highest and noblest of the 
rational powers, except perhaps the theistic, with which it 



90 A System of General Ethics 

should always be correlated. Perhaps moral excellence is 
even the highest divine attribute. At all events, we can 
conceive of none that is higher. Therefore, our proposi- 
tion is proved, namely, that Conscience is the transcendent 
faculty of the human soul. 

e. Origin of Conscience: 

We maintain that Conscience is an innate mental faculty. 
Just as the whole mind is a divinely created entity, so the 
Conscience, as a part of the mind, is of divine origin. As 
soon as man had a mind, he was a moral being. If he had 
not been, he never could have developed morality, for the 
moral never could have evolved from the non-moral. At 
some point in history, therefore, God must have implanted 
the moral faculty, and it seems to us to be most reasonable 
to believe that it was part of man's psychical constitution 
as he was originally created. There is no satisfactory his- 
torical and scientific evidence that God first made man a 
mere animal, without moral character, and afterward in- 
serted the moral faculty into his psychical constitution ; and, 
somehow, to many minds the thought of God's employing 
that method seems to be absurd, not to say revolting. For 
God first to get the world ready for man's occupancy and 
delectation, and then create him a moral and spiritual being 
to fit into his habitation, and hold intelligent fellowship 
with his Maker, — that seems to be the nobler and more up- 
lifting conception, and explains best his high enduements 
and his exalted aspirations for an immortal destiny. We 
do not see why the higher view should not be accepted in 
preference to the lower. 

Here we must notice an erroneous notion. There are 
speculative writers who contend that Conscience is not a 
native human endowment, but only an acquired capacity, 
which is the resultant of varied experiences throughout the 



The Law of Right 91 

past. This theory goes with the utilitarian evolutionism of 
Herbert Spencer and others, who hold that the right is only 
that which has been found to be useful and expedient, as 
has been seen in a previous section (Chapter IV, III, 11). 
As experience in social development found that some things 
were beneficial and others harmful, men somehow agreed 
to call the first right and the second wrong. In this way 
Conscience was gradually developed or evolved. 

A little reflection will, we think, prove that this is an 
inadequate account of the origin of Conscience. How 
could a uniquely moral faculty evolve from an absolutely 
non-moral ground? Can anything be evolved that was not 
previously involved? Can water run uphill, or rise higher 
than its source ? Can an effect be greater than its cause or 
totally different from it? Can you get something out of 
nothing? Ex nihilo nihil fit. 

Again, what good reason can be assigned for the evolu- 
tion of a special ethical faculty at all, when the other judg- 
ment faculties can very readily distinguish between the use- 
ful and the harmful? Conscience is not needed to make 
this distinction; we have other faculties that are compe- 
tent for that. Then why, we would inquire, did nature 
endow man with a superfluous faculty, and thus make his 
life unnecessarily complex ? What could have made nature 
produce a faculty for which there was no need? Such an 
exploit is contrary to the very basis of evolution itself as 
it is expounded by its own proponents. 

Let us remember, too, that the Conscience intuitively 
differentiates between the ethical and the purely useful or 
harmful. For example, disease microbes are harmful, but 
the Conscience never calls them ethically evil. However, 
lying, theft, slander, envy, hatred, and murder belong en- 
tirely to a different category, namely, the morally evil, and 



92 A System of General Ethics 

Conscience at once says that they are wrong, not merely 
pernicious. And, moreover, it declares that they are per- 
nicious because they are wrong, and not wrong because they 
are pernicious. We may be pardoned for saying that the 
utilitarian scheme of Ethics always "puts the cart before 
the horse ;" always mistakes cause for effect and effect for 
cause. Acceptance of it always seems to dull the edge of 
both the mental and moral perceptions. 

f. Conscience a distinct mental faculty: 

Even at the risk of some repetition we desire to discuss 
this proposition. First, the moral perceptions are unique 
— sui generis. The mind intuitively perceives the right and 
the wrong and their fundamental antagonism. Is not this 
just as distinctive a cognition as the cognition of beauty, or 
utility, or objective reality? If so, the mind must have a 
special capacity for such cognition. It would be passing 
strange if the human mind should have specialized faculties 
for other things, and none for ethical facts and truths, when, 
after all, the latter are the noblest and the most vital to 
human welfare. Surely the cosmos was not made on an 
irrational plan. If it has been, all our thinking and reason- 
ing is useless ; yes, worse than useless ; it is farcical and 
even tragical. 

Compare our ethical perceptions with our other percep- 
tions — with sense-perception, consciousness, memory, imag- 
ination, logical praxis, intuitions of time, space, substance, 
causality, utility and God. A moment's thought will con- 
vince the mind that all of them are different from the per- 
ceptions of Conscience, which have to do solely with the 
categories of right and wrong. 

The moral feelings are no less unique than are the moral 
perceptions. There is the feeling of moral obligation or 
duty, the moral imperative, the commanding character of 



The Law of Right 93 

the "Ought" — is not that feeling different from every other 
emotion? The feeling of satisfaction and self-approval 
for right-doing is unique ; no less distinctive are the feel- 
ings of guilt, compunction and remorse for wrong-doing. 
It requires no great mental acuteness to perceive that the 
ethical feelings are different from the feelings of mere 
pleasure, whether sensuous or intellectual; from feelings 
regarding the truth ; from feelings regarding utility, beauty, 
and scientific and philosophical research. Thus we have 
proved, we think, that the Conscience is a distinct faculty 
of the human soul. 

However, in order to canvass the whole situation with 
entire frankness and fairness, we must here note a difficulty 
that puzzles certain speculative minds. It is this : There 
is great diversity of moral judgment among men. Freely 
do we concede such diversity. It is patent on every hand. 
The very fact that moral progress is possible, and has been 
achieved in the world's history, implies changes in moral 
judgment. Nations and tribes often differ widely in their 
ethical standards. Certain practices which are regarded 
as right in some countries are looked upon with aversion 
in others. It has often been said that Conscience is one 
thing north of the Pyrenees and another south. 3 Moreover, 
individuals living in the same community often differ quite 
widely in their ethical judgments, one commending what 
another condemns. These diversities of view lead some 
men to think that, after all, man does not have a distinct 
moral faculty and that there is no real basis for moral dis- 
tinctions. 

But we must avoid hasty and superficial conclusions, es- 
pecially respecting problems that so vitally affect human 



3. Valentine, ibid, attributes the saying to Pascal. 



94 A System of General Ethics 

welfare. Let us think more deeply and discriminatingly, 
taking all the facts into account. First, in spite of this 
diversity of moral judgment, Conscience still persists ; its 
judgments may often be in error, but it still utters its voice; 
it does not vacate its throne; it still declares that some 
things are right and others wrong. 

Second, almost all people agree as to the great cardinal 
virtues — that is, there are no nations or tribes where mur- 
der, theft, falsehood, etc., are not regarded as wrong per 
se; while honesty, chastity and love are regarded as right 
in themselves, however crude may be the application of the 
primary principles. 

Third, even where startling differences exist on the sur- 
face, there is a deep underlying agreement as to right, duty 
and other virtues. For example, the Hindu mother in her 
ignorance once thought she ought to sacrifice her babe to 
the gods. The imperative of Conscience was there, how- 
ever sadly mistaken the moral judgment. Suppose after- 
ward she became a Christian; then her moral judgment 
was wholly changed; but that change did not destroy her 
moral sense, her Conscience. Nay, it rectified her moral 
judgment, and then her Conscience told her that she ought 
not to throw her babe to the crocodiles, but, on the con- 
trary, ought to consecrate and rear it according to the 
Christian standard. Note well this fact : despite the change 
in her moral judgment, her conscience and the moral im- 
perative over it were still there; which proves our propo- 
sition. 

Fourth, it should be remembered that all man's faculties 
are fallible, and that there is wide diversity of judgment in 
all realms, just as in the ethical sphere; yet we do not, on 
that account, assert that man has no distinct mental facul- 
ties, or no mind at all. When men differ in their judgments 



The Law of Right 95 

as to objects of beauty, we do not straightway declare that 
man has no esthetic faculty. Why, men differ on scientific, 
psychological, philosophical and even mathematical propo- 
sitions ; yet who thinks of denying that men have special 
capacities for these varied subjects? 

Fifth, the primary perception of right as right and wrong 
as wrong prevails everywhere ; it is only the secondary 
judgments that differ. Or, to put the same thing differ- 
ently, the primary ethical standard holds everywhere; but 
the application of the standard to concrete cases varies. 
The intuition of moral distinctions exists among all individ- 
uals and in all nations ; but just how to draw these distinc- 
tions in life gives rise to diversity of judgment, because the 
wrong has come into the world and has wrought more or 
less ethical confusion. 4 

Thus, we hold, the fact of diversity of moral judgment 
does not disprove the fact that the human Conscience is a 
distinct faculty. 

g. The supremacy of the Conscience: 

(a) Definition: 

The supremacy of the Conscience is its right to exercise 
a moral control over man's whole personality. 

(b) Nature of its authority: 

Its authority is not original, but derived or deputed. The 
ultimate authority is God and His law. Therefore Con- 
science does not in itself have the right of command over 
the other faculties, but is simply the divinely appointed 
faculty that discerns the supreme authority, and then de- 
clares it. The Conscience is not a norma normans, but a 
norma normata. 

4. Hence Desdemona's well-known saying : "I do perceive here 
a divided duty." 



96 A System of General Ethics 

It is supreme only in its own peculiar sphere, that of 
moral issues. It does not decide in other spheres. Except 
when moral considerations are involved, it does not com- 
mand the actions of the Sense, the Understanding, the In- 
tuitions, the Sensibilities and the Will. 

Its rule is advisory, not coercive. It does not "lord it 
over" the other faculties. Its function is to counsel, per- 
suade and command, but not to compel obedience. Hence 
its voice may be obeyed or disobeyed. Here is where other 
motives besides considerations of right may enter the mind, 
and present temptations to wrong-doing. Then the right 
and the wrong motives will come into conflict, Conscience 
urging the right motives and selfish pleasure or interest the 
wrong, and finally the ego through the will must decide and 
choose. Hence Conscience can only advise, persuade and 
urge. We cannot say that Conscience always is supreme, 
but only that it always ought to be supreme. Here is where 
the normative character of our science becomes evident. 

(c) Why Conscience should be supreme: 
First, as its sphere is the sphere of right and duty, its 
voice is the highest voice of the soul, the voice of the moral 
imperative ; hence its mandates should always be obeyed, 
no matter what the cost. Man would better lose everything 
else than his moral character. In every conflict between 
Conscience and the other faculties, Conscience should rule. 

Second, since Conscience derives its authority directly 
from the moral law, which is the law of God, the Supreme 
Lawgiver, its behests should be final. 

Third, other faculties are supreme in their own spheres. 
It would be inconsistent with the nature of things if the 
human soul did not have a power that was supreme in the 
moral sphere, which is the highest and noblest of all reali- 



The Law of Right 97 

ties. If this were not so, the world would not be a rational 
world. 

Fourth, no other faculty of the mind could rationally be 
assigned the primacy: the senses and appetites could not, 
for that would make man bestial ; the desire for enjoyment 
could not, for that would make man selfish, which would 
destroy the very foundations of morality; even the benev- 
olent affections could not be given the supreme jurisdiction, 
for, noble as they are, they must be regulated by the prin- 
ciples of righteousness. Love and charity which are not 
so controlled are mere sentimentality, and may lead to vast 
moral harm. God's love is not mere sentiment; it is pure 
and holy love, permeated and regulated by the law of right ; 
and man's love should be patterned after its divine arch- 
etype. 

(d) Conscience, though supreme, is not infallible: 

Some speculative thinkers feel that this is an insuperable 
difficulty, which they put in this form: If Conscience is 
fallible, how can it be man's supreme guide in the sphere 
of morality? However, the difficulty is not so serious as 
is frequently supposed. 

First, all man's faculties are fallible and limited, and that 
in their own spheres. How often the senses are in error! 
Frequently we do not see aright nor hear accurately; our 
touch, taste and smell often become diseased, and do not 
function normally. Yet no one thinks that, because the 
senses are fallible, they are not our best and only guides 
each in its own sphere. Although the eye frequently errs, 
it is still man's highest authority in the realm of sight. The 
same is true of man's other psychical powers. Memory 
is frequently defective, yet in its own sphere it must be our 
guide. The mathematical faculty is often at fault ; yet for 



98 A System of General Ethics 

its own science it is our only reliance. In the same way 
the Conscience is fallible, liable to error, but that does not 
invalidate its supreme place as man's guide in the ethical 
field. Indeed, if man's Conscience were infallible, it would 
be totally unlike all the rest of his mental outfit, and that 
would be absurd. Moreover, a large part of his moral en- 
deavor, achievement and discipline consists in the very fact 
that he must constantly seek to correct the errors and 
broaden the limitations of Conscience and his moral judg- 
ments, and thus advance step by step, just as he must in 
all other spheres of worthy and progressive effort. 

Second, let us put this argument concisely : Each faculty, 
though fallible, is regulative in its own sphere: the Intel- 
lect for knowledge ; the Sensibilities for feeling ; the Intu- 
itions for immediate cognition; the Will for self-determi- 
nation and choice; lastly the Conscience for moral dis- 
tinctions. 

(e) The Conscience, though fallible, is man's ethical 
guide : 

Even though fallible, should the dictates of the Con- 
science always be obeyed? Our answer is, Yes. 

First: To disregard the voice of Conscience would be 
to sin against our own primary perception and sense of 
right, and would, therefore, be the most fundamentally im- 
moral act that a man could commit. Just reflect for a 
moment: If a man sins against the very power that God 
has given him for discerning right and wrong, how can he 
commit a more grievous sin? 

Second: Whatever moral light the mind receives comes 
in and through the Conscience; therefore its guidance 
should be followed, whether the light be great or small. 

Third: In case of error of judgment, the mistake is of 



The Law of Right 99 

the head and not the heart. Judged by the absolute stand- 
ard of right, the action in such circumstances would be 
wrong, but the person himself, who has acted in good faith, 
that is, from a sincere motive and according to his best 
knowledge, cannot be held guilty. Note, however: As 
soon as the truly honest man sees his mistake by means of 
increasing light, he will reverse his judgment and change 
his conduct accordingly. The apostle Paul is a conspicuous 
example. As he himself declares, he was sincere before 
his conversion, and acted "in all good conscience;" but no 
sooner did the better light come than he acknowledged his 
error, and changed the whole tenor of his life. Had he 
been insincere before his conversion, it would be difficult 
for the world to believe that he was sincere afterward. 

Fourth: The other faculties of the mind, though their 
mistakes must often be corrected and their decisions re- 
versed, yet are our only guides in their respective spheres. 
After the correction has been made, we still must rely on 
them in their peculiar vocations. 

Fifth: Like other psychical faculties, the Conscience is 
educable. Indeed, the human mind is so constituted that 
all its faculties must be enlightened, developed and disci- 
plined. It would be strange if the Conscience were the 
sole exception, for then it would not fit into the quiddity 
of which it is an integral part. 

Sixth: This mode of reasoning will not excuse crime, 
persecution and fanaticism in the name of Conscience ; for, 
when closely analyzed, the motives back of such acts are 
passion and hatred, not the calm and judicial action of the 
moral judgment. Note the enraged, howling mob vehe- 
mently clamoring for the blood of its victim. It cannot be 
truthfully said that a good, clean Conscience, "void of 
offense toward God and man," and a pure desire for the 



100 A System of General Ethics 

triumph of truth and righteousness alone, are the moving 
power actuating such crimes. In this fact consists the 
deadly wrong of all mob violence and religious persecution ; 
it is the product of passion, not of Conscience. 

Seventh: At this point a practical suggestion is perti- 
nent. In doubtful and difficult cases of conscience, 5 de- 
cisions should not be made hastily. We should wait for 
more light. Here we can afford to hesitate, to "make haste 
slowly ;" indeed, it is highly immoral to push forward pre- 
sumptuously into action before the moral judgment is clear. 
We should reflect seriously, pray, ask advice, read good 
books, especially the Bible, until we have all the light that 
is possible on the situation. If we act in haste, we may be 
compelled to repent at leisure. "Be sure you are right, 
then go ahead," is a homely but wise maxim. 



5. See the discussion of casuistry in a subsequent section. For 
the precise place consult the Index. 



CHAPTER VII 






III. MORAL AGENTS (continued). 

3. Constituents of moral agency (continued). 

(3) The Will. 

a. Definition. 

b. Its unique powers. 

c. Freedom of the Will a sine qua non of morality. 

d. Proofs of the freedom of the Will. 

(a) Testimony of consciousness. 

(b) The test of experiment. 

(c) The demands of man's environment. 

(d) The mind's intuitive distinction. 

(e) Determinism inconsistent with itself. 

(f) Experience versus speculation. 

(g) Harmful results of Determinism, 
(h) Objections stated and confuted, 
(i) Limitations of freedom. 

4. Motives or intentions. 

(1) Definition. 

(2) Motives essential to moral agency. 

(3) Varied relations of motives. 

a. To the Will. 

b. To the actor. 

c. To the action. 



III. MORAL AGENTS (continued). 

3. Constituents of moral agency (continued). 

(3) The Will: 

a. Definition : 

The Will is the self-determining power of the mind. 
Other definitions might be given, thus : the capacity of the 
mind to choose and execute; the autonomy of the Ego 
or Self. 



102 A System of General Ethics 

b. Its unique powers: 

First, the power of attention. By a capacity that is en- 
tirely sui generis, the Will is able to compel the self to give 
heed ; to "stop, look and listen," as it were ; to draw in the 
wandering faculties and concentrate them on a special ob- 
ject or subject. When the teacher gives the command, 
"Attention!" he furnishes a motive for the student to give 
heed, but at the same time the student knows that he can 
and must exert his own will in order to obey the injunction. 
The ability to attend is a matter of conscious experience, 
not of mere speculation. 

Second, of originating motion and action. This is 
another peculiar functioning power of the Will. Mind 
through the Will is the only entity that can originate and 
create; that is capable of self -movement and self-direc- 
tion. Matter is inert. Of itself it can initiate no action 
and motion, but, once at rest, it can never move itself purely 
by its own power, and, once in motion, it can never cease 
to move unless acted upon by some force outside of itself. 
Not so with the Will. By an ability that is inherent it is 
able to move itself, to push and pull itself, as it were, and 
to cause material substances to move at its behest. So far 
as we know, there is nothing else in all the universe that 
possesses this unique power. 

How it does this we do not understand, but we do know 
that it does. It is a fact of experience, and may be tested 
in a thousand ways. Take just one simple experiment, 
which is just as patent as an experiment in a physical or 
chemical laboratory: Let your arm hang loosely by your 
side for a moment; now make an effort of the Will, and 
see whether you cannot lift it to a horizontal position ; then 
to an oblique, then to a perpendicular position; then you 



The Law of Right 103 

can drop it to your side again. Note, all the time in your 
consciousness you are vividly aware of an effort to use 
your will power, and also conscious that you are successful. 
If your consciousness deceives you in a matter so patent, its 
testimony is worthless in all other matters. 

Third, of alternate choice. This unique power can also 
be tested in many ways. You can choose one of two paths, 
one of two courses of action, as you will. Your awareness 
bears witness that you can choose between good and evil. 
You know that matter has not this power of self-determi- 
nation. It belongs only to that entity we call mind ; it is 
sui generis. 

Fourth, of execution. This simply means the power of 
the Will to carry into effect the choice previously made by 
the mind's decision. If the Will could not go further than 
to choose among alternatives, it would still be ineffective; 
it would stand helpless at the parting of the ways. 

c. Freedom of will a sine qui non of morality: 
This point will require no labored argument. If the 
Will has no power of self-determination, morality is only 
a name, a delusion of the brain, just as the consciousness 
of freedom itself must be. Kant said: "Thou canst be- 
cause thou ought est" 

The hypothesis that denies the freedom of the Will is 
called by two names : Determinism and Necessitarianism. 
The former means that the Will is determined by some- 
thing else than its own volitional power — by temperament, 
environment, heredity, physical causes, or overwhelming 
motives ; the latter means that all actions of the Will, how- 
ever free they may seem to be, are governed, after all, by 
inevitable necessity. The terms are two names for the 
same theory of the Will. Herbert Spencer was an expo- 



104 A System of General Ethics 

nent of this view. He held that if the Will is free, no 
science of Psychology is possible. 1 Just as if free acts, as 
well as those that are necessitated, could not be examined, 
analyzed, classified and organized into a system! Accord- 
ing to this view, there could be no science of Ethics, for a 
morality that is coerced is no morality at all; it is a mis- 
nomer. And yet Mr. Spencer wrote an elaborate work en- 
titled, "The Data of Ethics." Let us note the following 
points : 

First: An unfree being would not be a responsible be- 
ing. He could not choose freely between good and evil. 
Whatever choice he might make would be coerced. There- 
fore he would be a mere automaton, not a moral being. 

Second: An unfree being could not execute its options, 
even if it could make them. Supposing it would even be 
possible for the Conscience to discern between the right and 
the wrong, yet, if the Will were not able to execute the de- 
cisions of Conscience, the latter would be a useless and 
inane faculty; it would be like a government without an 
executive department; like a monarch upon a throne, with 
no power to carry out his decrees. Such a theory would 
make the human mind an irrational quiddity. Let us note 
that the Deterministic theory is an absurdity: The human 
mind is endued with moral perception and feeling, so that 
it can differentiate between right and wrong, and actually 
feels their fundamental antagonism; and yet it has no 



1. "Principles of Psychology," Vol.I, p. 503 : "Psychical changes 
either conform to law or they do not. If they do not conform to 
law, this work, in common with all works on the subject, is sheer 
nonsense; no science of psychology is possible. If they do con- 
form to law, there cannot be any such thing as free will." Of 
course, when a man has no higher conceptions of law and causality 
than mere physical and mechanical force, he cannot grasp the idea 
of freedom, whose laws belong to a higher realm, that of the psy- 
chical and ethical. 



The Law of Right 105 

power to choose between them ! And then, if it should de- 
lude itself into believing that it had freely chosen the right, 
it would have a feeling of peace and self-approval; or if 
it should be so credulous as to fancy that it had elected the 
wrong, it would be smitten with compunction and remorse ! 
That is the reductio ad absurdum of Determinism. It 
means that the human soul is irrational in its very consti- 
tution, made so by the Power that brought it into being. 
Men may believe this, if they will ; but they should not call 
themselves rational when they do. 

d. Proofs of the freedom of the Will: 

(a) The testimony of consciousness: 

All rational men are clearly conscious of being moral 
agents, and if you should tell them that they are not re- 
sponsible beings, they would be deeply insulted. If they 
are not free, their consciousness deceives them, and that, 
too, in the paramount issues of life. This would rob life 
of its high and holy purpose. If consciousness is under a 
delusion in matters of morality, it is under similar delusion 
in all other matters. If it is not, why not? We cannot 
believe that we men are irrational beings placed in an ir- 
rational universe. No! we think better of ourselves, the 
universe, and its Maker! 

(b) The test of experiment: 

In these scientific days experiment is the touchstone of 
truth. Just as you can experiment with physical and chem- 
ical elements, and thereby demonstrate their reality, com- 
position and nature, so you can perform experiments with 
the Will, and the results will be just as clear and patent to 
your consciousness in the latter case as in the former. We 
have shown how this may be done in the movements of the 
arm. Test your power of selection in another way. Place 



106 A System of General Ethics 

a chair in the center of the room, and determine to pass 
around it in various ways for the express purpose of prov- 
ing your ability to choose. Remember that your only 
motive is to demonstrate your freedom. Now elect to pass 
around it to the left; now to the left again, just to prove 
that you have the option and ability ; now to the right or left 
just as you choose; now will to stand before it in any atti- 
tude you please ; now will to step upon the seat and stand 
there. Have you not demonstrated your power of choice? 
You are aware that you chose freely and were not coerced, 
not even by an overpowering motive. 

Should it be objected that these tests belong to the realm 
of the senses, we will go a step higher in the psychical 
sphere. Use your imagination; think of your childhood 
home, of Japan, China, Germany, England, the sun, the 
moon, Jupiter, Sirius, the Pleiades. Do you note how you 
can freely direct your imagination? In a similar way you 
find you can control your memory. Next, move up into 
the abstract realm, the realm of pure thinking: think of 
thought, of virtue, of truth, of being itself. Note your 
ability to determine your own thoughts by a simple effort 
of the Will. The question is not how you perform these 
acts of volition, but that you do. 

(c) The demands of man's environment: 

First: As has been shown in a previous section, the 
natural realm is so framed that man must constantly exer- 
cise the power of choice in order to preserve health, happi- 
ness, sanity, moral character, and even life itself. 

Second: Society is so constituted that it holds every 
rational person responsible for his character and conduct. 
Otherwise social order would be impossible; social chaos 
would reign. Would it not be passing strange, nay, more, 



The Law of Right 107 

would it not be preposterous, to believe that the very thing 
that conserves the social organism, and makes social life at 
all worth while, should be a delusion and a snare? 

Third : Human government is based on the fundamental 
principle that men are free, and therefore responsible, be- 
ings. If men were not free, how puerile it would be to 
threaten them with punishment for wrong-doing, and then 
actually punish them when they were driven by necessity 
to criminal action ! Xo government built on the principle 
that men are mere automata could long endure. Xo nation 
has ever yet dared to take the risk of establishing a govern- 
ment on such an hypothesis. 

(d) The mind's intuitive distinction: 

The mind intuitively differentiates between free and 
forced actions. The author has used the following illus- 
tration in the class-room. Suppose, first, that a pupil, after 
the class had been dismissed, walks voluntarily out of the 
room into the hall. Some one asks him, "Did you come 
out of the class-room of your own free will and accord?" 
He replies, in tones of surprise, "Certainly I did!*' But 
suppose, secondly, that he has been disorderly, and some 
one ejects him by force from the room, and then he is asked 
the same question, "Did you come out of the room of your 
own free will and accord?" his answer would be, "No, I 
was thrown out by force !" A child intuitively knows the 
difference between a voluntary and a forced action. What 
clearer practical evidence can be adduced for the doctrine 
of freedom? 

(e) Determinism inconsistent with itself: 

Those who deny the freedom of the Will do not and dare 
not live and act according to their own theory. Insult or 
strike a determinist, and see whether he will excuse you on 



108 A System of General Ethics 

the ground that you were not free and "couldn't help it!" 
Should any determinist read these lines, he may resent our 
use of this practical argument, and chide us for employing 
ad-hominem methods; but just to give him a taste of his 
own theory, we reply, "We cannot help it!" A theory of 
the Will that cannot be applied to practical life is only of 
speculative interest; it has no real value. 2 

(f) Experience versus speculation: 

Freedom rests on direct and positive experience, on the 
testimony of consciousness ; while all forms of Determin- 
ism are based on speculation; on a vain attempt to figure 
out mental processes by merely physical and mathematical 
methods. 

(g) Harmful results of Determinism: 

If all men were to deny the freedom of the Will, the 
consequences would be baleful. Such a theory would pro- 
duce moral flabbiness, and men would everywhere, when 
guilty of misdemeanor, plead that they "couldn't help it." 
It would let down the moral bars, and open the sluices of 
license and vice. The morally strong and upright men of 
history have always held to strict views of the freedom of 
the Will, whereas only the moral weaklings have doubted 



2. We cannot help feeling amused at Mr. Thilly's efforts to prove 
the deterministic view and to disprove the libertarian view in his 
'Introduction to Ethics." On pages 337, 338 he says: "The deter- 
ministic theory is not, however, a discouraging and paralyzing doc- 
trine. On the contrary, the knowledge that we are determined 
must determine us to avoid certain conditions, and seek others more 
favorable." The very words "avoid" and "seek" connote the power 
of free choice, and prove that, as we have said in the text, it is im- 
possible for the Determinist to be logically consistent. He always 
reaches a point in his analysis where he has to admit the fact of 
freedom, whether he wants to or not. 



The Law of Right 109 

or denied it. A bracing motto for all men would be the 

couplet : 

"I'm the captain of my soul, 
I'm the master of may fate." 

Emerson's lines are worth pondering well: 

"For He that worketh high and wise, 

Nor pauseth in His plan, 
Will tear the sun out of the skies, 
Ere freedom out of man." 

(h) Objections stated and confuted: 

First: The Necessitarian says that freedom is an insol- 
uble mystery. How can the Will determine itself? How 
can anything start itself, move itself, initiate action by its 
own inherent powers? "How can these things be?" We 
cannot see into the inner process; we cannot prove it step 
by step. 

Our reply is: True enough, freedom is a mystery, and 
we cannot understand the mind's inner power of self- 
movement. But all mental phenomena are mysteries. 
Sense-perception is a marvellous mystery. No one under- 
stands just how men see, hear, taste, touch and smell. 
How can an external object impinge an image on the retina? 
How does the optic nerve convey the image back into the 
brain center? How does it then blossom out into the con- 
sciousness? How is the connection between the molecular 
action in the cerebrum and the mental awareness estab- 
lished? How can material things be translated into terms 
of mentality? These are insoluble mysteries to psychol- 
ogists and physiologists alike. Then there are the prob- 
lems of reflection, memory, imagination, and the intuitions. 
Is not the problem of Epistemology one of the outstanding, 
and as yet unsolved, problems of philosophy? In all these 



110 A System of General Ethics 

matters we can do nothing but fall back on experience. 
We know that we see, hear, reflect, remember and perceive. 
No less clearly do we know that we choose between alter- 
natives, and do so without compulsion. 

Second objection: In nature every effect must have its 
cause; and cause and effect are not the same force or 
entity, but something outside of or different from each 
other. So if the Will is on a balance, that is, if it is per- 
fectly equilibrate, something outside of itself must move it 
one way or the other; it could not move itself. 

Reply: The above is the argument of Materialism, 
which fails to distinguish between psychical and physical 
actions and categories. It can grasp the doctrine of cause 
and effect only in terms of material substances, which can 
be perceived by the senses only. But thinkers should re- 
member that, in the psychical realm, there are often moral 
and spiritual causes, utterly impalpable to sense perception, 
that are more potent, decisive and epoch-making than any 
or all of the physical forces in the universe. We have al- 
ready seen that the Ought, if placed in the scales, would 
outweigh the whole material cosmos. So the mind, being 
spiritual, is swayed by spiritual considerations, and is there- 
fore endued by its Maker with a capacity that in many 
ways, and those the most vital and exalted, far transcend 
mere material forces. Now, since the soul is so constituted 
that it can weigh and compare both moral and material 
values, it would be passing strange if it were not endowed 
with the power to distinguish the more worthy from the 
less worthy, and to choose between them. Therefore when 
the human Ego acts in the way of self-determination, it 
does not act without sufficient cause; but the causes that 
influence it lie in a realm that is higher and nobler than 
mere materiality. Rational beings, made in the image of 



The Law of Right 111 

their Creator, ought to be able to think in ethical and spir- 
itual terms and realities, not merely in those that are me- 
chanical and materialistic. 

Third objection: A certain class of theorists contend 
that the strongest motive must prevail in every case. If 
the Will is swayed by motives, as it must be, it surely must 
be pushed forward, nolens volens, by the strongest motive. 
If a number of motives are pressing upon the mind, the 
most powerful one must finally prevail. Thus there is no 
freedom, no choice, but merely a battle of motives in the 
soul, the strongest ultimately winning the victory. This 
is the argument from causality carried up into the purely 
psychical realm, and is therefore the astutest argument that 
Determinists can adduce. 

Reply: We have already shown that the rational mind 
does not act without rational motives ; it would not be 
rational if it did. However, the argument that the strong- 
est motive must coerce the Will does not go deep enough 
in its analysis of the psychical process. Let us assume a 
case, a very common one in human experience. Here is 
a man who meets with a temptation to do wrong. At least 
two motives press upon his mind — first, the immediate 
pleasure to be derived from the act; second, the urging of 
conscience to resist the evil and do the right. Now note 
the process carefully: What is it that stops, gives atten- 
tion, and weighs and compares the alternatives before act- 
ing? Is it not the soul itself? Does not that fact of itself 
connote freedom of will? If the soul were not free, the 
individual would not pause and debate for a moment when 
the temptation comes, but would yield to it per force at 
once. After balancing and counter-balancing the motives 
of pleasure and righteousness for a time, what is it that 
must finally decide between the two, that must turn the 



112 A System of General Ethics 

scales? Is it not the mind itself? Yes, it must decide 
which is the stronger motive — that of pleasure or that of 
moral integrity. Observe discriminatingly : it is not the 
strongest motive that forces the Will, but it is the mind 
which decides which is the strongest motive, and then the 
Will executes the mind's behest. In thus deciding, the 
soul exercises its freedom. It is not something outside of 
the soul that determines which is the strongest motive, but 
the soul itself by means of the conscience and the rational 
faculty. If it is the soul itself that weighs, balances and 
decides between motives, then the soul is not pushed on- 
ward by any compulsion, but acts of its own accord, using 
the powers with which it has been endued. This is the 
marvel of those mental struggles which have made or 
marred many a man in the moral conflicts of life. 3 

Suppose we analyze the experience that comes to the soul 
after such a mental wrestling match. If the man yields 
to the allurement, he feels a sense of shame and guilt, for 
he knows that he was not forced to do wrong; his Con- 
science urged him to resist; and now it is his Conscience 
that upbraids him because he disobeyed its voice. Would 
he have this feeling of guilt and humiliation if he were not 
conscious of being a free agent? Therefore his conscious- 
ness itself bears him inner witness that he is to blame for 
the wrong choice he made. On the other hand, if he with- 
stands the temptation, and preserves his integrity, he is 
conscious of moral approval; the "still, small voice" within 
him commends his action as noble, strong and praiseworthy, 
and that is a distinctively ethical satisfaction. Why should 



3. Jean Valjean's terrific wrestle with his conscience, so dramatic- 
ally described by Victor Hugo in "Les Miserables," is a notable 
example in fiction, and has, no doubt, been duplicated more than 
once in real life. 



The Law of Right 113 

he have such a feeling of approval if he was a mere autom- 
aton played upon by irresistible forces? If man is con- 
scious of freedom, and yet is not free; if he is conscious 
of guilt when he does wrong, and yet is not guilty; if he 
is conscious of moral approval when he does right, and yet 
is not deserving, then the mind of man is irrational in its 
very roots, in its very constitution. Then, too, even those 
who hold that the Will is not free have no rational ground 
for their contention. 

Fourth objection: Next we note the objections from 
heredity, temperament and environment. On these loci the 
champions of Determinism present what they regard as 
some of their strongest arguments against the libertarian 
view. They insist that men are born under the handicap 
of heredity, and cannot help being what they are and doing 
what they do. All the lines of ancestry converge to make 
them just what they are, and they cannot be otherwise. 
They are victims rather than free agents. It is also main- 
tained that natural temperament 4 (which must come largely 
from heredity) holds every man in its inexorable leash. 
Those Determinists who do not attribute man's moral status 
wholly to inheritance and temperament lay the account 
largely to environment and education. For example, how 
can a child born and reared in the slums be other than what 
he is — a moral outcast? Perhaps from his earliest con- 
sciousness he has been taught to lie and steal. What chance 
has such a child to develop moral freedom and character? 
On the other hand, the child who is well-born, who is sur- 
rounded all his life by wholesome influences, cannot help 



4. The following are the several kinds of temperament: San- 
guine, Melancholic, Bilious, Nervous, Phlegmatic and Tempered. 
Of course the classes often intergrade and vary in degree. The 
Tempered Temperament is that of the well-balanced man. The 
other classes are self-explanatory. 



114 A System of General Ethics 

being upright; no credit is due him for not becoming a 
moral reprobate. Some years ago a rather crass material- 
ist declared that " a man is the result of every circumstance 
that ever touched him." 

Reply: We have tried to state the objector's argument 
as strongly as possible, and have not intended in any way 
to weaken or blur his viewpoint. Our purpose is to be 
helpful to the thinker rather than polemical in argumenta- 
tion. So our refutation must be as frank, fair and thor- 
ough as we can make it. 

First : Let it be candidly admitted that heredity, temper- 
ament and environment exercise a strong influence on all 
persons, and, to a large extent, determine their moral and 
spiritual status. It must be conceded, too, that, in this 
world, which has been so sadly affected by sin and evil, men 
do not have an equal chance to be moral and upright. No 
one who is at all acquainted with social and economic con- 
ditions can help making these concessions to the Determin- 
ist. Hence they are honestly made here. 

Second: If, on account of bad birth and environment, 
there are human beings who are totally lacking in rational 
intelligence, moral sense and freedom of will, such persons 
cannot be regarded as responsible for their condition and 
actions; and therefore they should be treated accordingly 
by society and the civil law. We have institutions for the 
feeble-minded, the idiotic and the maniacal. Society usu- 
ally is not so obtuse as to regard irresponsible people as 
amenable to the law or capable of moral conduct. Our 
faith in God also leads us to believe that He will not hold 
such defective persons to account. 

Third : There are degrees of freedom. People who are 
born well, and are reared in favorable moral and spiritual 



The Law of Right 115 

conditions, have a larger degree of optionality than have 
those who are more or less handicapped by bad birth and 
surroundings. This does not mean, however, that the 
latter class have no freedom at all. But they are respon- 
sible only for the light and freedom they possess, not 
for what they do not possess. You do not expect a 
child to lift as much as a man; you expect him to lift 
only a child's burden. So the person who has a small 
degree of intelligence, freedom and opportunity cannot 
carry as large a burden of responsibility as the person who 
is more favorably born and situated. In all justice there 
must be a fair and gradient measure of requirement and 
accountability. A correct and most judicial principle is 
that laid down by Christ: "To whom much is given, of 
him shall much be required' (Luke 12:48). Hence both 
God and society will not demand as much from persons 
who are meagerly equipped by nature and environment as 
from those whose opportunities are better. "According to 
that a man hath, not according to that he hath not" (2 Cor. 
8: 12), is the true norm of responsibility. 

After all, society does not treat the people of the slums 
(taking them as examples of persons most encumbered 
with moral handicap) as if they were wholly irresponsible. 
If they were, the law would not permit them to be at large, 
but would confine them in asylums and reformatories. 
This proves a consensus of opinion that they have some 
degree of freedom and accountability. True justice will 
make due allowance for their disadvantages, but will not 
wholly exonerate them for plain wrong-doing. There is 
an old saying that "there is honor even among thieves," 
which means that everywhere in the human world there is 
some degree of moral discernment and liberty. It would 
be a misfortune for philanthropists, however kind and char- 



116 A System of General Ethics 

itable, to regard their beneficiaries as wholly irresponsible, 
and to treat them so. This leads us to an important con- 
sideration. 

That part of the community which has a better heritage 
and environment owes it as a solemn duty to give all pos- 
sible aid to the so-called lower classes. That is part of 
their moral task in the world. They should not despise 
the poor, nor look upon them as hopelessly reprobate; nor 
should they selfishly neglect them. And they should give 
them more than mere material help. This should not be 
neglected; but if it should be made the whole sum of 
charity, it would simply tend to pauperize the beneficiaries. 
The help that is given should also consist of moral and spir- 
itual uplift and inspiration; it should seek to stir the con- 
science into activity, to arouse the ability of freedom and 
the sense of responsibility, to create the desire to conquer 
the evil and attain the good. Hence the best help is that 
which leads to self-help. In many cases it is better to give 
people honorable work than material charity. Let us in- 
dicate the difference between the Determinist and the true 
ethical helper and reformer. If there are people in the 
community who are under the handicap of a poor moral 
opportunity, the Determinist will fold his hands, declare 
that they are not responsible, complain about nature's in- 
equalities, and so do nothing to aid them ; whereas the gen- 
uine libertarian will go to their succor, offer them help and 
encouragement, appeal to the meager conscience and sense 
of freedom they have, and try to awaken them into real 
moral action. Nothing so effectually cuts the nerve of 
humanitarian endeavor as does the philosophy of Deter- 
minism; whereas the true principles of ethics will furnish 
abundant motive for all kinds of philanthropic effort. 



The Law of Right 117 

(i) Limitations of freedom: 

The proponent of freedom frankly admits that the Will 
is limited in many ways; but that is no reason for believ- 
ing that man has no freedom at all. Man's powers are all 
finite, and so is the will, since it belongs to the same entity. 
Yet who would say that the intellect can know nothing be- 
cause it does not know everything? So men would reason 
very lamely who would say that the Will has no liberty be- 
cause it is not omnipotent. 

Let us illustrate. You have some strength, but your 
strength is limited. You can easily lift the book lying on 
your desk, but you cannot uproot one of the giant oaks 
growing on the campus. Another illustration is this : 
Driving along a country road, you have seen a horse teth- 
ered to a stake in a pasture-field by the wayside. The ani- 
mal can graze anywhere within the circle to the end of his 
rope, but beyond the periphery of that boundary he cannot 
go. So with the human will. It is free within its divinely 
prescribed limits, but further it cannot range; and that 
circle of limitation is also the limit of every man's responsi- 
bility. God will not hold him amenable beyond the bound- 
ary of his freedom, and society and human government 
should not do so. 5 



5. For a powerful vindication of the freedom of the will consult 
Professor L. Franklin Gruber's recent book (1918), "Creation Ex 
Nihilo," pages 97 and 98 — a work of the highest merit, most schol- 
arly and well reasoned. Consult also Dr. A. S. Pringle - Pattison's 
"The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy" (1917, page 
31), where the author, interpreting Kant, says: "First of all, the 
imperative of duty involves, as its self-evident condition, the free- 
dom of the being on whom the command is laid. 'Thou canst be- 
cause thou oughtest.' Kant . . . says that the being who can con- 
ceive of the idea of a law possesses, by virtue of that very fact, the 
power of realizing it. We accept such responsibility when we con- 
demn ourselves, as we do, for our own failures. So understood, 
freedom and intelligence go together." 



118 * A System of General Ethics 

4. Motives or Intentions: 

(1) Definition: 

A motive or intention is the reason why a moral agent 
lives and acts as he does; it is the purpose of his life and 
conduct, the end he has in view. The motive might be 
called the inside of an action. 

(2) Motives essential to moral agency: 

In a psychical outline it is difficulty to locate motives. 
One superficial critic thinks they should be placed in the 
Will; but that is too obviously wrong to need reasoned 
refutation. The motives are evidently in the reason and 
the feelings. Men often are impelled by pure processes of 
reason for doing things ; at other times men are controlled 
by their emotions, and sometimes they are moved partly 
by reason and partly by emotion. The Will is simply the 
executive functioning power of the mind, and therefore 
only carries out the behests of reason, conscience and emo- 
tions. Now, since the motives lie in the reason and the 
feelings, they must be essential to moral agency, because if 
men acted without motive or purpose, they would not be 
rational beings, and would for that very reason not be re- 
sponsible. Think for a moment of a being who would live 
without a purpose ; you can see at once that he would not 
be a rational being. 

(3) Varied relations of Motives: 
a. To the Will : 

In a preceding section (consult "Motives" and "Will" 
in the Index), we have given this point sufficient discussion, 
and need simply to repeat here that motives influence, but 
do not coerce, the Will. If they did, the Will would not 
be free, and hence man would not be a moral agent. 



The Law of Right 119 

b. To the actor: 

This is a most interesting thesis in Ethics. The motive 
determines the moral status of the actor, but not of the act. 
A man might do a wrong act with a sincere motive; in 
which case he would not be guilty, because he acted ac- 
cording to his best light. In common language we say, he 
did wrong, but he was sincere; "it was a mistake of the 
head and not of heart." By this we mean that, an account 
of the difficulty of the situation, his intellectual judgment 
was at fault, but his intention was honest. 

Again, a man might perform an act that was right in 
itself, but might do it with an ulterior motive of selfishness ; 
then he would have no merit; rather, all the more demerit, 
because he used the garb of truth for purposes of deception. 

While these are vital distinctions in Ethics, and should 
always be kept in mind, they should never excuse men for 
being careless in examining the ground and moral status 
of any course of action merely because they are sincere. 
It is not a sufficient reason for ill-considered conduct for a 
person to protest his honesty of purpose ; for had he been 
so pellucidly honest as he professes to be, he would not 
have acted prematurely, but would have investigated more 
thoroughly or waited for more light. 

The utterly sincere man will also, as soon as he is con- 
vinced of an error, reverse his decision and order his life 
accordingly. In brief, true, thorough-going Ethics de- 
mands that men shall constantly seek for more knowledge 
of all ethical reality, just as true scholarship impels men to 
constant and larger investigation in any chosen sphere of 
study. 

c. To the action : 

True Ethics holds that there is an absolute law of right, 



120 A System of General Ethics 

a real moral standard, and that all conduct must be meas- 
ured by that norm, irrespective of the motive that impels 
the actor. Even though the motive of the actor may be 
sincere, that does not make a wrong act right in itself ; nor 
will a wrong motive change a right act into a wrong one. 
In the first case those who have more light should show 
the actor that, though he was sincere, his action was wrong, 
so that he may rectify it and may not repeat it; while in 
the second case the motive should be rebuked and corrected, 
but the act itself commended. True Ethics ever seeks to 
uphold the ideal both of the motive and action. 



DIVISION IV 
THE ANTITHESIS OF RIGHT 



CHAPTER VIII 



I. CONNECTING LINK. 

II. DEFINITION AND TERM. 

1. Definition of sin. 

2. The term sin. 

III. THE FACT OF SIN. 

1. Proved by universal experience. 

2. Proved by the fact of moral distinctions. 

(1) Definition. 

(2) Proofs of moral distinctions. 

a. Universal consciousness. 

b. A postulate of human society. 

c. A postulate of human government. 

d. Argument from the constitution of the human body. 

e. Difficulties considered. 

f. The morally indifferent sphere. 

g. A higher and a lower good, 
h. Questions of casuistry. 



I. CONNECTING LINK. 

In the development of our ethical system thus far we 
have considered, first, the Ground of Right, second, the 
Law of Right in the Creation. In all our discussions some- 
thing has been implied, and in more than one instance has 
even had to be mentioned. It has not been like a haunting, 
shadowy specter, but, rather, has been a grim and terrible 
reality. It has been the fact of the antithesis or opponent 
of the Right, namely, the Wrong, the unethical, what we 



122 A System of General Ethics 

shall plainly call Sin. The very conception of the Right 
would connote at least the possibility, if not the actuality, 
of the Wrong. As the world is at present constituted, we 
cannot think of the Right without thinking of its opposite. 
That there is something wrong with the world of humanity 
goes without saying; every one must admit it. 

Since the science of Ethics deals with moral questions, 
and its main thesis is the Right, it must also, in order to be 
complete and thorough-going, deal fundamentally with that 
which opposes the Right and seeks to destroy it — namely, 
Sin. There are works on ethics, it must be admitted, that 
deal very slightingly with this theme. You will look in 
vain in the indexes of some such works for the word "sin." 
It is either treated under some milder and more euphonious 
term, or is practically ignored. But it is this very thing 
which we call sin that makes our moral tasks difficult and 
our moral problems perplexing and sometimes almost in- 
soluble. We must not shirk our duty here; we must not 
shrink from dealing with this vital problem with all the 
frankness, fairness and thoroughness we can command. 
To this difficult but absorbing task we must now apply our- 
selves. Let us do so with sincere, serious and reverent 
minds, for sin is a grave reality. 

II. DEFINITION AND TERM. 

1. Definition of Sin: 

Sin is any principle, state or act that is contrary to the 
Law of Right, or the moral law of God. 

2. The term Sin: 

In this work we shall deliberately use the term sin 
(Greek, au-apria, a missing, a failure). It is a stronger 
word than the word "wrong," and always connotes the idea 



The Antithesis of Right 123 

of a willful transgression of the law of righteousness, thus 
involving real guilt. It is probably the best and most 
familiar word we have in the English language to desig- 
nate the fundamental antagonism of the wrong to the 
right and the heinous character of the former. The ethi- 
cist who uses this term cannot look lightly upon the wrong, 
but must regard it as a very serious and vital obliquity. A 
less sturdy ethical view, one that minimizes the distinction 
between right and wrong, will not be likely to use the word 
"sin;" but, in our view, it is better and honester to call 
things by their right name. It is a disservice to humanity 
to employ euphemisms in describing things that are wrong 
and baleful. Although, as will be seen later, there are 
varying degrees of sinfulness, we must look upon sin as 
real guilt, as an inexcusable violation of the moral law. 

III. THE FACT OF SIN. 

1. Proved by universal experience: 

Were it not for the fact that some ethical writers try to 
minimize the wrong, and either blur or obliterate moral 
distinctions, it would not be necessary to argue the question 
of the reality of sin. However, in view of the fact that 
the consciousness of sin is practically universal, it is vain 
to deny the sad and stern reality of the presence of sin in 
the world. However men may speculate as to the origin 
of sin, it is here, and all of us must recognize its deadly 
character. It is the moral virus of the world. In the 
ethical realm it is what poison, disease and corruption are 
in the natural realm. There is a law written large and 
graven deep on the consciences of men that tells them they 
have done wrong and are responsible for their misdeeds. 
They cannot wipe out the smiting of the conscience. Even 



124 A System of General Ethics 

when men go so far as to deny the existence of God, they 
still cannot ignore the "still, small voice" of conscience 
within them. If sin is not a reality, why should men be 
so constituted as to feel culpable for wrong doing? Such 
a delusion and lie would make man's psychical nature ir- 
rational. 

We come now to one of the basic themes of the science 
of Ethics — the fact of moral distinctions. By considering 
this vital theme we shall adduce further proofs of the re- 
ality of sin, for it is the actuality of moral evil that brings 
out this difference between right and wrong in sharp relief. 

2. Moral Distinctions: 

(1) Definition: 

BY MORAIi DISTINCTIONS WE MEAN THE FUNDA- 
MENTAL DIFFERENCE AND ANTAGONISM BETWEEN 
RIGHT AND WRONG. 

We desire to lay emphasis on the word "antagonism" in 
the above definition, because right and wrong are basally 
opposed, and must ever seek to destroy each other's influ- 
ence and rule. Forever and forever there can be no truce 
between right and wrong. In their very nature they are 
deadly foes. It is only a weak, indeterminate kind of 
Ethics that in any way belittles or blurs this distinction. 1 

(2) Proofs of Moral Distinctions : 
a. Universal consciousness: 

Just as the fact of sin is proved by the universal con- 
sciousness of the human family, so with the fact of moral 
distinctions. Everywhere individuals and nations differ- 



1. The Christian Scriptures speak in clarion tones on this sub- 
ject: "Woe unto them that call evil good, and good evil; that put 
darkness for light, and light for darkness ; that put bitter for sweet, 
and sweet for bitter" (Isa. 5:20). 



The Antithesis of Right 125 

entiate intuitively between right and wrong. However 
they may differ in the application of moral principles to 
specific cases, they agree on the primary fact that right is 
good and wrong is evil, and that right and wrong are per 
se opposed to each other and mutually destructive. True, 
the child just budding into consciousness may have to have 
this difference suggested to him by parents and teachers, 
but he has an innate disposition to accept the fact, his con- 
science responding to it, just as the mathematical faculty 
responds to mathematical teaching. 

If the discriminating psychologist wishes to distinguish 
between the content and faculty or capacity, we have no 
objection whatever, because, while the content may come 
to the mind by suggestion from the outside, in every normal 
human being there must be the innate capacity or function- 
ing ability to which the suggestion makes successful appeal. 
Otherwise the suggestion could never find a lodgment in 
the mind; it would fall on sterile and unreceptive soil. 

Dr. Milton Valentine, in his excellent work on "Theo- 
retical Ethics" (pp. 28-36), proves most effectively that the 
fact of moral distinctions is involved, not only in personal 
consciousness, but also in the social organism, human his- 
tory, literature, anthropology and religion. Society agrees 
collectively on the broad principle that right and wrong 
are opposed, and that right makes for human welfare and 
wrong for human decay and ruin. 

While in human history wrong often prevails for a time, 
and there has not always been steady moral progress, yet, 
in a most fundamental and often striking way, the right is 
vindicated sooner or later, while a kind of Nemesis pursues 
the individual or the nation that does wrong. How few 
people who live corruptly and selfishly are long remem- 
bered after they are dead! Even if they are remembered, 



126 A System of General Ethics 

it is not with affection and respect. On the other hand, 
the men and women who have been great in goodness, as 
well as in genius, are the ones whose praises are rung by 
succeeding generations. 

The best and most enduring literature is that which up- 
holds the right and condemns the wrong. The morally 
pernicious book soon falls under sentence of reprobation. 

Ethnology impresses the same lesson, for no nation or 
tribe has yet been found that does not make moral distinc- 
tions. In some countries religion and morality are not as 
closely allied as they should be ; but in every religion there 
dwells this basal idea — that some things are right and salu- 
tary and others are wrong and baleful. And this is true 
in heathen lands as well as Christian. The apostle Paul, 
an ethical writer of deep insight, says of the heathen: 
"They show the work of the law written in their hearts, 
their conscience bearing witness therewith, and their 
thoughts either accusing or else excusing one another" 
(Rom. 2:15). 

Now, since the universal consciousness testifies that right 
and wrong are fundamentally opposed, it is reasonable to 
believe that this distinction is an objective reality, not 
merely a subjective delusion. If it is the latter, it certainly 
is a widespread one, and practically the whole world is de- 
ceived by the native intuitions of the mind. Such a view 
would make the world an irrational one, and the best and 
noblest human intuitions a hallucination. To such a belief 
we cannot subscribe. It is much more reasonable to accept 
the view that the universal consciousness bears witness to 
a basal moral reality. 

b. Moral distinctions a postulate of human society: 
The social organism is largely built upon the fact that 



The Antithesis of Right 127 

some things are right and others wrong per se } and we do 
not believe that these distinctions are merely artificial and 
arbitrary. Men who are interested in human welfare may 
well ask themselves seriously how long human society 
would endure were moral distinctions to be obliterated. 
No social circle has ever yet dared to try the experiment of 
breaking down all distinctions between right and wrong. 
Moreover, the best social organizations, and the most per- 
during and useful, are those that insist most urgently upon 
true virtue in their members. This is a cogent argument 
for the objective reality of moral distinctions. 

c. Moral distinctions a postulate of human government : 
All enduring civic institutions are erected on the principle 

that right and wrong are realities, not mere phantasms. 
We have already dealt sufficiently with this point. No gov- 
ernment could long exist that did not recognize this prin- 
ciple and build upon it. If right is not right and good, why 
are laws so framed as to reward and honor right doing? 
And if wrong is not wrong and pernicious, why does civil 
law reprobate and punish the offender? It is because gov- 
ernments perceive that they cannot stand if they abolish the 
distinction between good and evil. No truer epigram was 
ever written than this : "Righteousness exalteth a nation, 
but sin is a reproach to any people" (Prov. 14:34). 

d. Argument from the constitution of the human body: 
The human body is so constituted that the selfsame ac- 
tions which the conscience pronounces sinful are harmful 
to it, while those that are perceived to be right make for 
health, exhilaration and happiness. Note the terrible con- 
sequences to the human body of sexual lust and all kinds 
of excess and debauchery. Every insurance company looks 
upon good, upright and temperate people as the best "risks." 



128 A System of General Ethics 

While some good people are compelled to suffer, often 
through little or no fault of their own, yet they do not 
suffer from those ruinous diseases that are the result of 
sinful indulgence. The suffering of the innocent is a prob- 
lem that mere human philosophy can do little toward solv- 
ing; but there is enough wreckage of the human body 
caused by sinful indulgence to prove that it is framed to fit 
into an economy of moral distinctions. 

The speculatist in Philosophy and Ethics is prone to raise 
problems ; and so our next task will be to try to resolve 
some of his difficulties. 

e. Difficulties considered: 

First: In practical life it is not always easy to discrim- 
inate between right and wrong; indeed, in some cases it is 
quite difficult to do so. Often the person who really de- 
sires to do right is puzzled to know which course to pursue. 
Besides, right and wrong often seem to be blurred and 
mixed, so that motives and actions are partly right and 
partly wrong. In other words, the line of demarkation 
cannot always be sharply drawn. Does not this prove that 
the doctrine of moral distinctions is, after all, only a fig- 
ment? 

In reply we would say, first, that sin has come into the 
world, and its very nature is to cause ethical turbulence, to 
blur the distinction between right and wrong, and thus make 
man's moral task in the world a trying and laborious one. 
That is sin's business. If it did not create moral disturb- 
ance, it would not be sin, just as, if there were no physical 
disease in the world, there would be no people who are 
partly well and partly ill. Again, it is the nature of sin to 
blind men's moral perceptions and dull their sensibilities, 
so they cannot always clearly discern the right and delimit 
it from the wrong. 



The Antithesis of Right 129 

Nor is that all. If sin had not come into the world, men 
would have no real moral tasks, no difficult ethical prob- 
lems ; the right would always be clearly perceived, because 
there would be no evil to cloud the moral issues, to obscure 
the moral vision, and to handicap the moral powers. Then 
doing right would always be the easy and natural course. 

Thus we should not puzzle ourselves unduly over this 
problem, but should remember that, in spite of sin, the cos- 
mos is a rational one, and therefore cherishing and doing 
the right will enable men more and more clearly to differ- 
entiate it from the wrong, and will also give the ego more 
and more the habit of right thinking and right doing. Diffi- 
cult as it often is to apply the law of right to special cases, 
yet the primary perception and feeling that some things are 
right and others wrong persists, proving that the difference 
between them is real, not fanciful. Because mathematical 
problems are difficult, and the tyro makes frequent errors 
in mastering this discipline, does not prove that mathemat- 
ical rules and laws are only a delusion of the mind. The 
same method of reason holds with reference to moral dis- 
tinctions. 

Second : Another difficulty is that there is so much di- 
versity of moral judgment among men and nations. 

We have already considered this topic in our discussion 
of the Conscience. Here we simply repeat that the primary 
intuitive perception of a fundamental difference between 
right and wrong still holds good the world over; it is only 
in the secondary moral judgments and in the application of 
the primary principle to specific cases that diversities of 
view arise. It is the same with truth. All normal persons 
believe that there is such a quality as truth; also an abso- 
lute standard of truth; yet, in practical life, how many, 
many times it is hard to distinguish truth from error! In 



130 A System of General Ethics 

Esthetics the same principle obtains. That there is a real 
objective standard of beauty no one will deny; yet how 
much difference prevails in the application of the norm to 
specific objects ! So, since morality is a part of the world, 
and not something aloof and set off by itself, we should not 
feel unduly agitated because we cannot always agree in 
specific cases just what is right and what is wrong. 

(3) The "morally indifferent" sphere: 

Is there such a sphere? Strictly and fundamentally 
speaking, when the reference is to man's states and acts, 
there is not. Every state and act must be either right or 
wrong, or a mixture of the two. That is, a moral being 
can never be in a non-moral state — at least, not so long as 
he is conscious. 

However, the term "morally indifferent" has been ap- 
plied to certain conditions and choices of life, though not 
with strict accuracy. For example, there are two equally 
distant ways from my home to the recitation hall. In many 
cases it is morally indifferent which of the two ways I se- 
lect, and so I often take one way or the other as I list, 
without giving even to myself any specific reason for my 
choice. This morning I came one way, and I did right in 
doing so, and did not do wrong because I did not elect the 
other way. If men choose to call such a circumstance an 
instance of the "morally indifferent," it may be regarded 
as an allowable mode of speech or an usus loquendi. We 
shall show presently why it is not strictly accurate. 

Let us ask just now why God has left in human life such 
a sphere — that is, why there are so many times and places 
in life when we may choose either alternative without doing 
wrong. He had a good and sufficient reason. If the ques- 
tion of right and wrong were brought sharply before our 



The Antithesis of Right 131 

consciences every moment of our lives; if we could not 
take a step without being confronted by it, life would be a 
constant duress and bondage, a wearisome debate, an unen- 
durable struggle; there would be no room for any spon- 
taneous movement of life. Think how large a sphere there 
is where we can do right without effort; where we need 
not be in fear of violating the moral law or of offending 
God, whether we choose one course or another. We ought 
to be grateful to God that He has established so kindly a 
regime, and has not made life too strenuous for us. The 
moral imperative is not intended to crush us, but to develop 
us in a joyful life of righteousness. 

Still, it behooves us to be watchful lest we widen this 
sphere unduly, so as to blur our perception of moral dis- 
tinctions. Therefore we must sound a warning note here. 
Let us again cite the example of the two equi-distant walks 
to the college hall. Suppose I knew there was some one 
on one of the ways whom it would be my duty to meet, then 
it would be wrong for me to choose the other way, for that 
would be evading my duty. Thus, whenever there is a 
moral reason for electing one alternative rather than the 
other, then the choice between them cannot rightly be called 
morally indifferent. 

We have said, however, that in reality there is no morally 
indifferent sphere for moral beings. Let us go back to our 
illustration of the equi-distant ways to the recitation build- 
ing. Under ordinary circumstances, whether I shall take 
this way or that is not a matter of choice between right and 
wrong at all. The question of right only enters in. It is 
right for me to go either way. So, instead of being a ques- 
tion of right or wrong, it is a question of choosing between 
two rights of equal value. However, such a situation is 
not removed from the moral sphere, because, whether I 



132 A System of General Ethics 

choose one way or the other, I am doing right, I am per- 
forming my duty. Therefore, accurately speaking, there 
is no place in human life for the "morally indifferent." It 
is a misnomer for those loci in human experience when the 
choice lies between rights of balanced value, and when the 
wrong does not obtrude itself at all. We should call it the 
sphere of the "altogether right," which is the realm of the 
highest virtue. Otherwise those who are walking in the 
way of righteousness without strain and temptation would 
be in a state of "moral indifference," which would be 
absurd. 

(4) A higher and a lower good: 

Some speculative writers hold that the only ground of 
moral distinctions is the difference between a higher and a 
lower good. James Martineau was an expounder of this 
doctrine, for he says : "Every action is right which, in the 
presence of a lower principle, follows a higher ; every ac- 
tion is wrong which, in the presence of a higher principle, 
follows a lower." 2 

There is an obvious truth here. In this world of moral 
complications there are loci which are neither wholly right 
nor wholly wrong, but a mixture of good and evil. Al- 
most everywhere we find more or less turbulence. So 
sometimes one good has less of the evil element in it than 
another. In such cases we are in duty bound to choose the 
higher good, and if we do not do so, we do wrong; we 
commit sin. A sterling ethic must insist on this principle. 

However, Martineau's statement does not exhaust the 
doctrine of moral distinctions, but is only a partial truth, 
and therefore may do harm by its very superficiality. It 
would obliterate the real antagonism between right and 



2. "Types of Ethical Theory," Vol. II, Sec. 15. 



The Antithesis of Right 133 

wrong; it would also tend to minimize the heinousness of 
the wrong, its corrupt and evil character per se. If men 
should generally hold the idea that sin, after all, is only a 
lesser good, or making a choice of a lesser good in the pres- 
ence of a greater good, they would, by that very token, have 
lost their sense of the "exceeding sinfulness of sin." No! 
men's intuitions are surer guides than the "cobwebbery" of 
some speculative minds; for men hold that lying, stealing, 
adultery and murder are not lower goods, but evils per se 
of the most positive character, and are in nowise and no 
degree to be extenuated. Right and wrong must be called 
by different names, and must be looked upon as utterly 
antagonistic. 

(5) Questions of casuistry: 

The term "casuistry" is used in a good sense and a bad 
sense. In the good sense it is a branch of ethical science 
which deals with difficult cases of conscience (casus con- 
scientiae). All will admit that there are many situations 
in life where, as Desdemona said, we "do here perceive a 
divided duty." The line between right and wrong is not 
clearly marked. In a sin-smitten world like ours, this must 
be the case. We should accept as part of our moral task 
and discipline the necessity of using our mental faculties 
in applying the moral law to concrete cases. If we are sin- 
cere, and yet fall into error, we may well believe that God 
will overrule our mistakes for our ultimate good. It is 
perhaps better to err now and then than to have no mental 
and moral schooling at all. However, the more complex 
the situation, the more time should be taken in coming to 
a decision. On the topics, "Collision of Duties" and "Col- 
lision and Casuistry," Dr. R. F. Weidner 3 gives some help- 
ful suggestions: 



3. "Christian Ethics," p. 114. 



134 A System of General Ethics 

"There can be no collision when the matter is considered 
in a purely objective and ideal light. To the individual, 
however, such a collision may arise. But, in the ordinary 
course of life, the collision of duties most frequently has its 
cause in previous neglect, or in the fact that life has not 
been teleologically planned. In all collisions of duties the 
claims of justice must be preferred to those of affection. 
For example, a man should pay his debts first, and then 
from what remains to him give to those who need. The 
opposite was the course of Saint Crispin, who took leather 
which did not belong to him to make shoes for the poor. 
In real life cases of casuistry must be solved either by . . . 
the happy inspiration of the moment, or by sustained reflec- 
tion. Resolute, impulsive natures are best fitted for the 
first mode of decision ; cautious and thoughtful natures for 
the second." 

In its bad sense the word "casuistry" has at least three 
significations: First, a false, sophistical or equivocal mode 
of reasoning relative to moral obligations; second, making 
finespun distinctions merely for intellectual amusement or 
to display dialectical skill; third, higgling, or teasing the 
conscience, over matters of trivial concern, that is, over 
mere subtleties. 4 Of course, all these motives should be 
condemned as unworthy. However, when the exercise is 
engaged in for real intellectual and moral discipline, and 
with the purpose of helping men to a correct decision in 
practical life, it is to be commended. The warning may 
also be relevant here that mere intellection in dealing with 



4. A most valuable discussion of the subject of casuistry is to be 
found in Dr. J. Clark Murray's "A Handbook of Christian Ethics," 
pp. 311-315. He says that the practical man will often "unceremo- 
niously sweep aside all the intellectual cobwebbery of the casuist," 
and do his duty through a direct call of the moral intelligence. 



The Antithesis of Right 135 

ethical matters is apt to lead to irresoluteness in the per- 
formance of evident duties — duties that would be quite 
plain to the common normal intuitions. Via media is the 
best path to pursue. 5 

Under the head of difficult cases of conscience would 
come the question of "doubtful" amusements or "debat- 
able" indulgences. In a general work like this we cannot 
go into details, but must refer the reader to such special 
monographs as he may be able to procure. 6 In the settle- 
ment of such problems, sometimes quite perplexing to the 
young, we would advise, first, that one should have an en- 
lightened conscience, which will be more helpful in solving 
ethical problems than many pages of winding logic. Sec- 
ond, having such a conscience, one should be thoroughly 
conscientious in following its dictates and directions. The 
author has no disposition to be a purist, and certainly be- 
lieves in all forms of healthful and innocent diversion ; 
yet he would suggest that, instead of asking the question 
concerning certain forms of amusement, "Why, what is 
there wrong in them?" it would be more ethical to ask, 
"What is the good in them?" While they afford recrea- 
tion, which all people need at times, will they, at the same 
time, uplift one morally, and fit one afterward to do more 
effectively the serious and necessary work of life? 

Let us have wholesome recreation, by all means, and as 
much of it as we need to keep life from becoming irksome 
and humdrum. And let us be thankful that there are so 
many kinds of diversion that are of a perfectly right and 



5. The subject of casuistry might have been discussed in the 
chapter on Conscience, but it seems to be more easily understood 
after the treatment of Moral Distinctions. 

6. John H. Vincent, "Better Not;" James H. Brooks, "The 
Modern Dance." 



136 A System of General Ethics 

innocent character, and that afford just the kind of relax- 
ation that human nature requires. But it must be said, 
too, that there are other forms of amusement that are too 
exciting, too engrossing, and take too much time from the 
real work of life. They wear one out, so that, instead of 
resting the worker, they unfit him for resuming his duties 
with zest and effectiveness. The pursuit of pleasure to 
the point of dissipation and exhaustion is always wrong, as 
are pleasures that are followed as the chief business of 
life. Let this be our guiding ethical principle: The main 
track of life is our serious and useful employment; the 
side tracks are for rest and relaxation, so that we may, at 
the proper time, come back to the main track with a fresh 
rebound. 

A vexing question pertaining to cases of conscience is 
this: "Is a lie ever justifiable?" Here again we must 
refer the reader to special monographs. 7 Our reply would 
be, "A lie, properly defined, is never justifiable." How- 
ever, the phrase, "properly defined," must be explained. 
What is a lie in the root sense of the term? It is an un- 
truth told for the purpose of deception with a cowardly, 
selfish, spiteful or other evil motive. There are many 
things that are not true, but they are not lies. Aesop's 
fables are not true, but they are not lies. The parables of 
the Bible are not true stories, but no one would call them 
lies. Bunyan's allegories, "The Pilgrim's Progress" and 
"The Holy War," are not true narratives, but they cer- 
tainly are not lies. All these are not lies, because they do 
not deceive any one, and are not meant to deceive, but are 
intended to illuminate and symbolize the truth. 



7. Henry Clay Trumbull, "A Lie Never Justifiable;" Robert E. 
Speer, "The Marks of a Man," Chap. I. 



The Antithesis of Right 137 

The conscientious physician who disguises certain facts 
from his patients in extremely critical circumstances, when 
the shock of the blunt truth might prove fatal, is not a liar, 
because his purpose is a beneficent one, not a selfish or rep- 
rehensible one. Neither can it rightly be said that he "does 
evil that good may come," because his course is not 
"evil," but, rather, a procedure that belongs to the order 
of things as God has framed them. He withholds a part 
of the truth for the important purpose of saving life. It 
would be brutal for him to blurt out the truth in a way that 
would almost immediately cause death. Of course, the 
conscientious physician will always speak the whole truth 
when his judgment tells him that such is the wisest and 
best course. If he were to disguise the truth except in 
very grave and exceptional circumstances, he would have 
to be classed with liars. 

For a general in a righteous war to disguise his plans 
from the enemy, and resort to tactics that lead the enemy 
astray, would be called legitimate strategy, and would not 
be characterized as a lie. No just war could be won with- 
out strategy. 

Are football players who employ ruses to win the game 
to be called by the harsh name of liars? Our answer is, 
No; not when the artifice is a part of the game to which 
the players on both sides have agreed. In such a case 
the umpire never calls "foul," no matter how much one 
side is victimized by the other. But note — when the player 
resorts to a subterfuge that is not agreed upon as a rule of 
the game, he has acted a lie ; and if his trick is discovered, 
he is justly penalized, and all his colleagues must suffer 
with him. 

We believe that people's natural intuitions usually enable 
them to differentiate between what are properly termed 



138 A System of General Ethics 

lies, and what are known as justifiable ruses, strategems 
and disguises. We know that "camouflages" of all kinds 
must be carefully guarded, or they will be abused; and it 
is for that very reason that we should so train our con- 
sciences and school our moral judgments as to be able to 
discriminate between the use and the abuse. This again 
is a part of the discipline of life. If our moral task were 
always easy, it would not be a task. There may be situa- 
tions in which it will be very difficult to distinguish be- 
tween a lie and mere artifice or strategem; in which cases 
we would offer this advice: It is better to err, if err you 
must, on the side of safety — that is, on the side of strict 
veracity. 

Let it be remembered, too, that it is the motive more than 
anything else that makes the lie. It is not always the mere 
form of the words. A person may tell the truth in such 
a way — with a shrug, or a laugh, or a peculiar emphasis — 
as to convey a false impression. It is a lie, however, be- 
cause the purpose of the speaker is to deceive. We have 
known people to deceive in this way, and then, when they 
were accused, to declare that they had spoken the precise 
truth. They were the worst kind of falsifiers, however, 
because they used the truth itself to coin a lie. 



CHAPTER IX 



IV. THE GENESIS OF SIN. 

1. Nature of the problem. 

2. The true view. 

(1) Sin the free act of a moral agent. 

(2) An eternal possibility, but not a necessity. 

(3) An adequate test necessary to moral agency. 

3. Erroneous views. 

(1) God not the author of sin. 

(2) Sin not eternal. 

(3) Sin not posited in matter. 

(4) Sin not a lapse of the Infinite. 

(5) Sin not due to man's primitive animalism. 

(6) Agnosticism not satisfactory. 



IV. THE GENESIS OF SIN. 
1. Nature of the problem: 

This is one of the outstanding problems of Ethics and 
Philosophy. No less puzzling is it to the practical mind. 
Nor is it an easy problem. In order to gain true insight 
into it, men must think beneath the surface, must be able 
to appreciate the unique character of ethical questions ; in 
other words, must be able to think in ethical categories and 
terms. One must rise above the merely material and me- 
chanical. The ethical problems cannot be solved by means 
of physics, chemistry and mathematics. Ethics belongs to 
a realm of its own — its data are sui generis. This is true 
even while it interpenetrates all other spheres. 

Another word is patent at this point. The man who is 
able to appreciate nothing but pleasure, who is a mere 
eudemonist or opportunist, can never rise to that elevation 
of thought and motive which will enable him to appreciate 



140 A System of General Ethics 

moral values and excellencies for their own sake ; can never 
see and feel that morality is its own excuse for being. For 
this reason the facts of sin and suffering in the world form 
an insoluble enigma for the mere utilitarian in Ethics. We 
shall deal frankly with the ethical problem before us, set- 
ting forth first the true view, then the erroneous views. 

2. The true view: 

(1) Sin the free act of a moral agent: 

Consider carefully the exact nature of sin. It must be 
a free act, or it would not be sin, for sin always implies 
guilt. If it were something that was coerced, something 
that could not be avoided, it would not be reasonable to call 
it sin and hold the offender responsible. Conversely, if, 
as conscience bears witness, sin is something that ought not 
to occur and that might be avoided, then sin has its right 
name, and the word stands for a reality; then also there 
is a real basis and an adequate reason for the universal feel- 
ing of guilt when sin is committed. Moreover, the feeling 
of responsibility for our moral status and conduct connotes 
freedom, with ability to perform the good and repel the evil. 

Now, bearing in mind that a moral act is the free act of 
a moral agent, we already see some dawning light on the 
problem of the genesis of sin. Christian Theology and 
Ethics, following the teaching of the Bible, tells us specific- 
ally about the genesis of sin in the world; yet we are con- 
strained to think that Natural Ethics, which is based on 
reason, can at least indicate how sin must have originated. 1 



1. Possibly some readers will think that we make too large a 
claim here for human reason ; and we are not disposed to argue 
the question. Perhaps unaided reason never could have discovered 
how sin originated; but this much is undoubtedly true: since its 
genesis has been revealed in the Bible, reason can show that the 
Bible gives the only adequate explanation. 



The Antithesis of Right 141 

While it cannot point to a definite historical act, as Chris- 
tian Ethics can, it can and does reason that, since sin is a 
free act or it would not be sin, it must have had its genesis 
in the free act of the first human moral agent whom God 
created and who was the progenitor of the human family. 
If this is not true, the problem is insoluble for Natural 
Ethics. Do you ask why? Because a being who was not 
a moral agent could not have sinned. If the first man had 
been a mere automaton, he never could have violated a 
moral law, and therefore sin never could have entered the 
world. But sin is here; no one can deny its presence. 
And, therefore, being a moral act, it must have had a moral 
inception — that is, must have been the free act of a moral 
agent. 

Now, science teaches the doctrine of the unitary origin 
of the human race. It rejects the idea of a multiple origin. 
Therefore, since all men have descended from the primitive 
man, and since all men are congenitally sinful in disposition, 
the rational conclusion must be that the progenitor of the 
race brought sin into the world. 

We must deal frankly with another problem of sincere 
minds : Why did not the Creator so constitute the first man 
that he could not sin ? Why did He not make the first man 
impeccable ? 

Our reply is : God can do nothing that is contrary to the 
nature of things, to their fundamental structure — at least, 
so far as we can understand, He cannot do so; for, like 
God Himself, the nature of things is eternal. In fact, the 
nature of reality is the very basis of God's eternal being. 
He could not be what He is and at the same time be some- 
thing else ; and what He is now He must have been from 
eternity, for if there ever was a time when He was not 
what He is now, He never could have become what He now 



142 A System of General Ethics 

is. True, God is omnipotent; but a basal element of His 
omnipotence is that He is able to preserve inviolate the ab- 
solute and eternal constitution of things as they ought to be. 
If He could or would act contrary to this principle, it would 
prove, ipso fact, that there was imperfection in His nature, 
and therefore He would not be the perfect and all-wise 
God. Moreover, divine omnipotence also includes the abi- 
ity to restrain His power whenever the eternal ought de- 
mands it. When a great athlete holds his strength in check 
by an act of his will, that does not mean that he does not 
possess that strength in full measure. So divine almighti- 
ness is capable of almighty self-restraint. 

Still again, for God to invade the free and ethical realm 
by acts of mere physical omnipotence would be a wrong and 
capricious use of His power, and that would make God a 
sinner. Therefore it does not mean that God is limited in 
power because He permits a degree of freedom in the hu- 
man realm ; it does mean that He is so powerful that He is 
able to restrain His power when He sees fit to do so. 

Now let us apply these deep and fundamental principles. 
So far as we can rationalize on the problem, two options 
were open to God : First, He might have created mere good 
and happy automata, such as would have done His will 
simply because they could not have done otherwise; they 
would have been good by necessity; they would have had 
no choice in the matter; therefore they would not have 
been moral agents, and would have had no moral character. 
If the reader will pardon the expression, they would have 
been mere happy "Jumping Jacks." 

Second, He might have created beings with a will in lib- 
erty — beings who could choose or refuse to do His will; 
who could elect the right or its opposite ; therefore beings 
who were intelligent, rational, free, and possessed of real 
moral character and ability. 



The Antithesis of Right 143 

Now, which alternative did God choose? Historically 
we know that He chose the second, for man is here, and he 
is a moral agent. Whether we like God's decision or not, 
we shall have to put up with it ! To rebel against the divine 
regime is like the ox kicking against the goads. But is it 
not more rational to believe, even though we may not un- 
derstand perfectly, that the marvellous Power that made 
the universe, and placed man in it, and endued him with 
intelligence and freedom, acted wisely and ethically? Is 
not that, we ask in all earnestness, a saner position than to 
fall into pessimism, whimper and complain, and look upon 
the world as a lapse and misfortune? 

But, penetrating to the bottom of the problem, did the 
Power that made man do the best and wisest thing in en- 
dowing man with so great a responsibility as that of moral 
freedom? We reply, Yes — and because of the following 
facts: moral excellence is the highest good; freedom is a 
nobler enduement than mere mechanism; a moral being is 
better than an automaton ; moral character is the very thing 
that makes man superior to minerals, vegetables, and the 
brutes around him. To repeat for emphasis, when God 
made minerals, vegetables and animals, He made automata ; 
when He made man, He made a higher species of being; 
and this He did by endowing him with the high prerogative 
of freedom. Will any one indicate why He should have 
made a universe of mere automata ? What worthy purpose 
would have moved Him to make such a universe? But if 
He made the automatic part of the cosmos to provide a 
habitation for moral beings, then His adventure was worth 
while. 

It cannot be denied that God made an adventure — we use 
the word advisedly, yet reverently — when He decided to 



144 A System of General Ethics 

create moral beings. Nothing great and high was ever done 
without some risk. It is a great risk to establish a repub- 
lican or a democratic form of government, for liberty may 
so easily be perverted into license — but will anyone, es- 
pecially here in America, say that the adventure has not 
been worth while? However, let the critics of the divine 
order remember one thing: God will bear His part of the 
responsibility; you and I will never be held accountable 
for His act in creating moral agents ; He will see to that ; 2 
the only thing for which He will hold us amenable will be 
our use of the moral powers with which He has endowed 
and blessed us. Are we unwilling to do that much? If 
we are, we must be moral weaklings indeed. 

Of course, the Epicurean, who looks upon mere pleasure 
as the chief good, and can never lift his thoughts and aspi- 
rations to anything higher, will find fault with God's method 
— and will also thereby expose the "yellow streak" in his 
own character. But the true and stalwart ethicist, who 
looks upon moral excellence as the highest good, will gladly 
approve of God's election, and will thereby exemplify his 
higher and finer mould. Men's theories are usually an in- 
dex to their character. 

(2) Sin an eternal possibility, but not a necessity: 
Another problem that often causes intellectual confusion 
to people who do not think deeply enough is this: How 
could evil get its inception? If nothing can be evolved that 
was not previously involved, must not evil have had an 
eternal root ? How could it have been evolved from a non- 
evil source? 

This is indeed a topic that merits our profoundest and 
most serious thought. Difficult though it is, we must essay 



2. Theodicy is the technical name for a defence of God and His 
ways. 



The Antithesis of Right 145 

the task before us. Let us remember, as has been said, 
that we are dealing with ethical, not mechanical and mater- 
ialistic, subjects. Sin or evil is a moral fact and quality, 
not a material entity ; therefore our thinking and reasoning 
about it must be in terms of the ethical. Being a moral 
fact, it is evident that it must get its start in an act of free 
choice; for if it were the result of coercion, it would not 
be moral evil. 

But free will is creative. As we have seen in a previous 
section, the Will has the power of origination, of bringing 
into actuality something new. If that is not true, even the 
divine Being never could have created anything. There- 
fore, when the first human being made a wrong choice by 
a free act of his will, He brought something new into the 
world, something that had not been before — namely, sin or 
moral evil. If we are going to think lucidly on ethical 
subjects, this thought of the creative power of a free Will 
cannot be emphasized too greatly. 

The same mode of reasoning obtains regarding moral 
good as well as moral evil. Though man was created good, 
his goodness was a created goodness, and was therefore 
only automatic, and not in the deepest sense moral goodness 
(though of course it was real goodness). Now, had man 
by his own volition chosen to continue in his original good- 
ness, to practice goodness, and to increase his powers for 
higher attainment, He would have brought something eth- 
ically new into actuality — that is, he would have converted 
his created goodness into truly moral goodness for himself 
by taking it freely into his own will. Appropriating his 
created goodness by his free choice, he would have made it 
intrinsically his own. 

So with evil. When man chose the opposite of the good- 
ness with which he was created, by that very act he brought 



146 A System of General Ethics 

something new into actuality — namely, moral evil, or sin. 
It was not necessary for him to do so; it was not God's 
desire that he should make a wrong choice ; it was his own 
free act. Whatever may have been the test placed before 
him, it (the test) was not evil; it was simply a necessary 
touchstone of his free moral agency. 

Let it be remembered, too, that evil is not an entity, but 
a quality ; also that it is not a positive quality, like the good, 
but a negative. Hence it is eternal only as a possibility, 
not as an actuality. Note: the right always connotes the 
possibility of the wrong; else it would be mechanical and 
coerced, not ethical. However, the wrong should never 
become an actuality, but should forever remain only a pos- 
sibility. Take the idea of truth; that idea connotes the 
possibility of error or falsehood; but error and falsehood 
should never come into existence. 

Suppose we take an illustration : In this class-room there 
is good order. Does not that fact connote the possibility 
of disorder? Yet every right-minded person will admit 
that the possible disorder should not become a reality ; nor 
is it necessary that it should. So it is in the ethical sphere. 
The right, or the good, has existed from eternity as a pos- 
itive and actual quality, belonging to the very nature of 
God. On the other hand, the wrong has been only a pos- 
sibility from eternity. It is therefore out of the germ of 
possibility that the wrong came into the world through the 
act of a free moral agent. Thus we say that sin is not 
eternal ; it had a beginning. 

(3) An adequate test necessary to moral agency: 

In order to bring out moral quality into complete realiza- 
tion, one thing more was necessary — an adequate test of 
the moral agent. It stands to reason that, if God had 



The Antithesis of Right 147 

made man a moral being, and then had set him in the midst 
of an environment that would have given him no opportu- 
nity to exercise his power of choice, the Creator would 
Himself have been guilty of a puerile and ineffective act. 
You might compare it to a teacher who would ask a well- 
trained college Senior to solve a problem in simple addi- 
tion, to test his advanced mathematical standing and skill. 
So a moral agent must be subjected to an adequate test in 
order to prove his moral agency. The test must be ade- 
quate to be a real test. You would not test a giant's 
strength by requesting him to lift only a pound. 

What was the test that was applied to the progenitor or 
progenitors of the race ? Natural Ethics can go no further 
than to say that sometime and somewhere within the era 
of human history there must have been such an ordeal, 
but our science cannot tell when and where the transaction 
occurred. The Christian Scriptures reveal this fact defi- 
nitely, namely, in the garden of Eden when the man and 
woman ate of the forbidden fruit. Those who will not 
accept that narrative as historical must be content to leave 
the problem of the time, place and circumstances an open 
question. Natural Ethics goes no further than to say that 
such a trial of freedom must have been an historical event. 

3. Erroneous views: 

(1) God is not the author of sin: 

Lacking in depth of ethical thinking, some people argue 
that, since God created man, and man fell into sin, there- 
fore God must be the author of sin. They reason that 
there must have been something evil injected into man's 
nature by creation, or he would not have yielded to an 
allurement. 

We cannot allow that this method of argument is legiti- 



148 A System of General Ethics 

mate. Of course God created man, and made him a free 
agent; but He did not create him sinful; He did not put 
a bad streak, as it were, into his nature, a weakness that 
necessitated his fall. No; He made man free, but good; 
good in his constitution ; setting his will at equilibrium, but 
without bias and imperfection; so that he had the ability 
to decide to continue in the right way, if he chose to do so. 
At the same time, in order to complement his freedom, he 
had the ability to choose the opposite way, and thus make 
the possible wrong the actual wrong. If such freedom is 
an imperfection, then man was, ipso facto, imperfect by 
creation ; rather it was a higher kind of perfection than 
mere mehanical and automatic goodness; in brief, it was 
the great glory of man that he was endued with the highest 
and noblest prerogative in the universe, the power of free 
choice, which lifted him above the mere material and me- 
chanical forces around him. 

Another thought is germain here. Had God put an evil 
strain into man's nature in his creation, then, indeed, man 
would not have been truly and perfectly free, for then his 
will, instead of being perfectly equilibrate, would have been 
inclined toward evil, and his fall would have been inevit- 
able — unless God had forcibly interposed. No; we must 
rise to the conception that man was created good, with his 
will set on a perfect balance, and that he himself had the 
mysterious power to dip the scales one way or the other. 
Does the reader say he cannot understand how that can be? 
Very well ; but he himself (the reader) knows that, even 
though he is more or less inclined to evil by his inherited 
nature, yet he has the power of choosing among alterna- 
tives. How much more a being whose will was perfectly 
equilibrate ? 



The Antithesis of Right 149 

But if the first man did not have an evil principle within 
him — a "yellow streak" — how could he be tempted to do 
wrong? This is one of the fundamental objections of un- 
ethical thinkers. 

To this objection we reply: To be tempted is not a real 
sin. As long as the will does not consent to the temptation, 
does not choose it, does not incorporate it into the soul's 
inner being, there is no sin either of thought or action. On 
the other hand, the very fact that the soul is thus tested, 
and yet withstands the enticement, constitutes its true 
moral glory and power. In the name of reason, how else 
could a free agent achieve moral character save by being 
capable of and submitted to an actual test? Why, the need 
of an ordeal of some kind lies at the very heart of moral 
agency. Even if God determined the ordeal, He did not 
create the evil; he simply sought to prove and establish 
man's true moral character. God did not desire that man 
should make a wrong choice, and thus uncenter his life, 
but that he should choose the right, and so preserve his 
moral center of gravity. We know that this must be true, 
because God has so constituted man that even now, when- 
ever he resists temptation and upholds the right, he has the 
answer of a good conscience within him, and becomes more 
firmly established in moral character; and if that is God's 
desire now, it is reasonable to believe it was His desire in 
the beginning of human history. 

Sometimes the rather childish objection is raised that a 
human parent would not put a temptation in the way of 
his child. Certainly not! The parent ought to know that, 
since evil has come into the world, both he and his child 
are set in the midst of enough temptations to test their free- 
dom, and therefore it is not necessary to set any artificial 
tests in the child's way; indeed, it would be wanton to do 



150 A System of General Ethics 

so. But this is a very different case from that of the first 
human being, whose moral agency had to be proved and 
established by some kind of moral discipline. However, 
in the interest of virile Ethics, as opposed to the flabby sort, 
the argument may be carried further: Every sensible par- 
ent knows that, if his children are too much sheltered — 
"brought up in a bandbox," as the saying goes — so that 
they know nothing of the discipline of life, they will grow 
up to be moral and intellectual weaklings. Hence parents 
often do place their children in the school of severe train- 
ing, and the children are all the better for it. Our heav- 
enly Father ought to be credited with as much sense and 
reason as earthly parents possess. 

The summary of the argument respecting the genesis of 
sin, then, is this : God created the moral agent, but the 
moral agent was himself the author of sin. 

(2) Sin is not eternal: 

If sin were eternal, it would not be sin; it would be 
something necessitated, something that had to be. There- 
fore it would not belong to the category of the ethical, 
which can dwell only in the realm of freedom. Moral 
good is eternal because, as we have shown, God combines 
in His personality from eternity the ethically necessary and 
the ethically free. He has forever and ever chosen the 
right because it is right, and it has been right forever and 
ever because He has chosen it. Had God ever chosen the 
wrong, He would have Himself originated sin, but even 
then it would have had a beginning. 

Again, if sin and error were eternal, there would be no 
hope of their final extermination and the ultimate triumph 
of righteousness and truth; for the eternal can have no 
end. Besides, if both good and evil were eternal, that 



The Antithesis of Right 151 

would mean there were two eternal opposites and anti- 
theses; which is an absurdity in itself. 

(3) Sin is not posited in matter: 

This was the error of Plato, the Manicheans and the 
Gnostics. Sin cannot have its source in matter, because 
sin is a moral evil, and so cannot be predicated of material 
substance. Moral evil can be assigned only to psychical, 
rational and free beings. Morality does not have its seat 
in the body, but in the mind, which is the only entity that 
man can think, reason and choose. So far as we can see 
by the rational process, the physical cosmos may have been 
affected by the sin of the moral agent, who was made its 
head and crown, so that it may now suffer from disorder, 
disintegration and decay; but that is not moral evil, which 
could never have had its inception in unconscious and im- 
personal matter. 

(4) Sin is not a lapse of the Infinite: 

This is the view of Hinduism and Buddhism, which are 
pantheistic ; it is also the view of certain forms of modern 
Pantheism and particularly of Pessimism. Here we must 
refer the reader to works on Theism for a thorough refu- 
tation of these fallacious theories. 3 So far as regards 
Ethics, this view would totally annihilate morality, because 
it would make both good and evil the outgrowth of neces- 
sity. Pantheism recognizes no free, intelligent Personality 
back of the universe, but identifies God and the universe. 
That is, the All is not a Person, but a Thing. Those pan- 
theists who speak about the "Unconscious Intelligence" and 
the "Unconscious Will" are using self-contradictory terms. 



3. We would recommend Flint's "Theism" and "Anti-Theistic 
Theories" and Sheldon's "Unbelief in the Nineteenth Century." 
See also the author's "A System of Natural Theism," pp. 94-99, 
137-139. 



152 A System of General Ethics 

Therefore all the "becoming" and all the "developing*' of 
the god of Pantheism are necessitated, not free; hence not 
really moral. How, then, could a mere lapse or accident 
of such an unfree, unrational something be a moral act, and 
give rise to moral evil. It is an absurd philosophy. The 
moral could never evolve from the non-moral, nor the free 
from the non-free. If Pantheism, with its doctrine of the 
unfortunate "lapse of the Infinite,'' is true, all Ethics is a 
delusion and a snare. 

(5) Sin is not due to man's primitive animalism. 

If sin arose from man's primitive animalism, then God 
is Himself the author of sin, for He gave man his primitive 
animalism. It must then have been a part of his original 
constitution, part of his inherent being, and therefore must 
have been implanted in him by the Power that made and 
developed him. If man's yielding to his animal nature 
when he began to evolve into a free being was the primeval 
sin, then God made man's animalism sinful, and is the re- 
sponsible party for the evil in the world. 

Moreover, this program would not have given the prim- 
itive man a fair chance, because his animalism was the re- 
sult of cycles upon cycles of evolution, and must have been 
extremely powerful in his nature. If man gradually devel- 
oped a moral nature, it must have been very feeble at its 
inception, the mere glimmering of freedom and moral 
sense, and therefore it was simply inevitable that his age- 
long animal nature should prove too strong for his poor 
and meager moral equipment. So, according to this crass 
and earthy view, God was not only the author of sin, but 
did not even give man a fair chance. Such a theory would 
destroy the very foundation of Ethics. 

(6) Agnosticism not satisfactory: 



The Antithesis of Right 153 

Why not simply give up the ethical problem? It is full 
of mystery, anyway. For several reasons : 

First, the mind cannot rest satisfied in the agnostical 
position ; it craves a rational hypothesis ; it wants science ; 
wherever possible, it seeks definiteness and perspicuity. 

Second, conscience is too insistent a faculty to be put 
off and silenced by the simple assertion, "We do not know." 
There are problems that we may well permit to go un- 
solved, for they have only a negligible effect on our lives; 
but those so vitally connected with the moral imperative of 
the soul as this one demand a solution. 

Third, moral considerations are so practical, so neces- 
sary to individual, social and civic welfare, that the human 
mind demands some consistent and adequate account of the 
rise and origin of moral reality. It makes a great deal of 
difference in men's characters and lives whether they be- 
lieve that God is the author of sin, or whether it had its 
origin in man's fault. 

Fourth, Agnosticism in Ethics, as well as in Theology, 
spells the daunted mind; the mind that gives up its prob- 
lems instead of thinking them through to a consistent end. 
In matters on which such paramount issues for life and 
destiny depend, men ought not to acknowledge themselves 
defeated too soon or too easily. 4 



4. Says Dr. James Orr ("The Christian View of God and the 
World," p. 51) : "Agnosticism is not a state in which the mind of 
an intelligent being can permanently rest. It is essentially a con- 
dition of suspense — a confession of ignorance — an abdication of 
thought on the highest subjects. It is not, in the nature of things, 
possible for the mind to remain in this neutral, passive attitude." 



CHAPTER X 



V. THE CURE OF SIN. 

1. The answer of Natural Ethics. 

(1) An enigma. 

(2) God might forgive sin. 

(3) God might help man morally. 

(4) Man may strive morally. 

(5) But assurance is lacking. 

2. The answer of Christian Ethics. 

(1) God is loving and merciful. 

(2) God is also just. 

(3) The moral antimony adjusted through vicarious atone- 

ment. 

(4) God regenerates and sanctifies. 

(5) Assurance of the moral victory and goal. 

(6) The inner witness of the Spirit. 



V. THE CURE OF SIN. 

1. The answer of Natural Ethics: 

(1) For Natural Ethics this question is an enigma. 
Much as the natural reason may desire to solve every ethi- 
cal problem, it is compelled to confess its limitations. This 
is one of its most perplexing problems — the remedy for sin. 
It has no clear and certain answer. The most it can hope 
to do is to offer a few tentative suggestions, which we 
would state as follows: 

(2) It would seem to be reasonable that, if God created 
man a free moral agent, and man fell into sin, and then 
would come back to God in true repentance, God would 
forgive his transgressions and restore him to divine favor. 
However, here is reason's difficulty: If God should for- 
give sin without reparation to the moral law, how could the 
principle of justice be upheld and respect for the divine 



The Antithesis of Right 155 

government be maintained? Would not pure forgiveness 
without satisfaction to justice create a schism between di- 
vine mercy and justice? The great and puzzling difficulty 
would be how to get such an antinomy adjusted. There- 
fore, even one of the wisest of the Greek philosophers, 
Plato, said he did not know whether the gods would forgive 
sin or not, and even if they would, whether they ought. 
That was profound ethical insight; but even with all his 
depth, Plato could not elucidate the problem. Thus the 
answer of mere reason cannot be clear and positive. 
Neither can it be said that any man ever received explicit 
assurance of pardon merely through the light of natural 
reason. 

(3) It would also seem to be reasonable that the God 
who made man would come to his help morally, if man 
would return to Him in contrition and desire His aid. It 
certainly would be a satisfying experience if men knew 
that He would do so. Natural reason might, if it would 
or could believe this doctrine firmly, receive some help and 
inspiration from such a faith; and perhaps there have 
been men who have been made better by cherishing this be- 
lief and making the effort to live accordingly. The diffi- 
culty, however, is that there is no definite experience of 
such divine help coming to man through natural reason 
alone. The issue is vague and intangible, and has no sure 
foundation in experience. It is a light, perhaps, but only 
a faint and glimmering light. Nor does history give any 
clear testimony on this point. We do not read of any men 
having received clear and absolute certitude of divine for- 
giveness only through reason. 

(4) Again, it seems to be reasonable that, if God is im- 
manent and affords man moral assistance in some way, then 



156 A System of General Ethics 

man might overcome evil by degrees through moral striv- 
ing. That some men, by believing this earnestly and act- 
ing upon it, have made a fair degree of advancement in 
morality can hardly be denied. If no such achievement 
were possible to the natural man, society would doubtless 
in time become so corrupt as to cease to exist ; it would de- 
stroy itself through the elements of disintegration and de- 
cay within it. No one can deny that some men of the 
world are fine and lovable specimens of moral integrity in 
many ways ; that they are good and patriotic citizens ; that 
they are not to be classed with the debauched and salacious 
and dishonorable. Christian theology does not put all per- 
sons who do not accept the Christian religion into the same 
category so far as what is known as "civil righteousness" 
is concerned. And there is such a righteousness, as even 
Augustine taught, 1 that helps to conserve society for this 
world. Perhaps, too, the natural reason might vaguely 
hope that all things will work together for good to them 
that love and practice uprightness. 

However, the trouble with such reasoning is, it is vague 
and uncertain; it is only guesswork and surmise; it leads 
to no sure goal; it gives no positive assurance. Judging 
from the ineffective efforts of natural reason to reach any 
certain conclusions, it is even doubtful whether it could 
have discovered all that has been tentatively indicated 
above. 

(5) Let us summarize our results thus far: Reason 
teaches clearly enough that there is a Personal Ground of 
Right, that there is a Law of Right in the cosmos, that man 
has a moral constitution, that sin, or moral evil, has come 



1. See also the Augsburg Confession (Article XVIII), the creed 
of the Lutheran Church. 



The Antithesis of Right 157 

into the world, and that man ought to conquer sin and obey 
the law of right. But just how to accomplish his moral 
task, just how to overcome evil and achieve the highest 
good — that is not clear to man's unaided reason. 

May we be permitted, even in a work on General Ethics, 
to appeal to another source for help in solving this most 
vital and serious ethical problem? Whatever the worldly 
mind may think about the venture, the author does not feel 
in his conscience that he has discharged his duty to himself 
and his fellowmen, until he has pointed out what he be- 
lieves to be the true solution. 

2. The answer of Christian Ethics: 

(1) God is loving and merciful: 

The Christian Scriptures teach this doctrine clearly, pos- 
itively, "line upon line, precept upon precept," and thus 
give ample assurance that God is not only willing, but 
anxious, to forgive men their trespasses, if they will repent 
of their sins and believe the gospel. (Cf. Isa. 1: 18; 55: 
6-13; Psalm 103:8-14; John 3: 14-17; Luke 15:7, 10, 11- 
24; Rom. 2:4; 1 John 1:9.) Christianity also teaches 
that God does not hold Himself aloof, but actually comes 
to man in various earnest and beneficent ways, pleads with 
him, and offers him help, grace and pardon. 

(2) God is also just: 

No less clearly do the Christian Scriptures assert that 
God is just, and will therefore punish every transgression 
of His holy law. Just as the civil officer cannot wink at 
crime, cannot simply pardon the criminal without repara- 
tion to the law, so God must be just, and punish sin, if He 
would uphold and preserve the moral economy of the uni- 
verse which He has created. Who would respect God's 
government should He simply waive aside the eternal prin- 



158 A System of General Ethics 

ciple of justice and forgive sin without reparation? "Right- 
eousness and justice are the foundation of His throne." 
But if the foundation of the universe were destroyed, — the 
results dare not be contemplated. 

(3) The adjustment of the moral antinomy through 
vicarious atonement: 

If divine mercy seeks to pardon and save the moral 
offender, and divine justice at the same time demands the 
exaction of the penalty, how can the moral antinomy be re- 
solved? The answer of the Christian Scriptures is explicit. 
Because God so loved the world He sent a Substitute — One 
who was divine, so that all His work would be of infinite 
value ; also human, so that He could organically unite Him- 
self with humanity and truly take up humanity's task; and 
He came into the world, kept the law perfectly, and suf- 
fered the penalty of man's transgression in man's stead. 
Thus eternal and infinite justice has been upheld and satis- 
fied, and eternal love is free, ready and anxious to save all 
persons who accept the gracious Substitute and His work. 
This method is known in Christian Theology and Ethics as 
the vicarious atonement. In this way, as the Scriptures 
teach, "God could be just, and yet the justifier of every one 
who believes on His Son." Thus Plato's moral enigma as 
to whether divine forgiveness could be righteously bestowed 
or not, has been resolved. Divine love and mercy save men 
from their sins, but accomplish this result in an ethical way, 
not in a superficial and mechanical way. 

(4) God regenerates and sanctifies: 

According to the Christian Scriptures, God not only made 
the moral adjustment, so that He could righteously pardon 
sin and save the sinner, but He also offers to come lovingly 
and effectively to man's aid in the performance of his moral 



The Antithesis of Right 159 

task. Through the Word of God the Holy Spirit implants 
a new ethical and spiritual life and begets a living faith in 
the receptive heart, and this gives to man the ability to con- 
quer in every battle with evil. Then, having conferred on 
the believer the "new birth" — for it is called by that term 
in the Bible — God will continue to help him by His sanc- 
tifying Spirit and grace. 

(5) Assurance of the moral goal: 

The Christian Scriptures are also clear in teaching that 
the truly moral and spiritual life will lead to a definite con- 
summation — eternal victory over evil and eternal posses- 
sion and enjoyment of the Highest Good. This goal in- 
cludes an immortal residence in a place and condition of 
absolute purity and bliss. To many minds, and those 
among the noblest in the world, this assurance is an inspir- 
ing incentive to ethical endeavor. The Scriptures them- 
selves frequently appeal to it. 2 

(6) The inner witness of the Spirit: 

The doubter may think that there is still a lacuna in our 
reasoning. He may insist that we have merely cited the 
testimony of the Bible, which is the very matter in dispute, 
and may be of no more value than any other teaching. 

We reply that Biblical testimony is unique in this special 
respect : the Holy Spirit accompanies the divine Word, and 
impinges its message as true and real upon the receptive 
soul's inner consciousness ; that is, the Spirit through the 
Word begets an experience, an inner assurance of truth. 
To illustrate, the Bible teaches that God will forgive the 
penitent sinner (1 John 1:9); but note — God will not keep 
the joyful fact to Himself; He will send His Spirit into 



2. Vide John 14:1-3; 1 John 3:2,3; Rev. 2:10; 14:13; Ps. 17:15. 



160 A System of General Ethics 

the sinner's heart to tell him that his sins are pardoned. 
So also, when sinners are willing to accept Christ as their 
Redeemer, the Holy Spirit assures them in their conscious- 
ness that Christ is their Redeemer. That the Bible is the 
divine Word is also part of the content of Christian cer- 
tification. What we have thus briefly described is the ex- 
perience of regeneration or conversion, to whose reality 
millions of Christians bear glad testimony; whereas the 
objections of those who have never had it, and have never 
seriously tried to get it, are of little or no force. The Bible 
teaches explicitly about this experience, and tells how it 
may be obtained. 3 

Thus, in the interest of frankness and scientific thor- 
oughness, we have set forth the Christian life plan and 
hope. Whether Christianity holds the true view or not, 
Natural Ethics may not be competent so say. It is the bus- 
iness of Christian Theology and Apologetics to prove and 
defend the Christian system of religion. Yet Natural 
Ethics ought to admit that to ignore the profound moral 
teaching of the Christian religion would be both unethical 
and unscientific. 



We have now set forth as fully as was consistent with 
our plan a System of Theoretical Ethics. It might be ad- 
visable for the student at this point to review the method- 
ology pursued by consulting the "General Outline" near the 
beginning of the book. The principles laid down in Part I 
must now be applied to the various conditions of human 
life. 



3. Vide Ps. 53:10-13; 119:18.130; John 7:16.17; 8:31.32; 
Acts 2:38; Rom. 8: 16; 1 Cor. 2:9-12; 1 John 9:5-12. 



PART II 

PRACTICAL ETHICS 



DIVISION I 
INTRODUCTORY DATA 



CHAPTER XI 



I. DEFINITION OF PRACTICAL ETHICS. 

II. ITS RELATION TO THEORETICAL ETHICS. 

1. A vital relation. 

2. A vitally important relation. 

III. ITS SUBJECT-MATTER: MAN'S CHIEF DUTIES. 

1. Duties classified. 

2. The term duty. 

3. Duties and rights. 



I. DEFINITION OF PRACTICAL ETHICS. 

Practical Ethics is the systematic treatment of the appli- 
cation of moral principles to human life. 1 



1. The contention is sometimes made that Practical Ethics is an 
art, not a science (vide Valentine, ut supra, p. 23). We would say 
that the actual practice of ethical principles is an art, while the sys- 
tematic treatment and classification of the material and the discus- 
sion of the relation of the practice to the principles is a science. 
At all events, a system of Ethics would be very incomplete if it 
omitted the important duty of applying to actual life the principles 
found and established. The really earnest ethicist has more than a 
mere scholastic interest in the noble science of Ethics. Even if he 
cannot always distinguish between science and art in an academic 
way, yet his ultimate purpose should be to be of practical service 
to the world. 



162 A System of General Ethics 

II. ITS RELATION TO THEORETICAL ETHICS. 

1. A vital relation: 

This relation is a living one ; it is like that subsisting be- 
tween a tree and its fruit. A well-known aphorism may 
be applied here : "By their fruits ye shall know them." 
Theories of Ethics that do not and cannot, by their very 
nature, bear good fruit in outward conduct (and inward 
life as well) are not likely, by that very token, to be true. 
They will not bear the test of experiment. There are sys- 
tems of Ethics that rather confuse the mind on the ethical 
problems than throw light upon them ; that blur moral dis- 
tinctions rather than set them forth clearly and enforce 
them earnestly. Such theories will not bear good fruitage 
in wholesome and upright lives. In making these state- 
ments we are not veering upon pragmatic and utilitarian 
ground ; for the results we demand of any theory of Ethics 
are true moral character and conduct, not merely a selfishly 
calculating ethical scheme; which, after all, would be a 
contradiction of terms. 

2. A vitally important relation: 

First: A correct theory of Ethics is of paramount im- 
portance. The doctrine that a man can believe what he 
pleases, and at the same time live a truly moral life, is a 
fallacy. Belief cannot be dismissed in that lightsome way, 
with a mere toss of the hand. Those who look deeply into 
the heart and essence of things will see that even belief 
itself has a moral quality, so that if a man believes an error, 
he is just that far unethical. Neither can he be in an ethi- 
cal frame of mind if he is not vitally concerned for the 
truth ; and to be indifferent as to his beliefs and convictions 
is prima facie proof of such unconcern. 

In this work we have maintained that Ethics has a the- 



Introductory Data 163 

istic basis. Can any one who thinks seriously about it sup- 
pose that it makes no difference to God, who sees into men's 
hearts and motives, what they believe, and whether they 
believe the truth or not? Is it a matter of indifference to 
Him whether men believe in His existence and loving and 
just character or not? We should have deep and inner 
thoughts about ethical realities and states; we should not 
be superficial. 

A man's theories of life will and must have a direct bear- 
ing on his practice. For example, if a man does not be- 
lieve in God, he surely will not lead a God-fearing life. If 
a man does not believe in the reality of moral distinctions, 
it is evident that he will not live according to the law of 
right as he should, nor hate and eschew the wrong. The 
man who regards morality as a mere matter of expediency 
— that is, the utilitarian — will surely not have very high and 
noble conceptions of the beauty and glory and intrinsic ex- 
cellence of righteousness, and his low views cannot help 
exercising a degrading influence on his life. For the sake 
of his good name, or some other selfish advantage, he may 
observe the canons of conventional morality, and be a fairly 
decent citizen; but that will be the extent of his practice. 
Therefore, in view of the foregoing reasons, let no one de- 
ceive himself into thinking that he can believe just as he 
pleases, and yet live a truly ethical life before God and man. 

Second : On the other hand, correct practice is also nec- 
essary. A thorough-going ethic requires true and consci- 
entious effort in carrying out the principles of morality into 
all the practical relations of life. At first thought, it might 
seem unnecessary to insist on this topic. Some persons 
might think that, if your theories and beliefs are correct, 
the right kind of a life will flow out spontaneously from 
such a source, as water would flow from an open spring. 



164 A System of General Ethics 

However, practical experience proves that such is not the 
case. It might be so in a perfect and ideal state; but as 
we are constituted and as the world is constituted, we know 
that we must often make an effort, and sometimes a stren- 
uous one, to put our theories into practice. Important as 
correct views and knowledge are, they do not automatically 
effect the true life. Men must use their wills in the prac- 
tice of morality ; they must put forth an effort to live up 
to their standards. Practical Ethics is just as important 
as theoretical principles. The fatal defect, as we have seen, 
in the Ethics of Socrates was that he thought knowledge 
was the one thing needful, and overlooked the fact that the 
will must also be used. 

Again, strange and inconsistent as it may appear, there 
are men who seem to have only an academic interest in 
ethical theories. They care only about working out a 
finely wrought scientific scheme, but have little or no con- 
cern about the practical affairs of life. A man of specu- 
lative tendencies might spin out a wonderful ethical sys- 
tem, and one, too, that might be essentially correct, and yet 
he might make a recluse of himself, and show no interest 
in social and civic affairs. Such a man would not be living 
a truly moral life, because his life would be one of selfish- 
ness. 

Perhaps, too, the reader has known persons who had 
very fine ideas of right and wrong, and could talk glibly 
about them, and yet were far from scrupulous about telling 
the truth, keeping their promises, or paying their debts. 
There are even preachers who preach beautifully, but live 
unbeautifully. In this way we see that, in order to stabil- 
ize their lives for good, men must have both a correct the- 
ory and a correct practice. 



Introductory Data 165 

III. ITS SUBJECT-MATTER: MAN'S CHIEF 
DUTIES. 

1. Duties classified: 

Man's chief duties may be conveniently classified and 
assembled in the following way: 1. His duties to himself, 
or Individual Ethics; 2. His duties to nature, or Nature 
Ethics; 3. His duties to his fellowmen, or Social Ethics; 
4. His duties to God, or Theistic Ethics. 

In the interest of clearness we would remark that the 
classification here given cannot be said to be strictly scien- 
tific, in the sense that the several kinds of duty are sharply 
differentiated from one another. Speaking precisely, du- 
ties overlap. For example, all duties of whatever classes 
are duties to God, for He is the Source of the moral law 
and the Creator of the cosmos that is governed by it ; there- 
fore he cannot be indifferent to any of man's actions, be 
they good or evil. A good act toward our fellowmen must 
be a good act toward God whose children they are, just as 
a kindly act toward an earthly parent's children would be 
looked upon as a similar act toward himself. 

Man's duties to himself and his fellowmen also blend and 
overlap. If a man owes it to himself to keep himself pure 
and' make himself strong morally, he owes the same obliga- 
tion to his fellowmen; for the better his life is the more 
wholesome and salutary will be his influence on them. The 
same principle obtains regarding man's treatment of the 
natural cosmos. Since God made nature, and placed man 
in vital relation with it, every duty to it is also a duty to 
Him, because it is obedience to the law that He has or- 
dained. Any abuse of nature, whether of the sentient or 
non-sentient parts, is also a sin against Him, for He made 
it. In like manner, a duty performed to the natural econ- 



166 A System of General Ethics 

omy that will make it more pliant, usable and beautiful is 
also a service to one's fellow-beings. 

However, while the various classes of duties cannot be 
sharply differentiated, yet our divisions will be found to be 
convenient for orderly presentation. 

2. The term duty: 

Is the word "duty" the best word that can be used in 
working out a System of Practical Ethics ? This is a ques- 
tion that has caused the writer not a little concern. The 
objection to the word "duty" is that, in popular usage, it 
carries with it the thought of strain, or constraint, or some- 
thing burdensome and unpleasant to perform. If men 
look upon duty merely as a task, they will not be likely to 
perform it with much rebound and exhilaration, and that 
will rob their effort of much of its ethical value. Doubtless 
it is better to do one's duty by constraint than not at all, 
but such a performance falls far below the ethical ideal. 
To illustrate, if a man should tell his wife that he loves her 
merely because it is his duty to do so, she would feel more 
pain than pleasure in the statement. The same thing 
would be true of love to God and one's fellowmen. There- 
fore, if a better word than "duty" could be found, one that 
would bear in it the idea of joy as well as of obligation, we 
should much prefer to use it. 

However, such a term has not been found, and so we 
retain the common term as a matter of convenience and 
brevity. With a little effort we may, we think, make the 
word "duty" acceptable. Only those who have not attained 
to the moral elevation implied in the term will find it irk- 
some. To those who are in happy accord with moral re- 
ality and the infinite Source of moral good, duty is a de- 
light, not a task; they rejoice in the performance of every 



Introductory Data 167 

moral obligation; the doing of their duty is regarded by 
them rather as a privilege than as a burden. In this world 
of sin and moral turbulence even the good man may often 
find duty difficult, but he performs it with a sincerity and 
willingness that convert it into victory and delight, and 
afterward feels the "answer of a good conscience toward 
both God and man." Love of the right and the good trans- 
forms the whole idea of moral obligation, making duty a 
delight. Let this temper dwell in the mind of the reader 
as we pursue our study of duty together. As much as pos- 
sible let us banish all thought of irksomeness and strain. 

3. Duties and right: 

Another idea will brighten the thought of duty : Man has 
rights as well as duties. While he owes duties to his fel- 
lowmen, they also owe duties to him, and these become his 
rights. If he treats nature properly, he has a right to the 
fruits of his efforts, so far as he has had a share in pro- 
ducing them; and nature usually responds generously. If 
a man performs his duty as a citizen, he has a right to the 
protection of the State. 

Indeed, it might be scientifically more complete to make 
the subject-matter of Practical Ethics "Man's Rights and 
Duties," instead of only "Man's Chief Duties," and the 
author confesses that he has at times almost decided to use 
the former plan; but further thought has convinced him 
that the idea of duty, properly conceived, implies in every 
case the corresponding right; and therefore to treat man's 
rights first and then his duties would require much need- 
less repetition. So the original plan must stand. 



DIVISION II 
MAN'S CHIEF DUTIES 



CHAPTER XII 



MAN'S DUTIES TO HIMSELF (Individual Ethics). 
1. To his body. 

(1) He should not despise his body. 

(2) He should preserve it in health. 

a. By cleanliness. 

b. By proper food and drink. 

c. By judicious exercise. 

d. By needed rest and sleep. 

(3) He should control and regulate its passions. 

(4) He should remember its dignity. 



I. MAN'S DUTIES TO HIMSELF (Individual Ethics). 

In order to clear up a speculative difficulty, a few prefa- 
tory remarks are apropos at this point. Men who indulge 
unduly in speculations are apt to question everything. And 
so, strange as it may seem, there are those who contend that 
an individual cannot owe a duty to himself. This was the 
view of James Martineau, whose objection was purely 
speculative, not practical. He argued that it was absurd 
to think that the self could owe a duty to the self. He puts 
his objection in this way: "Duties to self can be saved 
from contradiction only by an impossibility, namely, the 
splitting of oneself in two, susceptible of reciprocal obliga- 
tion." 1 

However, the objection is not valid. It arises from a 
wrong idea of the self, of the nature of personality. We 



1. Quoted by Davis in his "Elements of Ethics," p. 148. 



Mans Chief Duties 169 

know by experience that the self, that is, the ego, can ob- 
jectify itself; that the mind can and does think of itself. 
The mind is the only entity that can perform this wonder- 
ful and mysterious exploit. It does this by that function- 
ing power of the ego which we call self-consciousness. 
How it does this we do not understand, any more than we 
understand how the mind can cognize external objects; 
but it is a clear fact of experience that the mind can know 
itself and can watch its own operations. It can, as it were, 
"split itself in two." 

Now, if the self can know the self, can think of the self, 
then surely the self can owe to the self a duty ; and there- 
fore the apparent a priori difficulty turns out to be no diffi- 
culty at all — unless the speculatist should go so far as to 
deny the possibility of self-consciousness. 

We may push the argument still further. The individ- 
ual is keenly sensible of moral obligations to himself. 
Often we hear a man say: "I owe it to myself to do this. 
I cannot afford for my own sake to do other than what is 
right. I must act worthy of myself." A man, tempting 
another, once said, "No one would ever know it;" but the 
other replied: "I would know it myself, and could never 
look myself honestly in the face if I were to do this un- 
worthy act." He realized that he owed a duty to himself. 

Again, personality is a most distinct and persistent thing. 
Every individual is marked off by most clear-cut lines of 
cleavage from all other persons and objects. Every man 
thinks of himself, plans for himself. Even among a mil- 
lion people no individual loses his identity. The years may 
bring many changes in circumstances, experiences and 
opinions to the individual, but his personality — his Ihood 
— perdures and defies all mutations. He still says, "I am 
I, and I am the identical person I was when I was a lad." 



170 A System of General Ethics 

This being so, it is evidently the divine plan that each per- 
son is under obligation to preserve his own egoity and to 
make the most of it. 

Thus it is reasonable to believe that the individual owes 
a duty to himself. 2 Let us, then, consider man's chief du- 
ties to himself as a moral personality. 

1. To his body: 

(1) He should not despise his body: 

Man should not contemn his physical organism, as Plato, 
the Gnostics and the Ascetics did, for they looked upon it 
as the seat of all lust and defilement. This view is wrong, 
for the body is part of man's natural constitution, and is 
vitally connected with the mind. Seeing what a marvel- 
lous mechanism it is, we may reasonably believe that its 
Maker designed it for a wise and noble purpose. If He 
did not, He certainly took a great deal of pains for little or 
naught. It has a dignity at its best, too, that differentiates 
it from all other organisms of the natural world, and that 
clearly marks its superiority. It is at the same time the 
organ and home of the mind. Natural reason would surely 
agree with the Christian revelation, which teaches that 
the body is "the temple of the Holy Spirit." Let us re- 
member, too, that moral evil could not have its source in 
the corporeal. There may be physical evil — that is, weak- 
ness, decay and corruption — in the body, but moral evil 
must have its locale in a self-conscious, rational and per- 
sonal entity, which attributes can be predicated only of 



2. Dr. Noah K. Davis (ut supra, p. 147, 148, footnote) says: 
"With Kant duties to self are even the source of all other duties." 
Then he makes this direct quotation from Kant: "Supposing that 
there are no duties of this kind, then there would be no duties of 
any kind ; for I can think myself under obligation to others only as 
far as I am under obligations to myself." 



Man's Chief Duties 171 

mind. We shall classify for convenience the specific duties 
that man owes to his body. 

(2) He should preserve it in health: 

a. He should do this by cleanliness. There surely is 
sound ethics in keeping the body clean and wholesome. 
The person who is habitually untidy in body is not like to 
be particular about keeping his mind immaculate. Physi- 
cal and ethical purity go together, because man's whole be- 
ing consists of body and soul organically united into one 
personality. True indeed is the popular adage: "Cleanli- 
ness is next to godliness." At all events, we may well say: 
"Cleanliness is a vital part of godliness." John Wesley 
said wittily: "Religion is a great face-washer." He ob- 
served that, as soon as thriftless and untidy people were 
converted, they began to appreciate the value and need of 
water and soap. The daily papers once reported that a 
woman had sued for a divorce on the ground that her hus- 
band would never take a bath ! Can you blame her very 
much? Besides the disgust felt in such a case, the vital 
point is that a man who would be so filthy in body would 
likely be corrupt morally as well. Good health cannot go 
with filth, and it is man's duty to preserve his health so that 
he can do the work in the world he ought to do, both for 
his own sake and the sake of others. A great ethical Book 
enjoins, "Having your hearts sprinkled from an evil con- 
science, and your bodies washed with clean water" 3 — that 
is, be both mentally and physically clean. 

b. Good health is also promoted by the use of proper 
food and drink. As to quantity, many people, who are 
otherwise good people, are guilty of over-eating and exces- 



3. Heb. 10:22. 



172 A System of General Ethics 

sive drinking. In so far they are unethical. Think of the 
coarseness of a man's making a gormand of himself! To 
bring on indigestion by gluttony is more than merely repel- 
lent; it is positively sinful. The cause of much mental 
sluggishness among students, of much sleepiness in church 
services, and of much general stupidity, is over-indulgence 
in food and drink. 

On the other hand, every person should have plenty of 
good, plain, wholesome food, and should drink freely of 
pure, fresh water. The reasonable cravings of the normal 
appetite should be satisfied. To go half-starved surely is 
not natural, and therefore must be unhygienic. Ordinarily 
the natural appetite can be trusted to give warning when 
sufficient food and drink have been taken. The danger 
lies in vitiating the palate with too many dainties, condi- 
ments and sweetmeats and the use of malt and alcoholic 
beverages. It should be remembered that everything that 
passes over the palate, no matter how delicious its taste, 
must afterward be taken in charge by the digestive organs. 
How unethical it is to abuse their good offices ! How 
wrong for a man or woman to mar or destroy his or her 
usefulness in life by bringing on dyspepsia through so 
coarse a habit as voracity! 

A simple rule may be observed here. If you eat plain 
and nutritious food, and never gormandize, your appetite 
will always warn you when you have eaten sufficient, for, 
its cravings satisfied, you will no longer relish food. You 
will declare that you "do not care for another mouthful." 
But if you add dainties that flatter the palate, you can of 
course swallow a good deal more than you need, all of 
which will have to be digested by the stomach. If you 
drink pure cold water — not ice water — you will not care 



Man's Chief Duties 173 

for any more the moment your thirst is quenched; indeed, 
you can scarcely force more down your throat. But you 
can swallow a great deal of spiced and flavored drinks, even 
when you are not in the least thirsty; and such indulgence 
will sooner or later undermine the foundations of health. 
All these reflections are relevant in a work on Ethics, be- 
cause it is every man's duty to himself, to his fellowmen 
and to God to preserve his health as far as possible, so that 
he can perform his appointed work in life. There is more 
saintliness in soundness than in sickliness of body. 

c. Another way to conserve the health is by proper exer- 
cise. Manual toilers need no special advice here, for their 
employment gives them plenty of physical exercise. Per- 
haps they might need counsel rather to rest their bodies 
more, if possible, so that they may have more time for 
meditation, reading and wholesome diversion. If there is 
no absolute need, and if mere worldly gain is the objective, 
it is unethical for any man to undermine his health and 
shorten his life by over-work; it is almost next door to 
suicide. 

However, students and all persons of sedentary occupa- 
tion need the precaution to take plenty of physical exercise. 
The body must be kept in healthy condition in order that 
the mind may do its best work. No person can study well 
and think clearly whose digestion is sluggish, or who is suf- 
fering from aches and pains. The best place for exercise 
and recreation, summer and winter, is out in the open air. 
Gymnasiums are good in their place, and we would not dis- 
parage them in the least; but they should not be made a 
substitute for outdoor exercise. Nothing can be more in- 
vigorating than brisk walks for a few hours along the 
country roads, when one can commune with nature and de- 



174 A System of General Ethics 

light himself with pastoral scenery, even while he is breath- 
ing in health from the pure air of heaven. To have some 
pleasant occupation for the mind during your "constitution- 
als," so that you do not think so much about taking exer- 
cise for its own sake, is apt to be more beneficial than 
merely walking as a task. 

The college man or the scholar who "studies too hard" is 
not truly moral. Perhaps, as a rule, little warning is needed 
in this respect, but here and there you will find an over- 
ambitious student who makes a sort of virtue of neglect- 
ing his body in order to develop his mind. He should be 
reminded that he has a mistaken idea of virtue, and that 
good health is of more value than mere scholasticism. The 
pale and sickly cast of scholarship is not of great benefit to 
the world, or even to the possessor himself. "A sound 
mind in a sound body" — that is the true maxim. 

At this point the subject of college athletics might be 
discussed at much length, but we deem a few words 
sufficient. The via media of Aristotle is the proper course. 
College athletics should be encouraged. It is a mark of 
narrowness, prejudice or selfishness to take no interest in 
them. The members of the faculty should be spectators of 
such manly sports. Besides the vigorous exercise, bringing 
robustness, suppleness and strength of body to the players, 
there is a real disciplinary value in base-ball, foot-ball, bas- 
ket-ball, rowing, and other forms of college athletics. They 
cultivate alertness of mind, quickness of decision, accuracy 
of judgment, concert of action with others, and sturdiness 
and independence of will, — all of which are exceedingly 
helpful to young men in their training for life. A good 
moral discipline also goes with the acquirement of physical 
mastery and prowess; for the young men who indulge in 
any kind of vice, such as over-eating, drinking intoxicants, 



Man's Chief Duties 17 S 

smoking cigarettes, and sexual abuse, will soon unfit them- 
selves for the gridiron and the arena. Nor can it be denied 
that many college athletes are just as masterful in scholar- 
ship as in physical strength and skill. Note that among the 
best lawyers, legislators, physicians, ministers, and captains 
of industry, you will often find those who were famous as 
athletes in their college days. In most colleges, a certain 
standard of scholarship is required of those who are ad- 
mitted to the regular games. 

Still, we must look at the other side of the question of 
athletics. Human nature is prone to go to extremes. Col- 
lege games are so exciting, so fascinating, that it is not al- 
ways easy to stay on the golden via media. So many people 
thrive on excitation, and the more intense it is, the more 
they are led away by it, until it becomes a furor with them. 
It becomes necessary, therefore, to point out briefly the 
harmful and unethical character of excess in college sports. 
First, there is danger of too much physical development, 
so that, according to a well-known law of physiology, the 
blood must expend all its material in making brawn to the 
neglect of brain. The writer, himself a college instructor, 
has noted this fact more than once — that young men who 
had developed themselves into physical giants through ath- 
letic exertion were sometimes quite indifferent students, 
were dull and listless in the class-room, and certainly did 
not "graduate with honors/' The trouble was, they ex- 
pended all their energy on the athletic field. 

Second, when the student's interest in athletic sports 
grows too intense, it occupies his mind to such an extent 
as to crowd out any real zest and relish for his studies. 
Even in the class-room he is sighing for the athletic field. 
One cannot serve two masters. 

Third, it is not very creditable for a college to be more 



176 A System of General Ethics 

famous for the development of brawn than of brain, of 
physical giants than of mental experts. The primary pur- 
pose of colleges and universities is scholarship, not athletics. 

These suggestions are made by one who is a friend, not 
an opponent, of college games, and who attends them with 
not a little enthusiasm ; but one, too, who is trying to strike 
the proper balance. So fairness requires us to add that 
sometimes students who do not care for college recreations 
and sports, and take no part in them, are among the dullest 
students ; whereas the athlete more than once carries off 
the college honors in scholarly achievement. So the way 
to keep the proper balance in these matters is to be both 
athletic and scholarly. 

Perhaps it may be said, after all, most students do not 
become athletic in the sense of actually going upon the ath- 
letic field. And that is true, and it should be so. How- 
ever, this is no reason why every student should not take 
sufficient exercise of a vigorous kind to develop his mus- 
cular strength and keep his body in robust health. There 
is the gymnasium of the well-equipped college, which is 
accessible to every student; and there are the country 
roads, fields and woods for walking, tumbling, climbing, 
and all kinds of calisthenics, and at the same time for cul- 
tivating acquaintance with nature. Few kinds of exercise 
are more health-giving to the body and more exhilarating 
to the mind than a "hike" through the country. Let us 
make the outdoors our chief gymnasium. 

d. Health is also conserved and promoted by taking 
needed rest. Some persons, students as well as others, 
need no special admonition to secure enough rest, for their 
chief aim in life seems to be to avoid real strenuous study 
and work. They dally, lounge and sleep so much that they 



Man's Chief Duties 177 

become both physically and mentally stupid. There are 
few cemeteries in which you will find the epitaph, "He died 
from over-work." For loafers the whip of a strong in- 
centive needs to be applied. For them Solomon's counsel 
would be pertinent: "Go to the ant, thou sluggard; con- 
sider her ways, and be wise." 4 

However, there are other persons who, in their greed for 
money, knowledge or honor, toil too hard, and thus bring 
upon themselves premature exhaustion and death. This is 
unethical. The man who does not take enough rest and 
sleep cannot do his best work in his waking hours. Some 
mental workers sin in this respect. So much study, and 
more frequently so many social engagements, rob them of 
their needed sleep, so that, instead of being alert and vigor- 
ous, they go languidly about their tasks. We have even 
known young students to go to sleep during the 7 :45 A. M. 
recitation, which, we take it, was a sure sign of their hav- 
ing kept late hours. The student can do more deep and 
accurate thinking in three hours of the morning, after a 
refreshing night's rest, than in five or six hours of "burn- 
ing the midnight oil." Faithful brain workers need plenty 
of sleep, and they owe it to themselves and to others to get 
it. If we cannot spare more time from our work and study, 
then let us have fewer social dissipations, and thus conserve 
the golden hours. Our work should be so systematized, 
and our social affairs so arranged, that nothing will rob us 
of the rest and sleep our bodies require. 

(3) Man should control and regulate the passions of 
the body: 

On this topic the apostle Paul gives excellent ethical 
counsel: "I keep my body under" (1 Cor. 9: 27) ; "Through 



4. Prov. 6 : 6. 



178 A System of General Ethics 

the spirit mortify the deeds of the body" (Rom. 8: 13) ; 
"The body is not for fornication, but the body is for the 
Lord and the Lord for the body" (1 Cor. 6: 13) ; "Or know 
ye not that your body is the temple of the Holy Spirit who 
is in you, whom ye have from God" (1 Cor. 6: 19) ? 

It should be borne in mind that no natural passion is 
wrong per se, as the fanatics and ascetics think, but is in- 
tended for a good and useful purpose. Sexual love and 
sexual passion are necessary for the procreation of the hu- 
man family; the appetite for food and drink for the main- 
tenance of life itself. However, the perversion and abuse 
of these passions and appetites are grossly sinful and in- 
jurious, and therefore Ethics can in nowise and no degree 
condone them. They must be condemned outright. So 
far as regards sexual desire, the social economy is so con- 
stituted — and divinely, no doubt — that a "pure life for two" 
of opposite sexes is possible, providing they have true con- 
jugal love for each other and have been properly and law- 
fully joined in hymeneal bonds. Nature herself seems to 
have placed her stamp of approval upon monoganous mar- 
riage, for the best civilizations in the world go with such 
a regimen; whereas history and experience prove that any 
other arrangement brings dire consequences in its train. 
Here nature's teaching and the experience of the human 
family agree with the teaching of Jesus Christ, our great 
ethical Teacher, who laid down the rule that one man and 
one woman should constitute the marital relation, basing 
His doctrine on the original creation of only one individual 
of each sex. Polygamy is apt to run into lust and many 
other excesses, and always entails much marital trouble. 
Above all, Ethics must rebuke and condemn with a stern 
voice all secret abuse and all patronage of the brothel. The 
terrible penalties which nature imposes for salacious in- 



Man's Chief Duties 179 

dulgences speaks against them with no uncertain voice as 
wrong and baleful. Happy are the man and the woman 
who, coming together in lawful wedlock, can truthfully say 
that they have kept themselves pure and uncorrupted for 
each other. 

(4) Man should also remember the dignity of the body: 
Perhaps Natural Ethics is not competent to describe the 
exact process by which the Creator formed and organized 
the human body; that must undoubtedly be referred to 
Biblical Theology; but our science can point confidently to 
the insignia of dignity which He has stamped upon the 
body. Compare man's body with that of the lower animals ; 
while it has many points of resemblance to them, yet its 
upright position, its graceful form and movements, and es- 
pecially its expressive physiognomy — all these mark it with 
a distinction that is all its own. Is it not reasonable, there- 
fore, to conclude that the human body was made for a high 
and noble purpose? May it not even have been framed 
for an immortal destiny ? At all events, moral science must 
maintain that man is of too exalted a mien to grovel corpor- 
eally in the mire. There is a voice within him bearing wit- 
ness to the fact that bodily purity and soul purity must go 
hand in hand. It is for this reason, no doubt, that the 
great apostle wrote : "I beseech you therefore, brethren, by 
the mercies of God, to present your bodies a living sacrifice, 
holy, acceptable to God, which is your spiritual service*' 
(Rom. 12: 1). Here the word "spiritual" includes the idea 
of the ethical. 



CHAPTER XIII 



MAN'S DUTIES TO HIMSELF (continued). 
2. To his mind. 

(1) The process of culture. 

a. The Intellect. 

b. The Sensibilities. 

c. The Will. 



I. MAN'S DUTIES TO HIMSELF (continued). 
2. To his mind: 

(1) The process of culture: 
a. The Intellect: 

At this point the "Outline of the Human Mind," given in 
Chapter II, should be consulted. In this work we accept 
the view that the mind is a distinct entity, fitted by creation 
for sustaining vital relations with the body ; we also hold to 
the theory that man is a dichotomy, not a trichotomy (a dual 
being, not tripartate), because we believe that the terms 
mind, soul and spirit are only different names for the same 
quiddity. Therefore we shall proceed without further de- 
lay or argument to consider the ethical culture of man's 
psychical powers. 

First, the Sense should receive attention. It is the men- 
tal functioning power that sustains a direct relation to the 
body; the meeting place, so to speak, of body and mind. 
Much, indeed, very much, of the mind's content and furni- 
ture comes to it through the avenues of the physical senses. 
The sensory system furnishes the mind with its material 
data. 



Man's Chief Duties 181 

A very practical subject is this: the ethical culture and 
control of the Senses. Even here it is evident that man is 
not a mere automaton, but a moral agent, his will being able 
in many respects to regulate sensuous desire and action. 
Take the sense of sight. Note in how many ways we can 
see or not see, as we choose. An old adage runs, "None 
are so blind as those who do not want to see." Therefore 
we may and should look upon the things which it is right 
for us to behold, and turn away from those that are wrong 
and harmful. The same is true of hearing. As the idiom 
goes, we should "turn a deaf ear" to the voice of every 
tempter. So all the senses may be ethically brought under 
the control of the will, and made to obey the commands of 
conscience. It is idle to say, "I cannot help it!" That is 
the excuse of the moral weakling. 

On the positive side, all the senses should be properly 
developed ; the eyes to perceive quickly, accurately, and 
appreciatingly all the beauties of nature and art; the ears 
to delight in beautiful and refining eloquence, rythm and 
music; the palate to relish the most nutritious food (the 
Lord pity the poor dilettant in eatables and beverages), so 
that every person may have as his motto, "Plain living and 
high thinking," instead of the reverse. 

Next in our schedule of the mental powers (see Chapter 
II) is the Understanding. How important it is to cultivate 
the power of reflection! Many people do almost every- 
thing but meditate. They cannot train their minds on one 
subject for more than a few moments, but simply flit from 
one trifle to another. Sermons and addresses are, no doubt, 
often prosy enough, but more frequently they seem to be 
dull to people simply because, as listeners, they cannot con- 
centrate their mental faculties on one theme for more than 
a few minutes ; they have never schooled themselves to 



182 A System of General Ethics 

logical, consecutive and continuous thinking, and so they 
miss the beauty and power of many an instructive discourse. 
To grow old without knowing how to meditate and to dwell 
with one's own thoughts, is a sad misfortune. Learn to 
reflect ; cultivate the power of thinking on good and uplift- 
ing themes; they will be an invaluable asset to you when 
dreary days and old age come ; then you will never need to 
be lonely. Learn to use the will in carrying on thought 
processes. 

The cultivation of the memory also has great ethical 
value. To commit something worth while every day would 
be a good rule. Great is the moral benefit of storing the 
memory with apt and inspiring maxims and proverbs, es- 
pecially in youth. Many a man has been kept true and firm 
in the path of virtue because he learned in youth such trite 
but bracing epigrams as these: "Be sure you're right, then 
go ahead ;" "Whatever is worth doing at all is worth doing 
well ;" "The Lord knoweth the way of the righteous, but 
the way of the wicked shall be turned upside down." Par- 
ents and teachers should engraft such helpful maxims in 
the minds of children and youth, for often at the proper 
psychological moment they will spring up in the mind, and 
will act like a tonic to the moral nature. 

There is an expelling power in good suggestions and 
thoughts. One of the best ways to crowd evil imaginations 
out of the mind is to crowd in good ideas. If the reader 
does not know how Dr. Chalmers received the suggestion 
for his classical sermon on "The Expulsive Power of a 
New Affection," it would be worth while to acquaint him- 
self with the story. On the same principle, Paul gave ex- 
cellent ethical advice when he wrote, "Be not overcome of 
evil, but overcome evil with good" (Rom. 12:21). In 
another place this acute teacher emphasized the value of 



Man's Chief Duties 183 

filling the mind with ennobling thoughts, so that no room 
would be left for the ignoble : "Whatsoever things are true, 
whatsoever things are honorable, whatsoever things are 
pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are 
of good report; if there be any virtue, if there be any 
praise, think on these things" (Phil. 4:8). 

In still another way the cultivation of reflection and 
memory have great ethical value. When the conscience is 
puzzled as to the proper course of action, as it often is, its 
problem, which in such a case cannot be settled by mere in- 
tuition, is carried over into the Understanding, and is 
placed under the analysis of reflection — and possibly the 
logical faculty, too — and after weighing the pros and cons, 
the mind arrives at a conclusion, which we call a moral 
judgment. Here there is much opportunity for moral de- 
velopment and discipline. 

Man also has a scientific faculty, which we include in the 
Understanding. What is the use of the study of science 
for the practice of ethical principles ? It is this : Surely it 
would be unethical to ignore the teaching of the science of 
the day in framing our ethical theory, just as it would be 
unethical to disregard any other body of related truth. The 
ethicist must ever have an open mind ; for a mind closed 
by prejudice or willful ignorance is not moral. Whether 
the ethicist agrees with certain scientific conclusions of the 
day or not, he must not close his eyes to them, but must try 
to appraise them at their own value. If they are false, it 
is his duty as an ethicist to point out their error, and to 
show as clearly as possible in what way they undermine the 
foundations of truth and morality. 

The study of science has a real value for Ethics in this 
regard : it trains the mind in inductive processes ; it is ex- 
perimental, and keeps close to facts and realities; if it be 



184 A System of General Ethics 

true science, it does not first form aprioristic notions, and 
then try to square the facts with them. It is well for the 
ethicist to form the scientific habit in this respect, and thus 
save himself from being led into vain speculations. Theo- 
retical Ethics has no mission if it does not remain with the 
facts and lead to clearer thinking and better living. 

The study of Logic is also of importance in the practice 
of ethical principles, for it is the study of the laws of cor- 
rect thinking and reasoning. While it does not discover the 
ultimate truth, it does aid in reaching correct conclusions 
from true premises, and in detecting fallacies. So it is 
men's duty to discipline themselves in the study that will 
enable them to avoid sophistries and reach true conclusions. 

The next division of the Intellect is the Intuition. By 
this we mean the functioning power of the mind which cog- 
nizes certain truths by immediate perception, without a rea- 
soning process and without being able to explain logically 
how the cognition takes place. In the "Outline of the 
Human Mind" the various kinds of Intuition are named in 
their order as nearly as we can determine them. There 
might be some difference of opinion among psychologist as 
to the order, but most of them would agree that these are 
the chief objects of immediate and spontaneous perception. 

There is the cognition of outward reality — that is, the 
reality of the external world. Probably the first intuition 
of the child is the cognition of the outer world through the 
sense of sight. It seems to recognize other objects before 
it comes to a clear recognition of self, for it will speak of 
itself in the third person for some time after it has learned 
to use language; only by and by does it begin to use the 
pronouns of the first person. 

But what is the ethical import of these various spontan- 
eous cognitions ? It is this : Practical Ethics is of supreme 



Man's Chief Duties 185 

importance to individual and social life, and therefore it 
must have a substantial basis in reality ; but if a man holds 
to a speculative philosophy like Phenomenalism, Positivism 
or Idealism, he will doubt the reality of the physical world ; 
and if he doubts that, it is only a step to doubting the valid- 
ity of his moral intuitions. Doubting them, he will soon 
lose his sense of right and wrong. If he cannot trust his 
consciousness of the outer world, why should he pay any 
heed to the voice of conscience? And more, the person 
who holds the idealistic view will be likely to move in a 
dreamy, unreal world of mere speculation, instead of the 
world as it is; therefore, he will feel little interest in the 
practical and real needs of the world. The day-dreamer 
is of little use to humanity. 

Next in order is self-consciousness, which should also be 
properly cultivated. In order to be forceful in the world 
people must develop their personality. One of the marks 
of strong men the world over is their clear recognition of 
their own ego, which sometimes seems to amount almost to 
egotism. They assert their own individuality, perform 
their own work in the world, and live their own life; and 
if their powers are consecrated to the welfare of humanity, 
they are all the more potent for good on account of their 
keen self-consciousness. 

However, there are many persons who are excessively 
self-conscious, so that they care little for others, except as 
they can make some selfish use of them; and nothing is 
more centrally unethical than selfishness and egotism. 
Again, undue self -consciousness leads people to act unnat- 
urally in the company of their fellowmen, as if they were 
the chief center of attention. The cure for such an ab- 
normal psychical state is to use the will in reflecting that 
one is not of so great importance as to engross general in- 



186 A System of General Ethics 

terest, and also that, while you are thinking of yourself, 
perhaps others are just as much preoccupied with them- 
selves. These simple suggestions, if heeded, would save 
many persons from being so painfully backward, con- 
strained and unnatural in society. Most of us may well 
forget ourselves by becoming absorbed in matters and per- 
sons of more importance. It may be humbling to you and 
me to recall that we are only one among many, yes, among 
millions and millions, but it is good moral discipline. 

The intuitions of time and space, cause and effect, and 
mathematical and other axioms have at least this bearing 
on ethical practice, that, to cognize them as part of the re- 
alities of the world, and not as mere mental delusions, will 
have a tendency to keep men sane and practical in the per- 
formance of the every-day duties of life. The next intu- 
ition, the cognition of truth and error, has a direct bearing 
on morality, in that it is imperative for all men to seek the 
truth, accept and cherish it, conform their lives to its prin- 
ciples, and to recognize error, reject and avoid it, and warn 
others against it. Men should never become indifferent to 
the truth. Even when it is difficult to find, one should be 
earnest in one's search for it. Nor should one permit one- 
self to become cynical about it, as Pilate had evidently be- 
come when he asked the question, "What is truth?" Bet- 
ter far is it to accept the great Teacher's estimate of truth, 
when He said to His followers: "And ye shall know the 
truth, and the truth shall make you free." 

The culture of the esthetic faculty also has its ethical 
value; it is plainly man's duty to appreciate and develop 
beauty in the world, both in nature and art. "Beauty is its 
own excuse for being." Then it has been put in the world 
for some good use. The love of the true and the beautiful 
must go hand in hand with love for the good. Part of 



Man's Chief Duties 187 

beauty's ethical value lies in its refining influence on char- 
acter. The extremes to be avoided in this connection are 
dilettantism and affectation. 

For Practical Ethics one of the most important of the 
Intuitions is the cognition of right and wrong, or Con- 
science in perception. First, the Conscience should always 
be obeyed. Even when it is comparatively unenlightened, 
it is the best guide the soul has. As was shown at the 
proper place in Part I of this work, to disregard the voice 
of Conscience is the most inner and vital sin the individual 
can commit. But, laying aside all bemisting speculations, 
men should seek all the light that is possible, so that they 
may not err in moral judgment. This means that the whole 
mind, including the Conscience, should be enlightened by all 
available knowledge, in order that the moral faculty may be 
keen and sensitive and loyal to the law of righteousness. 

It is a sad fact of human experience that the Conscience 
may become calloused or atrophied, "seared as with a hot 
iron," 1 so that it no longer utters its warning, or at least 
does so in a feeble way. This immoral state is the result 
of frequent or continued disregard of the admonitions of 
the inner voice, just as all the powers of the mind become 
enfeebled by neglect and misuse. There is nothing more 
perilous than to tamper with one's moral nature. The sin 
against the Holy Ghost, of which the Bible speaks, is un- 
doubtedly the result of the hardening process that comes 
from long-continued disregard of the warnings and appeals 
of the good Spirit through the moral faculty. 

It is germain to say at this point that many persons are 
not as scrupulous as they should be ; or perhaps it would be 
more exact to say, they are scrupulous about some things, 



1. 1 Tim. 4:2. 



188 A System of General Ethics 

and have elastic consciences about other things. To specify, 
they would not think of defrauding an individual or a busi- 
ness firm, but have little scruple about cheating the gov- 
ernment, especially by making false returns of their money 
and property to the assessor. They forget that a lie is a 
lie, no matter to whom it is told. Moreover, the govern- 
ment of the country is not a mere abstraction; it is in the 
hands of the people, and is supported by them; and there- 
fore every person who defrauds the State in any way de- 
frauds his fellow-citizens, and compels some one else to 
pay an unjust share of the public tax. 

It is true, too, that some people who would not cheat an 
individual will take a dishonest advantage of a company or 
a corporation. Here again they forget that companies and 
corporations are composed of people, every one of whom 
is defrauded when the concern itself is defrauded. You 
have known people, no doubt, who, if the conductor over- 
looked the collection of their tickets, had no compunction 
about taking a free ride on the street-car or the railway 
train. The trouble is, lack of downright honesty. Some 
persons who are kind enough to their fellowmen are cruel 
to poor, hard-driven beasts of burden — one-sided ethics 
again. Some people have such distorted ethical principles 
that they are extremely conscientious about church-going 
on Sunday, and then on Monday morning they resume the 
week's business of grinding down and defrauding their fel- 
lowmen in work or trade. Thus we might continue to 
specify, but it is not necessary. The truly ethical person 
is conscientious in all respects, in all relations and transac- 
tions. 

Man's duties to God will be discussed at length in a sub- 
sequent chapter. It need only be said here that the theistic 
intuition, like all the other intuitions, should be cultivated 



Man's Chief Duties 189 

duly, or man's moral development will be deficient and one- 
sided. 

b. The Sensibiities : 

It goes without saying that man is largely emotional ; he 
is often swayed by his feeling ; sometimes more than by his 
reason and judgment. 

The Sensibilities are that part of man's psychical consti- 
tution that gives him pleasure or pain, and that imparts 
warmth and enthusiasm to his life, speech and actions. 
Without feeling the world would be a stolid world indeed. 
We speak of some people as being "cold," because they are 
lacking in kindly and generous feeling. This fact becomes 
palpably evident in public speaking. Two men may address 
the same audience : one is "coldly intellectual," and, though 
he may say brilliant things, he arouses little interest in his 
auditors; the other may be no less intellectual, but his 
thoughts are charged with true feeling, and he grips his lis- 
teners, holds their attention, and moves their hearts. 

The emotions are important in helping to furnish man 
with motive power, for it is not likely that man would ac- 
complish much even along intellectual lines if he had no 
feeling to spur him, no interest to engage him. To put it 
in paradoxical form, it is probable that an "intellectual ice- 
berg" would not be intellectual. Hence the feelings, like 
all other mental powers, perform an important function in 
human life. 

Again, feelings are to be cultivated for the sake of one's 
influence on others, who are often largely swayed by them, 
and therefore can be touched and moved by an appeal to 
them. The true and strong man will, therefore, stir their 
emotions in the right way, and will direct them along the 
right lines by the genuine and hearty flow of his own ethic- 



190 A System of General Ethics 

ally guided feelings ; whereas if he were cold and phleg- 
matic, he would be unable to make any appeal to them what- 
ever. How much there is in heart touching heart! 

Yet the caution must be given here that feeling is not to 
be man's guide and norm. What is known as "emotional- 
ism" is emotion "gone to seed," carried to extremes, un- 
controlled. While we are to have fire in the heart, it is not 
to be zvild fire. To carry the metaphor further, we do not 
want a fire that burns down the house, but one that burns 
brightly in the stove or furnace, under proper control, and 
warms the building. Reason, judgment and conscience 
have been given us for the direction of our lives; but the 
emotions were never intended to occupy that ruling posi- 
tion; they were simply meant to give warmth and ardor 
and pleasure to our inner lives and outward actions. When 
the Intellect and the Sensibilities are in accord, when pleas- 
urable feeling goes with the proper intellectual exercise and 
direction, then the life is harmonious and happy, because 
then there is no schism in the mind. However, as the 
world and human nature are constituted, such concord does 
not always exist. Sometimes the judgment points in one 
direction, and the feelings prompt in the opposite direc- 
tion ; in which case the mind is more or less rent with con- 
flict. What is the advice to be given by true ethics in such 
a situation? The judgment, reason and conscience should 
always decide the course to be pursued, and the feelings 
should suffer the sacrifice. Never should men follow their 
feelings in opposition to the verdict of the moral judgment. 
Just here is where the ethical culture of the feelings is re- 
quired, in order that they may be brought into subjection 
to the enlightened reason, and so chastened and developed 
that the heart will by and by feel genuine pleasure in the 
performance of every duty, whether it is immediately agree- 



Man's Chief Duties 191 

able or not. The attractive feature in this principle is 
this: experience teaches that it is possible so to school the 
feelings that they will take delight in every judgment of 
the reason and conscience. In this achievement the great 
glory of the ethical culture consists, namely, to bring the 
whole being of the moral agent into harmonious life and 
action, so that no internal schism occurs. 

We have thus treated the emotions in a general way. It 
is not necessary to go into details. Attention is simply 
called to the classified outline of the human mind in Chap- 
ter II, where the emotions are divided into the sentient, the 
psychical and the intuitional, corresponding with the same 
divisions of the Intellect. The intuitional emotions are sub- 
divided into the affectional, the esthetic, the philosophical, 
the ethical and the theistic. All these various feelings 
should be harmoniously and symmetrically cultivated, and 
each brought into subjection to the corresponding percep- 
tion and judgment in the Intellect. Happy the man who 
can achieve such a poised state of mind ! However, it can 
be accomplished only by the proper use and development 
of the last great functioning power of the mind, namely, 
the Will, which is now to be considered. 

c. The Will: 

In a system of Practical Ethics no thesis is more impor- 
tant than the ethical culture and discipline of the Will (for 
its position see the psychical outline in Chapter II). The 
profound ethical significance of a Will in liberty has been 
sufficiently emphasized in Theoretical Ethics. Accepting 
the conclusions there drawn, our practical task now is to 
insist on the strenuous use of this vital power of the human 
mind. To attain Christian morality the Will must be dis- 
enthralled by the Holy Spirit in regeneration or conversion ; 



192 A System of General Ethics 

but in the present discipline we are dealing only with the 
ordinary morality of the natural life. For this kind of 
morality — sometimes called "civil righteousness" 2 in Chris- 
tian theology — the Will has some degree of freedom; if it 
did not have, human society and government would not be 
possible. 

Now, it is this peculiar power, which we call will power, 
that every man is under the moral imperative to use. Spec- 
ulations about the freedom of the Will, and the conclusion 
that it is under bondage to the law of necessity, will excuse 
no man's moral delinquencies before the bar of his own con- 
science or that of society or of the civil government. Man 
knows that he is a responsible agent, and society and gov- 
ernment treat him as if he were. True enough, it is some- 
times difficult to choose and do the right; but that is pre- 
cisely the reason why man has been endued with volitional 
power ; for a will that is never put to the test is no will that 
is worthy of the name ; the fact is, in that case there would 
be no opportunity for the exercise of option. The severer 
the strain of temptation, the stouter must be the resistance, 
and the greater will be the merit and sense of approval if 
the victory is won. Men must not be weaklings. There 
is something despicable about the moral weakling. God 
will hold each one of us responsible for the heroic use of 
our self-determining and executive functioning capacity. 
If we make the excuse, "I cannot help yielding to tempta- 
tion," the reply is, "Your will has been given to you for the 
very purpose of enabling you to withstand evil, and you 
must use it." Each one of us is called upon to be "a hero 



2. Vide Augsburg Confession. Art. XVIII ; The Apology of the 
Augsburg Confession, XVIII, 70; Schmid: "Doctrinal Theology." 
page 266; Jacobs: "A Summary of the Christian Faith," page 259. 



Mans Chief Duties 193 

in the strife." "I could not help it," is the excuse of moral 
flabbiness. 

Above all things, let us not accept, teach or preach a pu- 
erile, inane, sentimental kind of morality — one that whim- 
pers and complains, grows lachrymose, and cannot cour- 
ageously endure the stress and storm of life's rigorous 
discipline. The world needs virile men, heroes; men of 
sterling and robust virtue ; soldiers of the right ; men who 
can invariably say yes to the appeal of right and no to the 
wrong. It is nauseating to see men, who ought to be strong 
and brave, going around maundering about " the irony of 
fate" and "the pathos of life." Let them assert their man- 
hood, get into the work of life, and do something that is 
worth while. This world is not, as the poor pessimist 
whines, "the worst world," or "worse than no world at all," 
or "a misfortune," or "a sad lapse of the Infinite." No! 
it is a splendid stadium for moral achievement. Again we 
assert that the excuse, "I couldn't help it," is the plaint of 
the moral weakling. 

In view of the foregoing preachment, a few practical 
suggestions as to how the will may be reenforced are rel- 
evant : 

First: You are endued by the Divine Being with the 
power of reflection, as well as with the power of volition. 
Therefore when a temptation to wrong-doing assails you, 
do not yield to the impulse, as if you were a mere automa- 
ton or a straw in the wind, but stop and consider. Re- 
member, first of all, that it is wrong to succumb to the evil 
enticement, and to do wrong is the one crime in the world ; 
a sin against the highest part of your nature, the Con- 
science ; a sin against God and His holy law ; one for which 
He will hold you responsible at His final judgment bar; 
a crime against the moral economy of the universe ; a 



194 A System of General Ethics 

crime, indeed, that, if it could become sufficiently extended 
to go beyond divine control, would wreck the universe and 
hurl God Himself to destruction. 

Second: In the face of temptation reflect that it is not 
zvise to yield. Wrong-doing will bring its punishment and 
shame sooner or later, and in some form or another. If 
it were not so, the world would not be under a moral regi- 
men. So in the end it will not make for your best and 
most enduring welfare to do wrong. This reflection, like 
the first, will prove a spur to your will, and will furnish a 
motive for resistance of the evil. 

Third: Remember that the pleasures that come from 
wrong-doing usually are short-lived, bring nausea, discon- 
tent and ennui, and often much discomfort from a smiting 
conscience. 

Fourth: The reflection that one act of wrong-doing will 
tend to weaken the will just that much, will set both body 
and mind in the groove of evil habitude, and thus open the 
way for a final moral bondage from which you cannot free 
yourself — this reflection will also help to potentialize the 
will. An evil habit is more easily formed than broken — 
remember that. 

Fifth: A most wholesome thought will be that of your 
influence on those around you. If you do right under 
stress of temptation, your conduct will inspire others to be 
strong; but if you yield, you will help to spread moral 
flabbiness like a contagion. Do you wish to be a moral 
leper in your community? Stop and think about it seri- 
ously. It is on this principle of influence that a great ethical 
book says of the righteous, after they have passed into 
eternity, "And their works do follow them." 3 What a 



3. Rev. 14 : 13. 



Man's Chief Duties 195 

stimulus to the will it is to think of our influence over others 
both now and hereafter, perhaps even forever! Surely, if 
we possess true nobility of soul, we shall want to live in 
such a way in this world that, when we leave it, as all of us 
must sooner or later, we shall join "the choir invisible," 
whose music shall continue to make the world better and 
happier. 

Sixth: Always remember that you have a will; that it 
has been given to you for use; that you can use it if you 
make the effort; that you are not a puppet, driven hither 
and yon by circumstance; that society expects you to play 
the heroic part, and, if you do not, it will write you down 
as a moral imbecile; that God expects you to employ your 
volitional powers, and will hold you responsible for your 
use of them; that He will help you, both directly, and me- 
diately through His law, to choose the right path in life. 

Seventh: All your faculties have been given to be cor- 
related and to abet one another, in order to bring about true 
unity of moral life; therefore you are in duty bound to 
use every means in your power to develop and reinforce 
your will, placing back of it all possible right incentives for 
ethical being and doing. With all these facilities at our 
command, you and I are "without excuse" if we live and 
act like moral weaklings. 

Having now dealt with the process of culture though the 
Intellect, the Sensibilities and the Will, our next thesis will 
be no less important and engaging, namely, the motives for 
culture. 



CHAPTER XIV 



MAN'S DUTIES TO HIMSELF (continued). 
2. To his mind (continued). 
(2) Motives for culture. 

a. Wrong motives. 

(a) To gratify pride and ambition. 

(b) To secure a life of ease. 

(c) To gain a dishonest advantage. 

b. Right motives. 

(a) To gratify the normal desire for knowledge. 

(b) To supplant evil thoughts with good ones. 

(c) To serve God and humankind more effectively. 



I. MAN'S DUTIES TO HIMSELF (continued). 
2. To his mind (continued): 

(2) Motives for culture: 

The question here is paramount for the young student: 
What are the proper motives for seeking mental culture? 
Or, to phrase it differently, why should a young person 
seek an education? Methods of culture belong to the de- 
partment of Pedagogy, and are of great importance. The 
proper motives for mental development, however, consti- 
tute a vital question in Practical Ethics. Let us classify 
our material. 

a. Wrong motives: 

The young person who seeks an education merely to 
gratify his pride and ambition is not actuated by worthy 
motives. It is possible that the words "pride" and "ambi- 
tion" may be used in a good sense. When "pride" means 
proper self-respect, or a true appraisement of oneself over 
against loss of self-respect, it is right; and when by "am- 
bition" is meant the noble aspiration to be of some value in 



Man's Chief Duties 197 

and to the world, it is also right. But when these terms 
are used in the selfish sense, the motive is unethical, and 
soils the whole purpose of the educated life. The man who 
seeks culture merely to minister to his own fame and 
aggrandizement, will be an egotist and pedant, and will be 
likely to trample on the rights of others. 

Likewise the desire for a mere life of ease is an unethical 
motive for acquiring an education. Sometimes young per- 
sons are actuated by this unworthy motive. Parents, too, 
are sometimes controlled by this thought ; they want to 
give their children an education to save them from a life of 
manual toil. They cherish the false idea that it is easier 
to "make a living" by using the mind than by working with 
the hands. That is a wrong motive, because it is sordid 
and selfish. Children who are driven to school under such 
a regime will never become truly educated, for in order to 
secure real culture the heart must be interested as well as 
the intellect. Besides, it is a mistaken notion to suppose 
that a living can be made more easily with brain work than 
with manual work. To do real and successful work with 
the mind is just as difficult as to work with the hands. If 
this is not true, why do not more boys and girls pass 
through the high-school, and then go to the college and the 
university? Is it not chiefly because they find mental toil 
too difficult for them? How often you hear young people 
say that they "would rather work than go to school!" In- 
deed, the people who make a good living and achieve true 
success purely by intellectual effort are proportionately few, 
and all of them know the exhaustion of onerous mental 
labor. Brain work, remember, is fully as difficult and 
wearing as brawn work. Therefore, it is both wrong and 
foolish for young people to seek for mental culture as an 
easy means of gaining a livelihood. 



198 A System of General Ethics 

Another perverted motive for acquiring education is to 
enable one to secure a dishonest advantage over others who 
have less mental acuteness. Mere intellectual training, 
minus the proper development of the moral nature, may 
lead to harmful results for society and the State. In itself 
it is no guarantee against a corrupt life. Indeed, in these 
days a man must be well educated to be a successful rascal. 
In many ways a knowledge of chemistry, physics, mechan- 
ics, mathematics, business, rhetoric and literature may be 
used by an expert to carry on fraudulent purposes. Some 
years ago, when extensive efforts were made to cleanse our 
municipal and state governments from corruption, the as- 
tounding discovery was made that most of the grafters and 
boodlers convicted of civil crime were graduates of our 
leading colleges and universities ! Does not this fact prove 
that a course in true, stalwart Ethics is needed in the curri- 
cula of our academic institutions? It is not enough to say 
merely, with Lyman Beecher, "We must educate ! We must 
educate !" but our motto should rather be, "We must edu- 
cate all the powers of our coming citizens, their consciences 
as well as their intellects. " 

b. Right motives: 

(a) To gratify the normal desire for knowledge: 
While many people, sad to say, do not appreciate knowl- 
edge for its own sake, there are many others who are 
thirsty for the springs of true mental acquisition. They 
delight in learning and in the exercise and discipline nec- 
essary to secure it. This in itself, other motives being pure, 
is a worthy motive. It is divinely implanted, and therefore 
it is right to gratify it, and wrong not to do so. All knowl- 
edge that the human mind acquires must first have been 
possessed by the divine mind, and thus the pursuit of true 



Man's Chief Duties 199 

learning is simply trying to find out God's thoughts and 
purposes. To realize this truth vividly is to add an inspir- 
ing incentive to the search for knowledge. And no one 
need ever to fear that God is jealous of man's reverent and 
sincere pursuit of truth. The greatest ethical book in the 
world gives this excellent counsel: "Wisdom is the prin- 
ciple thing ; therefore get wisdom ; and with all thy getting, 
get understanding" (Prov. 4:7). 

(b) To supplant evil thoughts with good ones: 

This thought is indeed worth emphasizing. It expresses 
the great ethical value of culture. When we see school 
children bending over their books, or hear them conning 
their lessons, we might ask, "What is the use of it all?" 
Much of it seems to be so mechanical, such a pointless 
"grinding of gerunds." However, we should reflect that 
it is much better for the youth to be thus employed, filling 
their minds with thoughts from books, than for them to 
idle away their time, and spend it on the streets or in the 
haunts of vice. It certainly is better to spell, read, write 
and cipher than to learn to use profane and obscene lan- 
guage. While pupils are laying the foundations of schol- 
arship, they certainly are not engaged in mischief, but are 
cultivating habits of industry. In and of themselves mental 
disciplines have their moral value, and prepare the young 
for the appreciation of the higher pleasures of life rather 
than for those of a gross and groveling nature. 

(c) To serve God and humankind more effectively: 
Not for a moment would we imply that unlettered people 

cannot be useful; indeed, many of them serve the world 
in ways that are most praiseworthy; and sometimes much 
better than some of the educated class. However, other 
things being equal — mark the qualification — the educated 



200 A System of General Ethics 

man multiplies his power for doing good. This is true in 
almost all lines of life. For example, the farmer who is 
educated, and is at the same time a practical and successful 
farmer and a man of good character, is apt to be a most 
useful man in the community; for he has the talent and 
training to do many things that others who are less dis- 
ciplined cannot do; he has the gift of leadership along 
many lines of economic, civic, moral and religious advance- 
ment. The housewife who has mental training will find 
many opportunities for employing her gifts in a salutary 
way, rearing her own family aright, and leading the com- 
munity in social and religious service. 

Think, too, what a dull and humdrum world this would 
be without men and women of culture ; there would be no 
inspiring books, sermons, lectures, poetry, art and music. 
Even the labor-saving machinery of the day would have 
been impossible had it not been for the years of investiga- 
tion and experiment in mechanics, physics, chemistry, en- 
gineering, etc., which have been carried on in the labora- 
tories of our colleges and universities. Nearly every use- 
ful discovery and invention may be traced back to the teach- 
ing of the schools. Thus we see how education has been 
of great practical value to the world, and, with proper 
moral and spiritual culture, is the producer of a high civ- 
ilization, a secure form of government, and many of the 
amenities of life. 

Now, the highest motive that can inspire the man who 
seeks mental culture is the ambition to contribute his share 
to make the world better and happier. If all educated men 
were impelled by this lofty motive, how rapidly the human 
race would advance ! How much human suffering would 
be prevented and ameliorated ! No higher ethical note has 
ever been struck than that of the Biblical prophet who 



Mans Chief Duties 201 

wrote: "The Lord God hath given me the tongue of the 
learned, that I might speak a word in season to him that is 
weary" (Isa. 50:4). There is much selfishness in the 
human heart, and no one is able in the present world to 
eliminate all of it from his nature; yet the highest motive 
for culture is the altruistic one, and all educated people 
ought to strive for it more and more. Of all people in the 
world, those who have had the advantage of culture should 
be the most unselfish, the most devoted to the good of their 
fellowmen. To be haughty and self-centered, to look with 
condescension and contempt upon the unlettered, is to de- 
feat the very purpose of education and of all true educa- 
tional institutions in the land, whether they be supported 
by the State or the Church. An intellectual aristocracy ot' 
caste is unethical and paganish, unpatriotic and un-Amer- 
ican. The doctrine of the universal brotherhood of man 
should be cherished and practiced by the educated classes, 
whose responsibilities are greater than those of their less 
favored fellows. 

Culture should never run into conceit. The person who 
is vain of his erudition has really not learned enough to 
know how little he knows, or to realize the limits of human 
thinking. The more one investigates, the more one recog- 
nizes the mysteries of the universe ; the more insoluble are 
its most fundamental problems. Thus true culture will im- 
plant the ethical graces of humility and teachableness. 

This section concludes our thesis on man's duties to his 
body and his mind. However, man must not be treated 
only in this piecemeal way; he must also be dealt with as 
an integer; for his personality binds all his parts together 
in an organic unity. Logically, therefore, our next thesis 
will be man's duties to himself in his entirety. 



CHAPTER XV 



MAN'S DUTIES TO HIMSELF (continued). 
3. To his whole personality. 

(1) A strong personality. 

(2) A symmetrical personality. 

(3) A virtuous personality. 

a. Relation of virtue to character. 

b. Definition of virtue and virtues. 

c. Classification of virtues. 

d. List of virtues. 

(a) Positive content. 

(b) Antithesis. 

(c) Perversion. 



I. MAN'S DUTIES TO HIMSELF (continued). 
3. To his whole personality: 

(1) A strong personality: 

It is every man's right and duty to develop as strong a 
personality as possible. Should it be asked, "How can this 
be done?" we reply, by the vigorous use of the will. It is 
too late to ask how a man can be other than he has been 
born, or than nature and circumstance have made him ; for 
we have already shown that man is a moral agent, not a 
mere automaton, puppet or victim. Therefore, he must 
take a hold upon himself by an effort of the will, and lift 
himself out of his natural inanity and inertia. We do not 
mean that every man can become a genius by a mere effort 
of the will ; nor is such the design of the Creator, who evi- 
dently has a great affection, as Lincoln once said, for the 
"common people," of whom there are vast numbers. How- 



Man's Chief Duties 203 

ever, no rational man needs to be inane — that is, without 
some power for good in his community. In some mys- 
terious way there are implanted in our psychical natures 
certain latent resources upon which we may call by an 
effort of the will. In psychology these latent powers may 
be considered a part of our "sub-conscious" minds — though 
the writer has often wondered whether "super-conscious" 
would not be an apter term. Who knows but that, by an 
effort of the will, we may be able to draw upon the inex- 
haustible resources of the Power that made the universe? 
At all events, moral agents are endued with this mysterious 
faculty of reinforcing their mental and moral powers. 

Let us illustrate how men may thus potentialize their 
personality. Take the public speaker as an example. At 
first he may be afraid of his audience; may feel daunted 
before an assembly. Now, if he permits this feeling of 
trepidation to prevail, he will become panic-stricken, or 
"stage-struck," as it is often called, and will have to retire 
in deep humiliation. But if he will, as it were, "gather 
himself together," master his fear by an effort of the will, 
reflect that he has a message for his audience that they 
should hear, remind himself firmly that he is perhaps more 
capable than any of his auditors to handle the subject on 
which he has specialized, and, above all, determine by pure 
grit to win the victory, he will presently vanquish his timid- 
ity, replenish his powers, grasp his theme firmly, and at the 
same time grip the attention of his hearers, and so prove 
himself the master of the situation. This is simply an 
example of what may be called the capacity for self-poten- 
tialization. It may be applied in many other experiences 
of human life. 

(2) A symmetrical personality: 



204 A System of General Ethics 

The Psalmist exclaims, "The righteous shall flourish like 
the palm tree" (Ps. 92: 12). This is an apt way of symbol- 
izing the symmetry of the truly ethical character and life. 
Think of the strong, straight, tapering bole of the palm, 
lifting its coronal of leaves toward the sun, its roots strik- 
ing deep into the soil of the desert, drawing refreshment 
from the subterranean waters. What a suggestive picture 
of the upright man who develops a well-poised character! 

There are people who are one-sided and warped in their 
moral natures. They cultivate one virtue to the exclusion 
of others that are just as important. For example, some 
men pride themselves on their honesty and frankness, but 
are harsh and gruff, thus giving unnecessary offense to 
those around them. They should be both honest and kind. 
Some men who are brave physically are moral cowards ; 
others are the reverse. Both kinds of courage should be 
cultivated. The temperance advocate should also be tem- 
perate in eating and speaking. Occasionally you will find 
a man who is pious in many ways, but he is not scrupulous 
in paying his debts. One person said : "I am kind to other 
people ; that is my religion instead of going to church. " 
That is one-sided, for people should do both — be kind to 
other people and attend church services. On the other 
hand, no amount of Sunday piety will make up for every- 
day meanness ; neither will every-day humanitarianism ex- 
cuse the neglect of the worship of God on Sunday. The 
writer once overheard a man conversing in a hotel lobby in 
an extremely profane and vulgar way; indeed, his speech 
was so vile that a policeman should have been called to 
arrest him and conduct him to the lockup ; then he turned 
toward some of the rest of us, and declared, with much 
gusto, "Well, I'm no hypocrite, anyway!" As if not being 



Mans Chief Duties 205 

a hypocrite would excuse, or in any way extenuate, such 
vileness of speech ! Let it be remembered that no virtue 
can be played over against a vice. It is the duty and 
privilege of every man to cultivate all the virtues and graces 
proportionately, making the character beautiful and well- 
balanced. Men should avoid ethical lopsidedness. 

While there may be some overlapping of this division 
and the next, yet we find it most convenient in assembling 
our data to make a new section. It is a man's duty to cul- 
tivate — 

(3) A virtuous personality: 

a. Relation of virtue to character: 

Virtue is the essence of true character. In its ethical 
sense, it is virtue that makes the true man ; the man who 
is genuine through and through, and not merely in his ex- 
ternal life ; "an Israelite in whom there is no guile ;" a man 
who is too high-minded to think mean thoughts or do mean 
and dishonest acts. Virtue is the very heart of morality. 

b. Definition of virtue and virtues : 

Virtue is rectitude and virility of character. Derived 
from the Latin vir, virtus, it originally meant manliness or 
masculinity, and later valor; but it has now come to have 
a purely ethical significance, and may be predicated of the 
feminine character as well as the masculine ; for we speak 
of a virtuous woman as appropriately as of a virtuous man. 
While virtue is the generic term, the virtues may be re- 
garded as the species. Therefore we must define further. 

The virtues are those various ethical qualities that go to 
make up the character of the truly upright man. 

c. Classification of virtues : 

It is doubtful whether a strictly scientific classification 



206 A System of General Ethics 

of the virtues can be made at this stage of ethical analysis. 
Plato's four cardinal virtues were Wisdom, Courage, Tem- 
perance and Justice. Perhaps not all of them were used 
in precisely the same sense as we use the terms today. This 
list, however, is not comprehensive enough. For instance, 
the great virtue of love is omitted. If all the virtues are 
to be included in these four, the definition of each would 
have to be greatly expanded beyond its real meaning. No 
other method of classification, however, seems to be satis- 
factory. Therefore, we think it would be best for each 
virtue to be treated separately, remembering that all of the 
virtues have their unity in the generic term Virtue. How- 
ever, in a work on General Ethics lack of space forbids the 
treatment of all the virtues, and so we must be content with 
some outstanding examples, which will indicate the method 
by which all the rest may be dealt with. 

d. List of virtues: 

In this world of mixed good and evil an analysis of the 
virtues leads to the discovery that each virtue has its pos- 
itive quality or content, its antithesis and its perversion. A 
few of the virtues seem to be so imbedded in the ethical 
solidarity as apparently to have no perversions. The fol- 
lowing is a partial list of virtues, with their antitheses and 
perversions, which will be suggestive of further study and 
expansion : 



Positive Content 


Antithesis 


Perversion 


Love 


Hatred 


Sentimentality 


Faith 


Unbelief 


Credulity 


Hope 


Despair 


Ultra-optimism 


Humility 


Pride 


Servility 


Firmness 


Vacillation 


Obstinacy 


Courage 


Cowardice 


Foolhardiness 


Self-respect 


Self-contempt 


Conceit 



Man's Chief Duties 



207 



Fidelity 


Perfidy 


Indiscriminate Loyalty 


Veracity 


Falsehood 


None 


Sincerity 


Insincerity 


None 


Enthusiasm 


Lethargy 


Fanaticism 


Diligence 


Sloth fulness 


Ultra-assiduity 


Affability 


Surliness 


Sycophancy 


Neatness 


Slovenliness 


Fastidiousness 


Individuality 


Inanity 


Erraticism 


Patience 


Impatience 


Stolidity 


Conscientiousness 


Unscrupulousness 


Squeamishness 


Politeness 


Boorishness 


Effusiveness 


Liberality 


Stinginess 


Prodigality 


Dignity 


Vulgarity 


Superciliousness 


Chastity 


Licentiousness 


Prudery 


Self-denial 


Self-indulgence 


Asceticism 



It would be superfluous to expand on the entire forego- 
ing list. In general it should be said that each positive 
virtue should be cultivated in its proper sense and propor- 
tion, while both the antithesis and the perversion should be 
conscientiously avoided. As a rule, the antithesis will be 
clearly marked and distinguished, but the perversion of a 
virtue may often require the exercise of nice discrimination 
and moral judgment. Therefore it would be a good mental 
and moral discipline for students to write theses on the list 
given above. Let us specify briefly. 

Pure, strong love is nobly ethical, and calls out that 
which is best in men and women. It is one of the primary 
virtues, and should be cultivated in the home, the social 
organism, the Church, the State, and in international 
affairs. There is no doubt that, if this virtue were truly 
developed and exercised, no more wars among the nations 
would arise. Such love, however, would have to be mutual 
and international in order to be effective; for if even one 
nation refused to be controlled by this principle, conflicts 



208 A System of General Ethics 

would still arise that might force even the most peaceful 
country into a war of self-defense. The idea of inter- 
national good-will, however, should not be cast aside as 
Utopian and sentimental, but should be promoted by every 
right and wise means by men and women of large hearts 
and brains, and especially by statesmen and diplomats. 

The opposite of love, which is hatred, should never be 
cherished. No matter how wicked a fellow-being may be, 
we should not hate him, nor contemn him, though, of 
course, we should disapprove of, and even rebuke, his 
wrong conduct. To discriminate in both our judgment and 
our affection between the sinner and his sins is a divine 
gift, and connotes the highest ethical character. To cher- 
ish ill-will against a fellowman, to hold a grudge, to seek 
revenge — these not only are sins against the moral law, but 
are undermining to one's own moral nature, and will open 
the sluices for many other evils. The person who "keeps 
spite" is also unhappy himself. On the other hand, how 
happy are those persons who can look upon all their fellow- 
men with true and heartfelt affection ! They never live on 
a low and sullen plane. Even among nations that have 
taken up arms against one another, how magnanimous, how 
generous-minded, it is if any of them can act on the high 
ethical principle of "making war without rancor !" 

However, beautiful a virtue as love is, it is capable of 
perversion. It may degenerate into mere sentimentality, 
which is love that lacks ethical quality. For example, the 
parent who declares that he loves his children too well to 
correct their faults and punish their wrong-doing is really 
actuated, not by true love, but by mere sentiment, because 
true ethical love would lead him to seek the highest welfare 
of his offspring. The judge who would weep over the 
convict, declare he could not find it in his heart to sentence 



Man's Chief Duties 209 

and punish him, and would therefore set him free to do 
more injury to society, would be a mawkish sentimentalist, 
not a true lover of mankind. The truly ethical judge 
would, indeed, love the criminal, and tell him so in tones of 
genuine feeling, but he would also remind him that he has 
done wrong, has violated the civil and moral law, and must 
therefore suffer the condign penalty of his offense, because 
justice must be upheld and satisfied, and society must be 
portected. True love is always ethical; always surcharged 
with righteousness. 

We may subject the virtue of hope to the same analysis. 
Every one should, within reasonable limits, cultivate a hope- 
ful spirit. It is right always to "hope for the best," and 
under sore trial to "hope against hope." Such a temper 
will have a reflex influence on one's own life, making him 
happy and cheerful, and at the same time will shed an in- 
spirating radiance on other's lives. The right kind of 
"hope maketh not ashamed." The hope of a better day 
for this life and the hope of a future life of blessedness — 
both of them are right, and have an inspiring influence on 
those who cherish them. 

The antithesis of hope is despondency, or, to put it still 
more strongly, despair. Under discouraging circumstances, 
some persons lose hope. In such cases much can be done 
to hearten and cheer oneself by cultivating hope, by an 
effort to look on the bright side; by remembering a good 
old adage which says, "Long is the lane that has no turn." 
The hope of the future life, such as is set forth in the 
Christian revelation, affords comfort to many people in 
their affliction, and so has much ethical value, keeping them 
from becoming bitter, pessimistic and cynical. The reason 
Judas hung himself was that, after he had sinned by be- 
traying his Master, he thought he could not be forgiven, 



210 A System of General Ethics 

and therefore he permitted himself to fall into despair. 
On the other hand, Peter, though he denied his Lord, 
afterward repented of his sin, threw himself on divine 
mercy, was forgiven, and restored to divine favor, and thus 
lived to much purpose throughout his subsequent career. 

But even hope may be perverted, and in this way : People 
may be so sanguine that everything will turn out well as to 
become careless, and simply drift. They may declare 
glibly, as many do, "The truth will take care of itself," and 
so may try to shift the responsibility of defending and pro- 
moting the truth. They may exclaim, "All's well with the 
world," and thus may minify the terrible character and ex- 
tent of the evil that exists. Ultra in their optimism, they 
indulge a hope that is not rationally grounded, and is there- 
fore doomed to disappointment. In order to cure the evils 
of the world, men must recognize them in their real enor- 
mity, and must put forth all their efforts to eliminate them. 
It is idle and fantastic to hope that they will cure them- 
selves, or will be cured in some magical way. An example 
of false hope is that of continuing year after year in wrong- 
doing, expecting that in some way forgiveness and salva- 
tion will be granted on a dying-bed. So hope, like nearly 
all the other virtues, must be guarded from abuse. 

A most interesting virtue is that of individuality. One 
might ask, "What is the difference between individuality 
and personality?" It is this: Personality is the ego, the 
self per se; whereas individuality is that peculiar quality 
or characteristic of each self that distinguishes him from 
all others. If it were not for this peculiar vein or trait of 
each person, all persons would be alike; all would be pre- 
cise replicas of all others ; each would have his own per- 
sonal substance, but there would be no difference in qual- 
ity. Looking over an audience of ten thousand people, the 



Man's Chief Duties 211 

orator would note that all of them looked precisely alike. 
But — and we should be thankful for it — the human family- 
has not been so constituted ; no two faces are exactly alike ; 
no two temperaments ; there is infinite diversity, making 
the study of human nature endlessly interesting. 

The positive content of this trait is a good element, and 
should be properly cultivated. There is an important sense 
in which each person "should be himself" — that is, act ac- 
cording to his own peculiar natural bent. He should not 
be affected; nor should he ape someone else. As a rule, 
the imitator hits upon some peculiarity of the person whom 
he admires, and makes himself ridiculous by trying to copy 
it. The peculiarity may be entirely natural and becoming 
to its original possessor, but may not fit the imitator at all, 
any more than another man's clothes would be likely to fit 
him. An old adage, derived from the Holy Scriptures, is 
pertinent here: "David cannot fight in Saul's armor." 
Every man should cultivate the vein of originality with 
which he has been endued by nature. If he seeks the schol- 
arly life, he should write his own compositions, develop his 
own style of expression, and deliver his own sermons and 
addresses. An essay plagiarized from a great author might 
be much superior to anything you might compose, but 
people want to read or hear what you can produce, what 
has been sifted through your individuality, even though it 
may not be of so high a character and value. The plagiar- 
ist is a thief and a pretender ; he steals from other men's 
thinking, and tries to pass for more than he is worth. 

The opposite of individuality is what we have called 
inanity in our list. Certainly there are degrees of origin- 
ality, and nature has set its own limits to it in every case. 
Yet no rational being has a right to permit himself to be 
or to become inane, but should assert whatever original 



212 A System of General Ethics 

power he has, make something out of himself for his own 
sake and the sake of society, and thus contribute his share, 
even though it be small, to the advancement of human 
welfare. 

Yet individuality may be carried to an extreme; it may 
run into eccentricity or erraticism. And therein lies the 
temptation of the man who is naturally gifted with strong 
individuality; he may become too erratic or individualistic 
to adjust himself to his social environment, and may insist 
on carrying out his views or plans regardless of the opin- 
ions of others. As the saying goes, the eccentric man is 
"hard to get along with." He is known as a "peculiar" 
person or "an odd genius." The man who declared that he 
was "the easiest man in the world to get along with, if 
people would only give him his own way," belonged to this 
difficult class. While individuality in its positive sense is 
an excellent trait, and distinguishes the strong character 
from the inane, "individualism" is an extreme, an over- 
assertion of one's selfhood, an affectation of idiosyncrasy, 
an overweening ambition to be "different." Persons of 
this type can seldom fit amiably into any social organiza- 
tion, whether it be a college, a college class, a literary so- 
ciety, a civil community, or a church. In the last-named 
organization there are people who are known as "church 
tramps," which means persons who become dissatisfied or 
"disgruntled" in every church with which they unite, until 
at length they drop out entirely, and ever afterward have 
a "pick" at all religious organizations. Here and there 
you will find a minister who, on account of his selfishness 
and eccentricities, cannot live in harmony with the members 
of his own vocation. To put our proposition in an epigram, 
you and I should cultivate individuality, but should avoid 
individualism. 



Man's Chief Duties 213 

Let us consider for a moment another virtue — humility. 
It is said that "humility is an angel virtue." Over against 
pride or haughtiness, a humble spirit makes for individual 
and social happiness. A great many of the ills of social 
life come from pride, leading to false and harmful social 
distinctions. "Oh, why should the spirit of mortal be 
proud?" is a sentiment that all men should endorse. "Be 
clothed with humility," wrote the apostle, and good advice 
it was. "Pride goeth before a fall," issued from the pen 
of another observing writer. One of the finest of the beati- 
tudes is, "Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the 
kingdom of heaven." Yet humility may degenerate into a 
fawning, obsequious temper, which is very offensive. It 
is a fine art to be able to be humble and at the same time 
preserve one's dignity and self-respect ; but it can be done, 
and it is part of every person's moral task to accomplish it. 

Let us treat a few other virtues in a very concise way. 
What a desirable virtue is firmness as against over-pliancy ! 
Yet there are people who pervert this virtue too, and mis- 
take obstinacy for it. You might define obstinacy as hold- 
ing on to small ideas or unworthy aims with a death-grip. 

All persons should possess and cultivate courage, both 
physical and moral, for any kind of a coward is weak and 
despicable ; yet to run into unnecessary danger, on account 
of recklessness or vainglory, is not a mark of true heroism, 
but of foolhardiness. From this spirit is derived the say- 
ing about men who "would rush in where angels scarce 
would dare to tread." The reason our Lord would not 
cast Himself from the pinnacle of the temple at Satan's 
behest was that it would have been an unnecessary adven- 
ture, as well as undignified, an attempted exploit merely for 
its own sake, and therefore would have been a case of 
"tempting God;" it would have been foolhardy, not cour- 
ageous. 



214 A System of General Ethics 

A strong trait of character is conscientiousness, and it 
needs much emphasis in this day and age, for there are few 
people who are over-scrupulous ; yet there are persons here 
and there who are squeamish; who let their consciences 
trouble them about little things, trifles, mere peccadilloes, 
that have no special moral character. 

A nice distinction is also to be made with reference to 
fidelity, which is the noble trait of loyalty to a friend, a 
country, or a cause. Almost above all other persons, the 
perfidious or treacherous man is to be despised. If he is 
disloyal to his country, we call him a traitor, as was Ben- 
edict Arnold. Yet, strange as it may seem, even so noble 
a virtue as fidelity may be abused, or carried to an extreme 
— that is, one may defend his friends or his country in 
transactions that are wrong; whereas one should be so 
true to their best interests as to try to set them right. 

There is the noble virtue of self-denial. It is closely 
connected with altruism in the proper sense of the term. 
In individual ethics it is right and dutiful for one to deny 
himself a lower indulgence for the sake of a higher good, 
and it is imperative that one crucify the "lusts of the flesh" 
in order to save one's better life. Therefore the true idea 
of self-sacrifice for one's own good and for the good of 
others is right and commendable, and is to be pitted against 
sensual and selfish indulgence. On the other hand, there 
is no virtue in asceticism, which is the perversion of self- 
denial. It is a mistake to think that we have no right to 
the good and pleasant things of life, as long as we use them 
temperately and unselfishly. Would it not be strange if 
God had surrounded us with wholesome and appetizing 
natural products, social amenities, intellectual pleasures, 
and esthetic attractions only to tempt and mock us? Aus- 
terity of life has nothing in itself to commend it. A re- 



Man's Chief Duties 215 

ligion that "makes us miserable in this life in order that we 
may be happy in the next" is not a well-balanced religion, 
but one of the fanatical sort. Better is a religion that 
gives us true joy and inspiration in every good and perfect 
gift in both this world and the world to come. 

One of the beautiful minor virtues is affability, which is 
almost a synonym of courtesy. It is a trait that greatly 
smooths the pathway of social, business and civic life. No 
man has a right to be surly or cross-grained, which is an 
index of a churlish disposition. When people declare that 
they are afraid of you on account of your snarling temper, 
it surely means no compliment to you. Sometimes people 
think they can excuse their over-bluntness by pretending 
that they are honest and outspoken, and are "not two- 
faced," but "always say just what they think." As a rule, 
though, they grow angry if other people express themselves 
with like frankness and brusqueness about their faults. 
The abuse of affability is sycophancy, which leads a person 
to bow and scrape and almost crawl before his fellowmen 
in order to curry favor. Such conduct only excites disgust. 
Generally speaking, people want others to preserve their 
dignity and self-respect, and not to flatter and cringe. 
Here, as with all the other virtues, we should remember 
Aristotle's "golden mean" — the via media. 

In general we may say, in concluding this section, Culti- 
vate the positive quality of every virtue, and avoid both the 
antithesis and the perversion, and thus develop a well- 
poised and fully rounded character. 



CHAPTER XVI 



II. MAN'S DUTIES TO NATURE (Nature Ethics). 

1. To trace the divine purposes in her phenomena. 

2. To study her scientifically. 

3. To preserve, mould and develop her. 

4. To show mercy to all her sentient creatures. 



II. MAN'S DUTIES TO NATURE (Nature Ethics). 
1. To trace the divine purposes in her phenomena: 

Abstractly considered, man cannot be said to owe a duty 
to impersonal nature, because, as has been said so often in 
this work, the moral inheres only in rational personality; 
but when the natural realm is looked upon as God's pos- 
session and handiwork, we may owe it a duty because it 
belongs to Him; or, in other words, we are under obliga- 
tion to Him and to ourselves to treat it in its relation to its 
Creator and Preserver. 

A superficial view of nature may lead to atheism. Many 
men see in nature only the working of inexorable law, 
which is made to account for all phenomena; as if laws 
were not simply modes of operation; the method of the 
lawgiver and executor ! Law is an abstract term, the name 
for a modus operandi, not the name of a concrete person 
who can initiate movements and carry out purposes. It 
certainly gives zest to the study of nature when men can 
feel that they are not investigating a mere machine, but are 
also tracing the thoughts of the Great Artificer. 



Man's Chief Duties 217 

2. To study her scientifically: 

By this we mean that we should investigate nature sin- 
cerely and judicially and as profoundly as possible, so that 
we may discover the actual laws that govern her. We 
should not read into nature what is not in her constitution ; 
should not idealize her, or go into sentimental rhapsodies 
over her, and so give to her a false glamour. On the other 
hand, we should appreciate and love her in all her varied 
forms. Many people today are so steeped in the artificial- 
ities of social life that they have no relish for the study 
and contemplation of the natural world ; they see no beauty 
in the sunset, the landscape, the panorama of mountain and 
ocean ; they bow down, rather, to the gods of gold, fashion 
and social frivolity. Persons of this type surely live 
meager and one-sided lives. 

There are persons who study nature, it is true, but per- 
mit themselves to grow pessimistic over some of her phe- 
nomena; that is, they see no beauty and kindliness in her 
operations, because their whole vision is filled with the 
strange, mysterious and seemingly cruel things that occur 
in her realm. To them, she is almost a monster, a sort of 
Minotaur, crushing everything with inexorable law. This 
is a one-sided view, and therefore unscientific, for he who 
will study nature in all her varied forms will surely find a 
preponderance of beauty and beneficence. Not only so, 
but the cynical conception of nature usually has an ethical 
basis in the critic himself, who centers his thoughts merely 
on physical and earthly pleasures, instead of on the higher 
moral and spiritual values that make for real character and 
happiness. It is a notable fact that materialists often turn 
pessimists; and "there is a reason for it." 

It must also be admitted that there are men who idealize 
nature, and rhapsodize over her as if she were perfect in 



218 A System of General Ethics 

all her moods and tenses. Many of the poets, romancers 
and nature-writers commit this error, and thus, as it were, 
inveigle people out into nature's realm, only to find them- 
selves speedily disenchanted, with the result that ever after- 
ward they scoff at nature and those who praise her marvels 
and beauties. When Rousseau advocated a return to simple 
nature and the ways of nature-peoples, he should have gone 
to live for a few weeks in the dense forests of Africa, to 
fight with noxious insects, venomous serpents and man- 
eating animals. All too soon he would have been disen- 
charmed, and would have hurried back to the comforts and 
security of civilized and cultured communities. He thought 
that savagery was the highest estate of mortals, but for 
some reason, an evident one, he never took up his abode 
with the Hottentots and Bushmen ; never even went among 
them as a missionary! Even so engaging a nature writer 
as Thoreau, who sometimes scoffed at civilization and man- 
kind, and belauded nature in her raw state, did not live 
very long in his secluded shanty at Waldo Pond, but soon 
returned to the haunts and amenities of a civilized com- 
munity, where he fared much more comfortably. And even 
while he was "roughing it" at Waldo, he was glad to avail 
himself of many of the inventions and conveniences of art. 
Even the nails which held the planks of his shanty together 
were made by human machinery, and the planks themselves 
were the product of the sawmills of the civilization he 
affected to despise. James Russell Lowell and Sidney 
Lanier wrote beautiful poems on "The Marsh," nor did 
they overdraw their attractions ; but it is worth mentioning 
that they did not take up their residence there among the 
gnats and mosquitos ; they simply made brief visits to such 
haunts, usually under the most favorable weather condi- 
tions. Besides, their marshes were comparatively small 



Man's Chief Duties 219 

areas in the midst of well-cultivated farms, and were very 
different from the Everglades of Florida or the dank and 
quaking swamps of Louisiana. 

To most people, it must be admitted, raw nature is not 
attractive, but is rather repellent and fearsome. The nature 
which they really admire is that which is more or less cul- 
tivated and moulded by human art. As a matter of fact, 
nature must be tamed and developed before it can be made 
serviceable and attractive to the vast majority of mankind. 
When nature and art are properly combined, the most sat- 
isfactory condition is obtained. The Bible teaches that our 
first parents, though placed in the beautiful garden of Par- 
adise, were to "dress and keep it." It also represents God 
as saying to the original pair: "Be fruitful, and multiply, 
and replenish the earth, and subdue it." That word "sub- 
due" is a very significant word. Rational investigation in 
a large and comprehensive way proves that the teaching of 
the Bible in this respect is correct. Why nature in her 
native state is not all that we might desire is a problem of 
Theism and Theoretical Ethics, and has been dealt with 
elsewhere in this volume ; but we suggest here that perhaps 
the moral discipline acquired by man in subduing and 
moulding the natural realm was one of the primary pur- 
poses of the Creator. So let us study nature sanely and 
sincerely — in other words, scientifically — and not permit 
ourselves to become pessimistic, on the one hand, nor over- 
sentimental, on the other. We can be nature-lovers with- 
out being "nature-fakirs." 

Another word of caution is needed in a treatise on prac- 
tical morality. The nature-lover should never permit him- 
self to grow cynical toward his fellowmen. It is only too 
true that some persons who consort with nature are given 
to more or less scorn of mankind. Apparently they cannot 



220 A System of General Ethics 

love man and nature at the same time and with real fervor. 
This marks a narrow and one-sided frame of mind. 
Thoreau was something of an offender along this line. It 
certainly is not necessary nor ethical to cry down man in 
order to cry up nature. Man and nature are not rivals in 
our affections, or, at least, should not be. Both are a part 
of the same cosmos, and the offspring of the same Creator. 
The truly balanced ethical attitude is that of love for 
nature, man and God. 

It remains to be said, to offset any misunderstanding 
from the remarks previously made, that in many respects 
nature, even in her primitive state, is most beautiful 
and ethically inspiring. Witness the glory of the sunset 
and the sunrise ; the silvery path of the moon on the ocean ; 
the scintillant glancing of the rising sun on the fretted 
waters of the river or the lake; the panorama of snow- 
capped peaks and snow-filled gorges among the Rockies, 
the Alps and the Andes; the star-paved dome of the sky 
at night. Truly the Psalmist was correct when he ex- 
claimed: "The heavens declare the glory of God, and the 
firmament showeth His handiwork." 

Moreover, nature is always fascinating to the seasoned 
and earnest investigator, whether her mood is stern or 
gentle. Agassiz spent enraptured days in the study of a 
worm or a snake, from which most people would have 
shrunk with disgust and fear. John Muir and Enos Mills 
fairly revelled in the fierce storms of the Alpine heights of 
the Rocky Mountains and the Sierra Nevadas. Thus, as 
a scientific study, all nature presents a captivating field. A 
further duty of man to nature will occupy the next section. 

3. To preserve, mould and develop her: 

The wanton destruction of nature is wrong, a grievous 



Man's Chief Duties 221 

outrage of the law of practical morality. Hewing down 
the forests in a wasteful way is a sin against God, man and 
nature. The more ethical men become, the more they will 
provide for the conservation of our woodlands, soil, min- 
erals, and all other natural resources. No generation has 
a moral right to overlook the needs of the generations that 
are to follow. It is downright selfishness to do so. 

It is also man's plain duty to cultivate and mould nature 
into forms of utility and beauty. Apparently God has pur- 
posely made nature somewhat "in the rough" — that is, in 
an unformed and undeveloped state, and no doubt His de- 
sign in doing so was to give to man the useful task of sub- 
duing and moulding her to his need. The forest must be 
hewn down, the soil broken up, the desert irrigated, the 
swamps drained, the level fields tiled, the ground tilled and 
fertilized, and the noxious animals, serpents and insects 
destroyed. Only in this way, speculate about it as we may, 
can nature be brought under the dominion of man and 
made to subserve his purposes; and so we are justified in 
concluding that such a regime of toil and conquest is ac- 
cording to the divine decree and will. Not only is man's 
physical and mental condition improved in this way, but 
the discipline of the thought and labor he must give to the 
subjection of nature is of incalculable moral value to him. 
Suppose for a moment that nature were brought to him all 
ready-made; then he would be little more than a happy 
creature, a sort of frisking animal, without true and virile 
moral character. Ethically man would have been inane. 

But nature should be cultivated not merely for utilitarian 
purposes ; there should be room for beauty as well, such as 
nature and art in proper co-ordination can produce. A 
public park, well planned and well kept, is of as much 
service to the people of a city as is a store or a factory; 



222 A System of General Ethics 

for in such a resort they may come into direct contact with 
nature as modified by art, and may draw therefrom refresh- 
ment, rest, and, above all, moral and spiritual uplift. The 
wise farmer will not merely grow corn and wheat and po- 
tatoes, nor raise only cattle and swine, but will also cultivate 
a lawn and a garden, and will add touches of beauty here 
and there to his acres, to prevent him and his family from 
becoming mere "groundlings," as Shakespeare puts it. 
Small natural, untrimmed spots should be left at intervals 
on every farm, where useful and beautiful birds may find 
residence, shelter and breeding-places, in order that they 
may destroy the noxious insects and rodents of the place, 
and furnish cheer for the workman by their sweet lays. 
Another duty of man to nature is — 

4. To show mercy to all sentient creatures: 

''Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy," 
is a beatitude that is germain to man's treatment of the 
sentient creatures around him. The disposition to kill, to 
shed blood merely for wanton pleasure, seems to be a part 
of man's original savagery and sin, and should be restrained 
by the quality of mercy. The people of Israel were not to 
muzzle the ox that trod the corn. Said the wise man : "A 
righteous man regardeth the life of his beast" (Prov. 12: 
10). 

True, there are harmful creatures that must be elimi- 
nated, for that is a part of the order of nature; there are 
also many creatures that must be killed for food; but the 
most merciful modes of slaughter should always be adopted, 
and all torture should be most conscientiously avoided. The 
trapping of animals in wild countries is one of the most 
cruel of sports, and it is a serious question whether man 
should not deny himself some comforts, and especially some 



Man's Chief Duties 223 

luxuries, rather than inflict such great suffering on inno- 
cent creatures. Nothing could be more inhuman than the 
slaughter of parent egrets for their plumes, while thousands 
of their helpless broods are left to die of slow starvation. 
And all this cruelty is inflicted to gratify the vain and sense- 
less craving for fashionable ornamentation! At the judg- 
ment day it will be only right if all human monsters will 
have to give an account for their wanton cruelty to helpless 
creatures. 

Domestic animals should also be treated with kindly con- 
sideration. To neglect and abuse them is a sign of a coarse 
and cruel nature. To lash a poor horse unmercifully or 
over-drive it is almost as great a wrong as to abuse a human 
being. 

Kindness to animals will have a reflex influence upon 
men's conduct toward their fellowmen. The man who is 
unmerciful to animals will be likely to show the same dis- 
position to the people with whom he comes in contact, if 
he feels that he can safely indulge his savage propensity; 
and, on the other hand, the man who is considerate toward 
animals will be apt to accord the same kind of treatment 
to his fellowmen. 



CHAPTER XVII 



III. MAN'S DUTIES TO HIS FELLOWMEN (Social Ethics). 
1. General Relations. 

(1) Love. 

a. Neighbor love. 

b. Patriotic love. 

c. Philanthropic love. 

d. Love for enemies. 

e. Other graces flowing from love. 

(2) Justice. 

a. In the industrial sphere. 

b. In the civic sphere. 



III. MAN'S DUTIES TO HIS FELLOWMEN. 
(Social Ethics). 

1. General Relations: 

(1) Love: 

If we remember that true love is not a weak, namby- 
pamby quality, but a strong, ethical emotion, we think there 
will be general agreement in giving it the first place in our 
list of social virtues. One of the greatest ethical writers 
of the world has put it thus : "Love is the fulfilling of the 
whole law ;" also : "And now abideth faith, hope and love, 
and the greatest of these is love." Is it not obvious that 
love, surcharged with righteousness, would soon imparadise 
the world? For convenience of treatment let us classify 
the various kinds of love for our fellowmen. 

a. Neighbor love: 

One of the greatest ethical commands of all time is this : 
"Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." If reason could 



Mans Chief Duties 225 

not have discovered this rule or expressed it, reason can at 
least sanction it. The parable of the Good Samaritan 
teaches that every person in need is a neighbor and that 
every man who aids another displays a neighborly spirit. 
Not only are those who live in our immediate community, 
or who belong to our social set, or to our own race or na- 
tion, — not only are they our neighbors, but all men in the 
world who are in any kind of need. Hence even the 
heathen are our neighbors, and we are debtors to try to lift 
them out of their state of fear and superstition. To love 
our neighbor as ourselves does not mean that we are re- 
quired to hate or despise ourselves, but simply that we shall 
do them good as we desire good for ourselves. It means to 
obey the Golden Rule in our dealings with our fellow- 
beings. In its positive form, this rule leads to a strong and 
active life in the service of mankind. We know how we 
desire to be treated. That is to be the norm of our treat- 
ment of our fellows. How this rule, if generally practiced, 
would transform the social, economic and political spheres ! 

b. Patriotic love: 

There dwells in the normal heart the love of country. It 
is according to the laws of nature and of God that the true 
citizen should have a peculiar love for his own land, her 
form of government and her institutions, and should be 
willing to serve her faithfully in peace, and, in case of 
peril, to make any sacrifice, even to the shedding of his 
blood and the laying down of his life, for her preservation. 
The American, for example, who cannot heartily join in 
saying or singing, "My country, 'tis of thee," is lacking in 
both patriotism and morality. 

Nor does such virile and righteous affection mean that 
the citizen must uphold his country in the wrong. His 



226 A System of General Ethics 

very loyalty ought to move him to try to set her right, for 
he knows that no country can prosper long if it runs in the 
way of wrong-doing. "Righteousness exalteth a nation, 
but sin is a reproach to any people" (Prov. 14:34). We 
think Carl Schurz's well-known aphorism is the most eth- 
ical expression of patriotic love with which we are ac- 
quainted: "My country right or wrong; if right, to be kept 
right; if wrong, to be set right." Criticism of public pol- 
icies, not definitely settled in our constitution, should never 
be characterized by those who want to usurp authority as 
a lack of patriotism ; for it is only by public discussion and 
the free expression of honest opinion that advancement in 
righteous government can be made; and this is especially 
true in a free Republic like ours. The public man or the 
private citizen who wishes to put a padlock on the exercise 
of free speech that is honest and aboveboard is the man 
who is a peril to the country; for he is trying for personal 
advantage to inject the spirit of autocracy into our Repub- 
lic and her institutions. He is not a true American, not a 
true patriot. 

On the other hand, freedom of speech may be greatly 
abused ; it may be the expression of a merely cavilling tem- 
per, or of a partisan purpose ; and in the time of a nation's 
peril, it may be of such a character as to afford "comfort 
to the enemy," and tend to weaken the cause of righteous- 
ness for which the nation stands. While it might be un- 
American to suppress by force even such expressions of 
opinion, for that would endanger our liberty in this 
country; yet it should be noted that all unjust and unwise 
criticisms of a government's policies are an index of an 
unpatriotic spirit, and it would be the true citizen's duty to 
rebuke such criticisms in plain and cogent terms. 



Man's Chief Duties 227 

c. Philanthropic love: 

Perhaps neighbor love, strictly speaking, would include 
all love of a general character ; yet there seems to be some- 
thing distinctive about love for mankind, or philanthropic 
love. It is the love of humanity in its entirety ; for man as 
such for the sake of his human quality; it is love for the 
genus homo. It is therefore the most comprehensive kind 
of human love — that is, it is humanitarian. Thus, it is 
opposed to all selfishness, clannishness, sectarianism, and 
all provincial, racial and national narrowness, which cannot 
see and appreciate the human quality outside of its own 
class or circle. Nor is this kind of love in the least incon- 
gruous with the love of home and country. Such cosmo- 
politan love should be cultivated by all persons, for only in 
that way can the era of universal peace, good-will and 
brotherhood be ushered in. 

d. Love for enemies : 

Can a man love his enemies, and do good to them that 
despitefully use him? Many persons regard this as an ex- 
tremely difficult duty, and others even think it impossible. 
They declare that it is against nature to love those who 
mistreat them, and so they want to reserve to themselves 
the right to follow their natural impulses to cherish resent- 
ment, or, to put it colloquially, to "get even," to give "tit 
for tat," to return "a Roland for an Oliver," and to "pay 
back in the same coin." 

What has Natural Ethics to say regarding this matter? 
To love people who mistreat us with the love of compla- 
cency and approval is impossible, nor is it required by any 
ethical law. When they have done actual and intentional 
wrong against you or any one else, you certainly cannot 
and should not approve of their conduct. Indeed, you 



228 A System of General Ethics 

should do the very opposite. It is always wrong to con- 
nive at and condone wrong, whoever is the guilty party. 
However, you can hold toward your enemies the love of 
compassion and sympathy, if you will, and can be willing 
to forgive them and to win them from their wrong think- 
ing and doing to the better way of righteousness. That 
means that you can be generous, magnanimous, too big- 
souled to cherish a grudge, or show a petulant spirit, or 
seek revenge. Indeed, life is too short to permit any part 
of it to be spent in holding resentment. 

Remember, again, that no one can be happy, and do his 
best work in and for the world, while he is harboring ill- 
will against any of his fellowmen, because such a temper 
always depresses the mind, clogs its free activity, and 
wastes valuable time; while a forgiving spirit gives joy, 
peace and buoyancy to life, and leaves the mind free to 
perform its worthy tasks. True, your enemy is not justi- 
fied in mistreating you, and will sooner or later have to 
give an account for his misdemeanors ; but neither are you 
justified in "keeping spite," or seeking an opportunity for 
wreaking revenge. 

Let it be borne in mind, too, that resenting an insult will 
never mend matters, but will rather aggravate and continue 
the quarrel between you and your tormentor. If you in- 
sult him in return, you will simply afford him a chance to 
add another offense to the list. Thus the wrangle will 
never end. Suppose, on the other hand, you do not return 
reviling for reviling, but good for evil — "heap coals of fire" 
on your enemy's head — in most cases you will shame him 
into silence or reconciliation, and may even win him to a 
better life. Where one will not, two cannot quarrel. 

Perhaps it would be helpful to make a distinction here. 
In rare instances men of so peculiar a disposition may be 



Man's Chief Duties 229 

found that there is no "getting along with them." In such 
cases, after we have made all reasonable efforts to concili- 
ate and win them, we may be compelled simply to "let them 
alone," at least, for the time being; for by obtruding our 
kindly offices upon them we may only increase their bitter- 
ness and wrath. However, we should be sure in our own 
minds that this "let alone" policy is not the outgrowth of 
ire or indifference on our part, but the calm and kindly 
judgment that it is the best way to deal with our enemy, 
until he can be brought in some more indirect way to a 
better frame of mind. 

Finally, let it be remembered that there is nothing so 
destructive of peace and good-will in the home, the social 
circle, the neighborhood, the school, the college, and the 
Church as the disposition to harbor spite and return evil 
for evil. A kindly and gracious temper toward our enemies 
is entirely consistent with manly and womanly self-respect 
and dignity. Yes, you can treat your enemy in a magnani- 
mous way without displaying a soft, lachrymose and cring- 
ing spirit. There is always the beautiful via media. You 
and I can prove that we are too large-souled to be either 
petty or petulant. 

e. Other graces flowing from love: 

Some of the most engaging graces flow from the principle 
and practice of love. There is the grace of charitableness. 
The apostle has a fine saying: "Charity thinketh no evil." 
By this is meant that we should cherish a kindly temper 
toward our fellowmen, credit them with sincerity just as 
far as possible, put the best construction we can on their 
conduct, and avoid a harsh, suspicious and censorious judg- 
ment. All of us know people who always suspect other 
people of ulterior motives, usually selfish or sordid ones, 



230 A System of General Ethics 

no matter what they do. A suspicious disposition is very 
likely to arise from a consciousness of the impurity of one's 
own motives. As the colloquialism goes, such a person 
"measures other people by his own yardstick." Said the 
world's greatest ethical teacher : "Judge not, that ye be not 
judged; for with what judgment ye judge ye shall be 
judged, and with what measure ye mete, it shall be meas- 
ured unto you again" (Matt. 7: 1,2). This means, for one 
thing, that society will be likely to appraise a man accord- 
ing to his estimate of his fellowmen. Probably its more 
ultimate meaning is that, if we are harsh in our judgment 
of others, we will have no right to expect merciful judg- 
ment at the great assize of the last day. 

There is also the beautiful grace of courtesy, which flows 
from the fountain of love. Sometimes it is called urbanity. 
This virtue helps to make the course of social, commercial 
and civil life flow smoothly. When it is not allowed to de- 
generate into flattery, affectation and obsequiousness, it is 
a mark of unselfishness. To "scrape" and "cringe" to 
people, however, will only excite their disgust. But sin- 
cere courtesy is a noble virtue, and is opposed to gruffness, 
churlishness, rudeness, over-bluntness, all of which, when 
analyzed, have their root in a selfish and inconsiderate 
spirit. 

Politeness — otherwise, good manners — is also a result of 
kindly affection. No one has a right carelessly to run 
counter to the decent social convenances — to dress, talk, eat 
and act in a rude and offensive way. True social etiquette 
is necessary to refined society. Indeed, it is not going 
too far to say that good manners are a mark of a gentle 
and unselfish spirit, and therefore have more than a trifling 
ethical significance. The extreme to be avoided is that 






Man's Chief Duties 231 

of over-nicety and affectation. Here again the via media is 
to be followed. 

A rare grace is that of true appreciativeness, which is by 
no means a minor virtue. The kindly temper is not first of 
all critical, but seeks primarily to see the meritorious in 
every person, act and performance. There are persons 
who are critical of others first and last — critical of sermons, 
books and whatnot. How would they advertise their own 
acuteness if they did not pick out small faults ? Sometimes 
the book-reviewer, for example, will miss the large theme 
and main purpose of a book, and will use up all his space 
in quibbling about a few minor points or purely academic 
distinctions. In this way men who ought to stand side by 
side in fighting a great evil sometimes fall to haggling about 
points that would have no particular value, even if they 
could be settled. May all of us be delivered from the 
hyper-critic ! 

Sincerely to express appreciation to one who deserves it, 
is right; in fact, it is a duty. True, some shallow natures 
may be spoiled by praise, but this need not happen often if 
the commendation is discriminatingly bestowed. It is our 
plain duty to cheer struggling virtue. Flagellating sin has 
its place and its value, but it is negative, and often causes 
more anger and resentment than encouragement to well- 
doing. Better far to spend one's time and energies in the 
constructive business of helping people to overcome evil 
with good, and then give them credit when they show any 
marks of progress. The easiest and cheapest kind of 
preaching is castigating the evils of society ; it requires little 
acumen to discover obliquities and none to denounce them; 
but to find and proclaim the sovereign remedy — that re- 
quires grace, brains and true goodness of heart. The word 
"criticism," however, may be used in a good sense, or what 



232 A System of General Ethics 

might be called the scientific sense ; as, for example, literary- 
criticism is not the same as literary fault-finding, but often 
consists more in pointing out excellencies than shortcom- 
ings. It means a true and sincere evaluation of a work of 
literature. 

Gratitude is also a mark of ethical love. An ingrate is 
a most repulsive character. "How sharper than a serpent's 
tooth it is to have a thankless child!" moaned poor King 
Lear. On the other hand, what a beautiful frame of mind 
is indicated by gratitude to God and our fellowmen for 
every favor conferred! 

Opposed to the principle of love are all such acts as 
scandal, slander, backbiting and gossip, all of which should 
be conscientiously avoided and severely condemned. To 
rob a man of his good name is worse than to rob him of his 
property; and therefore not all people who are guilty of 
the gravest kind of grand larceny are in the penitentiary, 
much as they deserve to be there. 

(2) Justice: 

Justice is not inconsistent with love, but rather gives 
strength, dignity and uprightness to it. As has been said, 
love unregulated by justice and righteousness would be 
mere sentimentality, and would lead to the violation of all 
the moral commandments. In God's character the infinite 
attributes of love and justice are perfectly co-ordinated. 
Let us now proceed to apply the principle of justice in sev- 
eral ways, remembering that it should always be tempered 
with love. 

a. In the industrial sphere: 

If the law of simple justice, permeated by love, should 
prevail in the economic sphere, there would be no occasion 
for "labor troubles ;" for then the relations between work- 



Man's Chief Duties 233 

men and their employers would be characterized by mutual 
good-will, forbearance and sympathy. The capitalist who 
despises labor, and the laborer who hates capital, are actu- 
ated by the same unethical temper, being alike impelled by 
selfish and unjust motives. If real peace and prosperity 
are to prevail in the industrial world, there must arise the 
spirit of mutuality between employers and employes. Let 
us apply this principle. 

First, the capitalist who grinds down his workmen to the 
lowest pittance, and takes no interest in them beyond forc- 
ing out of them the maximum of labor, is not moral, but 
decidedly the reverse. His selfish and grasping disposition 
is one of the most fruitful causes of strikes and other forms 
of agitation among working people. For him and his 
family to roll in wealth and luxury, while his workmen 
must sweat and toil and live in squalid poverty — this causes 
much discontent among the poor, and can you wonder that 
it does? We appeal to our great ethical authority: "The 
laborer is worthy of his hire" (Luke 10: 7) ; "Come now, 
ye rich, weep and howl for your miseries that are coming 
upon you. Your riches are corrupted and your garments 
are moth-eaten. . . . Behold, the hire of laborers who 
mowed your fields, which is kept back of you by fraud, 
crieth out; and the cries of them that reaped are entered 
into the ears of the Lord of Sabaoth. Ye have lived del- 
icately on the earth, and taken your pleasure; ye have 
nourished your hearts in the day of slaughter" ( Jas. 5 : 1- 
5) ; "Thou shalt not oppress thy neighbor, nor rob him; 
the wages of the hired servant shall not abide with thee all 
night until the morning" (Lev. 19: 13) ; "And I will come 
to you in judgment, and will be a swift witness against 
those that oppress the hireling in his wages" (Mai. 3:5). 
Thus morality requires of the employer that he treat his 



234 A System of General Ethics 

employee justly and equitably, neither stinting him in his 
wages nor holding them back. To "get rich quick" by ex- 
ploiting other people is criminally immoral, and merits the 
most unqualified condemnation. 

On the other hand, the laborer owes just duties to those 
for whom he labors. He should not envy his employer, 
for the spirit of envy will be likely to lead to many kinds of 
wrong-doing. He should not "soljer," as the saying goes, 
in his work, but should seek to do his work well, whether 
his employer is present or not, and should take a genuine 
interest in the success and efficiency of the firm that em- 
ploys him and gives him an opportunity to earn an honest 
livelihood for himself and his family. Much of the labor 
trouble in the industrial world is due to jealousy, suspicion 
and inefficiency on the part of many of the laborers. "An 
honest day's wage for an honest day's work" should be the 
guiding principle for all employes ; and of course it should 
be the guide for their employers as well. While labor 
unions have a right to secure as good wages as are justly 
due them, they should also make efficiency and honest work 
one of their slogans. 

The science of Ethics cannot lay out a detailed social pro- 
gram; that function belongs to the science of Sociology. 
The sole province of our science is to insist that all parties 
in the industrial world shall be governed by the principles 
of justice and considerateness. That there are evils in the 
capitalistic system which call imperatively for redress and 
correction, no sensible ethicist will deny; and he knows 
only too well that the many abuses carried on by plutocracy 
constantly invite the peril of revolution. The demands, 
yes, the crying needs, of the poor and downtrodden will 
have to be met, or our country will face inevitable ruin and 
anarchy. And the well-to-do and wealthy are the ones who 



Man's Chief Duties 235 

can the most easily bring about the required reforms, 
if they will only lay aside their selfishness, their love for 
show and pleasure, and will cherish the feeling of humani- 
tarianism. Whether the proposed program of the socialistic 
party would prove a real remedy or not, may be questioned 
by the sober-minded publicist; but there is no doubt that 
the abuses imposed by luxurious and selfish wealth are re- 
sponsible for the rapid progress that Socialism has made in 
our land. Cannot all parties unite on the principles of 
humanitarian love and justice? Is it not only too true that 
heretofore the opposite principles — those of suspicion, jeal- 
ousy and competition — have been too much in evidence, 
and have been the cause of most of our divisions and hard- 
ships? Surely the time has come when the leaders of all 
parties in the industrial sphere ought to begin in earnest the 
propaganda of the gospel of good-will. 

b. In the civic sphere : 

The element of justice is vitally concerned in preserving 
the sacredness of the civil law, in seeing that it is faithfully 
obeyed, and in bringing all violaters to its bar for condign 
punishment. "Render unto Caesar the things that are 
Caesar's," is a good motto for all the citizens of a country. 
To "be in subjection to the powers that be," because gov- 
ernment is ordained of God and is necessary in the nature 
of things, is an excellent general rule. The only exceptions 
would be in case the government became despotic, and 
would command its citizens to do acts that were in violation 
of the law of righteousness; as, for example, if a ruler 
should command his subjects to worship a false god, or, for 
that matter, worship any god contrary to the dictates of 
their consciences. In instances of that kind the good citzen 
would have to obey conscience, even though he might have 



236 A System of General Ethics 

to pay the price of martyrdom. It must be remembered, 
though, that in cases of a mere difference of human judg- 
ment in regard to civil or political policies, the citizen should 
waive his judgment, and be obedient to his government. 
We believe that sober thought will enable most men to make 
the distinction between a difference of judgment and a 
command to commit an absolute sin. 

In this Republic, however, where "liberty" is so much of 
a slogan, we are in danger of losing respect for law and 
becoming a lawless nation. As is well known, there are 
citizens who obey only such laws as they must, and either 
surreptiously or openly violate the rest. Is it any wonder 
that liberty so often degenerates into license? Can we 
expect to have a strong and well-ordered government and 
a happy, upright and prosperous nation, when there are so 
many people in both public and private life who are trying 
to defeat the ends of justice? The emphasis cannot be put 
too strongly or too frequently on the apt proverb, "Right- 
eousness exalteth a nation, while sin is a reproach to any 
people." Our motto should be, "Liberty regulated by law." 
In a subsequent section we shall treat this subject more 
fully. 



CHAPTER XVIII 



III. MAN'S DUTIES TO HIS FELLOWMEN (continued). 

2. Specific relations. 
(1) The family. 

a. Husband and wife. 

b. Parents and children. 



III. MAN'S DUTIES TO HIS FELLOWMEN 
(continued). 
2. Specific relations: 

(1) The family: 1 

It need not be argued, we think, that the family is an 
institution demanded by nature and reason. Taking the 
constitution of the human family as it is, without going 
into misty speculation, we do not see how the race could 
be perpetuated except through the family. Reason, com- 
mon sense and the common conscience testify that the pro- 
miscuous mixture of the sexes would invite speedy ruin. 
Reason also teaches that monogamous marriage is the best, 
and that both polygamy and polyandry are wicked, not to 
say adulterous. There is such a thing as "a pure life for 
two" of opposite sexes, but not for more. At all events, 
the highest conception of the family today is the union of 
one man and one woman in lawful wedlock, bound together 
by true sexual love. Reason teaches that any other regime 
w r ould be immoral, and the experience of the human family 



1. For an excellent discussion of the family see Dr. Noah K. 
K. Davis. "Elements of Ethics," pp. 222-236. Our only regret is 
that we cannot transfer it to these pages. 



238 A System of General Ethics 

confirms the judgment of reason. 2 Let us first treat of the 
relation of — 

a. Husband and wife: 

This is a very tender and intimate relation, with pro- 
found ethical obligations on both sides. Indeed, this thesis 
is so important that it should have much more extended 
treatment than can be given to it here. We can touch on 
only a few of the chief matters. 

Marriage should, first of all, be based on true and pure 
sexual love, which has its physical, psychical and spiritual 
elements. Such love is sui generis. Platonic love between 
men and women may do very well for purely social and 
intellectual fellowship, but for the marital relation some- 
thing that is different in kind, something more intimate and 
ardent, is needed — namely, what is known as sexual or 
hymeneal love. No marriage should ever be contracted 
between parties who do not feel toward each other this 
peculiar kind of affection, which can subsist between only 
one man and one woman. Where marriage is thus 
grounded, it will be likely to last until death severs the 
bond. But where true sexual love is lacking to begin with, 
nausea will soon arise between the contracting parties, for 
no relation in life is so intimate as that between husband 
and wife. This fact is written into the very substance of 
human nature. A young man would do wrong to marry 



2. "Polyandry or polygamy, common among brutes, is inadmis- 
sible among person, it being inconsistent with the moral equivalence 
of the sexes. If more than one of either sex be bound to one of 
the other, the plurality is severally deprived of the rank of equal 
fellowship, and degraded to a thing useful merely as a means." 
Davis, ut supra, p. 227; also p. 223: "It (nature) sets apart a pair, 
male and female, for each other, their exclusive bond being spon- 
taneously guarded by hygienic barriers, and by a prompt jealousy, 
fierce and fatal." 



Man's Chief Duties 239 

the best woman in the world if he cannot love her in the 
conjugal way; and of course the same principle holds for 
the young woman. You will often hear the normal young 
man put his thought in something like this language: "I 
have great admiration for such and such a young lady, and 
think she will make an excellent wife for some worthy 
young man; but as for me, I cannot feel the kind of love 
for her that I think a man should feel for the girl he would 
make his wife." The same language on the lips of a young 
woman, with a change of pronouns, would be just as rel- 
evant. And these expressions only indicate that which is 
elemental in human nature; it is human instinct, and is 
divinely implanted. Let it be freely and frankly admitted 
that true sexual love is, to some extent, physical ; yet it has 
other elements that are just as essential, as we shall now 
proceed to point out. 

The Greeks were mistaken in representing Cupid as 
blind. No other god should have keener and more dis- 
criminating sight than the god of love. The weak, namby- 
pamby, sentimental notion that "love is blind" has been re- 
sponsible for many hasty, ill-advised marriages among 
young people, resulting in unhappy domestic relations and 
frequent divorces. Young folks should not allow them- 
selves to fall in love indiscriminately, but should learn to 
"look before they leap." An attractive face may hide a 
bad character or a petty, nagging disposition. So it is well 
to keep the eyes open, and fall in love with beauty of char- 
acter and temperament even more than with physical 
charms. No true woman could live happily with a moral 
leper, even though he were an Apollo; nor could the most 
saintly man make a happy home with the most beautiful 
woman, if she had a small and sulking disposition or were 
lax in sexual morality. 



240 A System of General Ethics 

By many sentimental people it is thought that hymeneal 
love is beyond control and direction. It is not! This is 
the bane of all kinds of emotionalism in religious, social and 
sexual life — the notion that feeling cannot be controlled by 
the will. Every transgressor who yields to his feelings 
offers the weak excuse, "I couldn't help it !" Then why did 
God endue you with a will and a conscience, and put them 
in the regnant place in your psychology? Do you suppose 
that all virtuous people around you have never been 
tempted by wrong impulses and emotions? If you knew 
their lives better, you would find that every one of them has 
had to say more than once to his passion, "Thus far shalt 
thou go and no farther! Here shall thy proud waves be 
stayed !" 

If young people would remember that all the feelings 
should and can be regulated by the will and the moral fac- 
ulty, there would not be so many conjugal misalliances ; 
and if a good many married people would exercise com- 
mon-sense and self-control, there would be far fewer 
broken families, leading to infelicity for all parties con- 
cerned. How foolish and weak people are! A married 
man, for example, permits himself to become infatuated 
with another woman than his lawful wife. Instead of re- 
sisting the impulse or passion like a strong man, because he 
knows it would be wrong and imbecile to yield, he imagines 
that he is helpless in the grip of his passion, and so gives 
way to it. If the woman is likewise weak and sentimental, 
the result in nearly every case will be as follows : The man 
seeks a separation from his lawful wife, marries the object 
of his illicit love, and imagines himself very happy for a 
short time; but all too soon he wakes up to find himself 
disenchanted ; he discovers that, after all, the charmer is 
far from being an angelic creature ; that she is, indeed, like 



Man's Chief Duties 241 

other women, very human, and therefore very faulty. A 
similar disillusionment soon transpires in the woman's ex- 
perience. Now, the very fact that both of them were so 
weak as to yield to temptation causes them to lose respect 
for each other; then will follow mutual contempt, the 
breeder of every kind of domestic infelicity. Let it be re- 
membered that sexual love is pure and genuine only when 
it is under the guidance of the highest moral law. Like all 
other emotions and passions, it is not to sit on the throne, 
but is to be the subject of the will under wise judgment. 

When all is said, it is still a matter for rejoicing that 
there are so many happy marriages in the world — mar- 
riages which, as the saying goes, were "first made in 
heaven." Yet, since imperfection inheres in all human re- 
lations, married couples, no matter how well mated, must 
make up their minds to exercise mutual forbearance, and 
not expect perfection of each other. Above all, true sexual 
morality demands that they be true to each in all the 
relations of life, and in every way preserve and perfect the 
bond of love between them. As for divorce, it should be 
the very last resort, and should be sought only on the 
ground of the grossest violation of the marriage compact. 
We believe that adultery on the part of one party justifies 
the wronged party in securing a divorce, for such an act is 
of itself a nullification of the marriage bond; but whether 
the person thus obtaining a divorce should marry another 
person is, to our mind, extremely doubtul, because, in so 
many cases, the desire for the second marriage might cor- 
rupt the motive in seeking the original separation. This 
may be rather stern ethics, and we have no desire to speak 
ex cathedra, but we think the proposition is at least worthy 
of serious consideration. 

And which should be the "boss" in the home, the husband 



242 A System of General Ethics 

or the wife? We answer, Neither! There should be mu- 
tuality there, if anywhere, and neither party should tyran- 
nize over the other. It is true that normally the husband 
should be the "head of the house," which simply means 
that he should be the man there, and should in many ways 
bear the chief responsibility. The glory of a man is his 
masculinity; the beauty of a woman is her femininity. It 
is difficult to respect a feminine man or to admire a mas- 
culine woman. Therefore, in the normal household the 
man performs the more difficult tasks, while the woman 
engages in the more gentle ministries. In this world of 
mixed good and evil, it sometimes happens that the woman 
is the stronger character and the man the "weaker vessel;" 
but most persons will acknowledge that this is a reversal 
of the normal status. It need not be considered a wicked 
situation, if the couple live together amicably, but it is not 
the normal order. 

b. Parents and children: 

First, is is an honor and a duty to have children. This 
is God's way of perpetuating the race without sin. To foil 
His purpose in this regard for merely selfish ends is a most 
grievous wrong, and leads to what is known as "race sui- 
cide." Many fashionable people, — mere pleasure-mongers 
they are — frustrate nature's plan, simply because children 
would interfere with their participation in the whirl of 
social enjoyment, the dance, the wine party, the "joy ride," 
and so on. This is downright selfishness, and means in the 
end an empty, blase life. No good can ever result from 
such violations of the laws of nature, which are the laws of 
God. 

On this vital point civic reformers and men of public 
spirit should exercise their best thought. And no mere 
prudery should seal their lips. What is to become of the 



Mans Chief Duties 243 

State if the better class of people refuse to have offspring, 
while the slums swarm with children? What will this 
order mean for the future citizenship of the country? 
Surely these considerations must "give us pause." One 
remedy that we suggest is a propaganda to make father- 
hood and motherhood and the rearing of families fashion- 
able in the best circles of society, and to make the failure 
to have children more or less of a reproach, even as it was 
in the ancient times. In this Christian land we should 
never let the mother of the Gracchi — and she only a Roman 
pagan — shame us. 

Children being born in the home, the chief duty of the 
parents is to rear them in the way of righteousness, to be 
honorable themselves, useful members of society, and noble 
and patriotic citizens of the State. The regime of the 
home should be kind but firm. Children should be taught 
obedience in the home. The old-time command, "Children 
obey your parents," is far too often reversed in these over- 
liberal days. Many parents seem to be actually afraid of 
their children, afraid to correct them, to cross their desires, 
and to assert parental authority. Hence many children are 
spoiled by over-leniency and indulgence. They become so 
angry and headstrong, when their wishes and whims are not 
gratified, that their parents often humor them only to pre- 
vent constant petulance and friction in the home. As a 
rule, such exhibitions are the result of failure to begin in 
time to control the children. A good adage is, "As the 
twig is bent, the tree's inclined." Solomon's proverb is not 
superceded even in these advanced days : "Train up a child 
in the way that he should go, and when he is old he will not 
depart therefrom." 

This matter of child training is vital for every sphere. 
Children who never learn to respect parental authority will 



244 A System of General Ethics 

not be likely to respect authority of any kind, whether that 
of the school-room, of the State, or of God Himself. The 
first lesson in self-government and the government of 
others is obedience, oneself, to properly constituted author- 
ity. It would be well for the General Government to take 
recognition of this fact, and endeavor to impress upon all 
our citizens the need of seeing to it that the children in 
home and school learn the lessons of respect and obedience 
to law and order. If this principle is not carried out more 
insistently and consistently than has been done in these 
latter years, our standard of citizenship will sink lower and 
lower, and in time the very foundations of the government 
will be sapped. No false ideas of "Liberty" should lead 
our people to forget that true freedom is that, and that only, 
which is regulated by law. A state of civil and moral 
anarchy is the most galling kind of bondage. From child- 
hood to maturity our people should be taught the differ- 
ence between liberty and license. The home is the proper 
place to begin this wise course of nurture and training. 
Let the American people be sure that their homes are not 
the nurseries of the principles of anarchy. 

Thus far we have advocated a somewhat firm regime in 
the home. Let it be remembered, however, that firmness 
should always be coupled with love and kindness. Parents 
should not be harsh and petulant with their children; they 
should not nag them. Such a temper will inculcate the 
same ill-grained disposition in the children. A significant 
injunction is that of the apostle: "Fathers, provoke not 
your children, that they be not discouraged" (Col. 3:24). 
Many a child has been embittered for life, simply because 
his parents were "cross" with him, ever ready to reprimand 
him sharply for every mistake, however trifling, and never 
disposed to praise him when he did well. If a child im- 



Mans Chief Duties 245 

bibes the notion that, whatever he may do, he cannot please 
his parents, he will cease trying to please them, and will 
grow morose. Parents should commend their children 
oftener than they reproach them. Even correction may be 
done in such a way as to keep the child's temper unruffled ; 
but that means that the parents must control their own 
spirits. 

The "sex problem'' is ever with us, and is a matter of 
such vital concern that it should not be overlooked in a 
work on Practical Ethics. Just "what a boy ought to 
know," or "what a girl ought to know," or whether books 
dealing minutely with sexual physiology should be put into 
the hands of boys and girls, are, we think, debatable ques- 
tions ; but there can be no doubt that parents should in- 
struct their children in the beautiful virtue of sexual chas- 
tity. Perhaps a good way would be for the father to give 
counsel to his sons and the mother to her daughters in 
these important matters. Just at the age when children 
are coming into sexual desire, and have not yet developed 
strong powers of will, it would not be advisable, we think, 
to enter into details in giving them instruction here, for in 
that way parents might set the imagination of their chil- 
dren on fire by suggesting too much, and thus simply stir 
prurient passions in them; but it is plain that parents 
should, by the use of more general, yet clear, definite and 
carefully chosen words, tell their children of the need, 
beauty and honorableness of self-control and absolute 
sexual purity; they should also no less insistently warn 
them of the sin, the shame, the disgrace and the danger of 
unlawful indulgence. No prudery, no feeling of false 
modesty or delicacy, should keep parents from performing 
their duty in this regard to their offspring, whose well-being 
for life may depend on their being rightly directed at this 



246 A System of General Ethics 

most fictile and critical period. There is, we are aware, a 
natural shrinking on the part of parents from speaking di- 
rectly to their children on these delicate sexual matters, but 
it is, nevertheless, one of the necessary duties of parent- 
hood. Timely advice to children may save all parties con- 
cerned lifelong regret and shame. 

As to the duties of children, they should honor and obey 
their parents. At a certain age — that of adolescence — 
children are apt to become headstrong and conceited. It 
is usually a time of trial and of contending emotions with 
the child. The boy is neither a boy nor a man, and it is 
difficult for him to adjust himself to his own feelings and 
environments and to control his awkwardness. He de- 
serves sympathy at this time, and should be dealt with 
wisely. He should not be ridiculed and humiliated for 
what he cannot help. On his part, he should remember his 
inexperience with life, and also that his parents and teach- 
ers are more matured in judgment than he. Their years of 
experience have taught them many lessons which he has 
not yet had the opportunity to learn. Reflections of this 
kind may spare him many humiliating and perhaps even 
serious blunders. "Old men for counsel, young men for 
action," might be a good adage to remember at this time 
of the young person's life. 

The time should never come when children do not love 
their parents and treat them with becoming deference. 
Parents may grow old and feeble, even as their children 
will by and by, but they still have the claim of filial respect 
from their children. It is especially encumbent on children 
that they should deport themselves in such a way as never 
to bring dishonor on their parents. Happy are the parents 
who can point with just and laudable pride to their chil- 
dren, and never need to blush for their conduct in the pres- 
ence of neighbors and acquaintances. 



CHAPTER XIX 



III. MAN'S CHIEF DUTIES TO HIS FELLOWMEN 
(continued). 

2. Specific relations (continued). 

(2) The social organism. 

(3) The State. 

a. Duties of the private citizen. 

b. Duties of the public official. 



III. MAN'S DUTIES TO HIS FELLOWMEN 
(continued). 
2. Specific relations (continued): 

(2) The social organism: 

That man is a social being needs no argument. Even his 
family relations, important as they are, should not erase 
his duties to society. True, the domestic relation should 
never be neglected, but should be especially cultivated and 
developed in these lax days; yet it is possible for a family 
to be self-centered, and to become clannish, care for no one 
outside of the relationship, and thus plot and scheme for 
their own advancement. 

Every person owes a duty to the social organism. He 
should be neighborly, and should add his quota to the social 
life about him. He should go to parties, and attend social 
gatherings and reunions as often as other engagements will 
permit, always taking it for granted that the commingling 
is of the proper kind. To be sociable is every person's 
privilege and obligation. No man has a right to think only 
of himself, and regard himself as "the hub of the universe." 
Such a spirit is disgustingly egotistic. 



248 A System of General Ethics 

Sometimes persons plead this excuse: "I am too back- 
ward to go into society." They would better put it, "Too 
self-conscious and selfish!" Let people of this order stop 
making themselves the sole center, go among their fellow- 
men, take a genuine interest in their welfare, and see how 
quickly their false reserve will melt away; and they will 
soon "feel at home," as the saying goes, in every properly 
constituted social company. Men who are "not socially 
inclined," as they put it, should bear in mind that a selfish 
disposition is their "besetting sin," and they should cure 
themselves of it as soon as possible. The social recluse 
lives an unethical life. Socially speaking, "it is not good 
for man to be alone." 

However, there is another side to this question, and 
therefore certain discriminations should be made. There 
are people who overdo the matter of sociability ; they want 
to be going all the time. So many lodges, parties and other 
social gatherings leave no room for self-culture, nor for the 
cultivation of the domestic relations and affections. Worst 
of all, is the habit of so many men to loaf on the streets 
and frequent the saloons. The saloon has been absurdly 
called "the poor man's club." A very poor kind of club 
indeed ! Sometimes a club in more senses than one ! Why 
should not these men stay at home with their wives and 
children, and contribute their share to making home a 
pleasant place? It would be quite to the point to popular- 
ize the sentiment that "the home is the poor man's club." 

It is said sometimes that the homes of the poor men are 
not attractive, and therefore they are not to blame for seek- 
ing social pleasures elsewhere. We reply that their homes 
are surely as attractive as the ordinary salooons and dog- 
geries which they frequent. The man who has a poor and 
squalid home would not be likely to be a welcome guest in 



Man's Chief Duties 249 

the so-called "gilded saloon." Therefore the excuse that 
his home is not attractive is a mere pretext. What is there 
engaging, anyway, about a saloon whose floors are covered 
with sawdust and other ingredients too coarse to be men- 
tioned, and whose air is malodorous with the fumes of to- 
bacco and all kinds of strong and adulterated liquors ? Be- 
sides, the men's wives and children must remain in their 
poor homes a much larger part of the time than the men 
themselves are obliged to. Why are not their homes as 
good for the men as for their wives and children? And, 
besides, if they would not spend their money in saloons, 
they would be able to beautify their homes and make them 
attractive ; and the time they worse than idle away in liquor 
dens might be spent in cleaning and brightening up their 
homes, and making them inviting places for the entire fam- 
ily. We see no excuse whatever for men to become 
habitues of the saloon. 

Sometimes well-meaning social and civic reformers tell 
you that, if you take away the saloon from the men, you 
must replace them with some kind of respectable and re- 
fined club-rooms where the men can spend their evenings. 
That may be a wise plan, and should be carried out to a 
reasonable extent. But why not, at the same time, organize 
a crusade in favor of the home? Why not popularize the 
domestic virtues and graces? ' Why not even go so far as 
to make it a "fad' for men to spend their evenings at home 
with their families in pleasant converse, reading good 
books, and playing innocent games ? What a change would 
come over the face of society if such a propaganda could be 
pushed to success ! Let writers and orators and reformers 
advocate the home more than the club or the lodge or the 
social resort. We reiterate with all our might, let us make 
the home popular. 



250 A System of General Ethics 

A word about the young. They should have plenty of 
social pastime of the right kind. It is according to nature 
that they should come together in a social way, and it is the 
duty of their elders to see to it that they have sufficient op- 
portunity to gratify this normal craving of their constitu- 
tion. True, there should be wise direction and restriction, 
yet there should not be too much espionage, and the matter 
of chaperones should not be overdone; for young people 
should not be made to feel that the policeman's club is al- 
ways dangling over them. 

On the other hand, wise counsel for the young people of 
today is in place. Some associations, by overdoing the 
social features of life, cultivate the spirit of discontent with 
home life in the minds of the young, making them feel that 
they must always be "going somewhere." It is rare now- 
a-days to find a young man or woman who is content to 
stay at home for an evening with his or her parents, to be- 
guile the time in pleasant conversation, innocent games and 
useful reading. We are becoming a nation of "gad-abouts." 
It is only too true that many of our people have lost all 
relish for home, quiet, meditation and reading. Even "sen- 
sational literature" is becoming "too heavy" for many of 
the youthful flitters of the day; they must be forever go- 
ing somewhere, to a show, a frolic, a dance, a loafing place 
on the street, or to the saloon, because the home, the church 
and the library are "too dull for anything." We repeat, it 
is high time to begin a crusade in favor of the home. 

The woman who neglects her husband and children for 
the ail-too- frequent and all-too-prolonged eucher party is 
treading upon most unethical ground; not so much, per- 
haps, because the games are positively wrong — unless there 
is gambling — as because so much precious time is frittered 
away, and matters of real value are neglected. The passion 



Man's Chief Duties 251 

for gaming is also destructive of relish for higher and 
nobler ocupations. How few of the gaming crowd are 
able to sit down with you and converse on the subject of 
good literature! 

To sum it all up, let us cultivate the social nature within 
proper limits, and take an interest in our community and 
our friends, but never let social functions encroach on our 
other duties. 

(3) The State: 

Just as the family and the social organism are institu- 
tions of the natural economy — in other words, divine insti- 
tutions — so a civil government in some form is grounded 
in the nature of things human, and is necessary for the per- 
petuity and good order of the human race. Let us again 
classify our material. 

a. Duties of the private citizen: 

The first duty of the private citizen is respect for and 
obedience to the civil law in so far as it is righteous, or in 
other words, loyalty to the government under whose pro- 
tection he lives. Unhappily there are too many people in 
the United States who disregard certain laws that do not 
please them; and when the officials themselves connive at 
such violations, a condition that tends toward anarchy 
threatens. It is little wonder that we have so much license 
in this country, and so little sense of the true idea of civil 
liberty, which does not mean that every man has a right 
to whatever he pleases, but only to every just and right- 
eous privilege granted him by law. It is not what is often 
known as "personal liberty" — the "do-as-you-please" idea 
— that is the bulwark of our Republic, but what is known 
as "civil and religious liberty," meaning that liberty which 
always has regard for other people's rights, for the general 



252 A System of General Ethics 

welfare of the nation, and for the laws that are enacted 
directly by the vote of the people, or by their properly con- 
stituted representatives. 

We are persuaded that some reform is needed to regu- 
late the ballot in this country. Although unable to mark 
out a program, we call attention to a palpable wrong: In 
our present system the vote of the thug and the debauchee 
and the illiterate person counts just as much at the elections 
as the vote of the most intelligent, patriotic and upright 
citizen. Is not a government based upon such a principle 
resting on an insecure foundation? Does it not seem that 
something should be done to circumvent its collapse? For 
good citizens to protest against unjust legislation is their 
patriotic duty; but that is very different from permitting 
the corrupt classes to trample upon the just laws of the 
State. 

At this point an important distinction should be made. 
While Christian people should be interested in civic affairs, 
and should take an active part in them as patriotic citizens, 
it should always be remembered that there is to be no union 
of Church and State in this Republic, whatever may be the 
situation in other countries. Every movement in the di- 
rection of such a combination should be firmly and stead- 
fastly resisted. It is right that truly Christian principles 
should pervade the body politic, yet this should be brought 
about only by moral suasion, and never, never by force. 
No man can become a Christian save by his own choice. 
He might be coerced to perform certain outward acts and 
ceremonies, but at heart he might be very far from being 
a Christian; he might, indeed, be a veritable pagan or un- 
believer. You cannot make people Christians by legal en- 
actments and processes. The sphere of religious freedom 
is too sacred a domain for the intrusion of "the mailed 



Man's Chief Duties 253 

fist." Vice is to be restrained by law for the protection of 
society and the government, but people cannot be made re- 
ligious in that way. Therefore religion reaches its best 
status only when it is left to develop itself freely without 
coercion from the State or civil statutes of any kind. 

Every citizen should take an interest in public affairs. 
He should inform himself sufficiently to be able to vote in- 
telligently at the polls, for our free institutions depend 
on the intelligence and morality of the people who exercise 
the right of franchise. No man has a right to evade his 
duties to the State, or to shift his political tasks to his 
neighbor's shoulders. The man who does not go to the 
polls on election day and cast an honest ballot is not a true 
patriot, not only because he fails to cast his vote for good 
officials, but also because his example, if followed generally, 
woul destroy our republican form of government. 

Sometimes religious people become fanatical. They be- 
come so absorbed in heavenly things that they take no in- 
terest in mundane affairs. The writer once knew a man 
who refused to go to the polls to vote on a great moral issue 
in the community, because he thought the world was going 
to come to an end in 1915, and therefore he would have no 
part in "worldly affairs." Oddly enough, however, he spent 
election day in building a coop for his chickens! The 
prospect of the speedy coming of the judgment day did not 
seem to interfere with his looking after his own little 
"worldly affairs." Whatever may be said of such religi- 
osity, it is not in accord with the true teaching of the Holy 
Scriptures, for Christ taught us to "render unto Caesar the 
things that are Caesar's," and the apostle declared that 
"godliness is profitable unto all things, having promise of 
the life that now is, and of that which is to come." The 
Christian religion is not only other-worldly; it is also this- 



254 A System of General Ethics 

worldly, using the terms in the good sense. A religion that 
will not teach us to live well and sensibly in this world will 
hardy fit us for a strong and felicitous and useful life in 
the next stage of existence. 

If it is the citizen's duty to exercise his civil privileges, 
it is no less his duty to help support his government to the 
extent of his pro-rata share. It is just as dishonest to cheat 
the State as to cheat your neighbor. To refuse to report 
your money and property at the actual value as required by 
the statute, when the assessor calls upon you, is positively 
dishonest, whether you are rich or poor. All grafters, who 
cheat the government and grow rich dishonestly at its ex- 
pense, are disloyal citizens, traitors to their country's wel- 
fare, and ought to be discovered and punished condignly. 
To defraud the government is not to defraud an abstrac- 
tion, but the people themselves, especially those who are 
honest; for it stands to reason that every embezzler in- 
creases the taxes of the honest citizens of the country. We 
repeat, the man who gets money dishonestly from the public 
treasury is a crook, a despicable thief, stealing from all the 
honest folk of the land. He should be put into the pen 
where he belongs. Unless he repents and makes restitu- 
tion, he should not be permitted to move in decent society. 

b. The public official: 

If private citizens are to be loyal and obedient subjects, 
it is all-important that public functionaries should set them 
a good example, should formulate just, salutary and equi- 
table laws, administer and execute them faithfully, and en- 
deavor in every way to instil the principles of patriotism 
and respect for law in the country far and wide. Let us 
lay down a few fundamental principles : 

First, the official is not to look upon himself as a kind of 



Man's Chief Duties 255 

lord or autocrat for whom people are to slave and to whom 
they are to make obeisance. This is especially true in this 
Republic, where the people are the real rulers. Rather, the 
man in a public capacity should regard himself as the servi- 
tor of the people ; and this conception will not detract one 
iota from his honor and dignity. A greater One than any 
president, magistrate, king or kaiser made this statement 
respecting Himself : "The Son of man came not to be min- 
istered unto, but to minister." What an example to men 
in public positions ! Note the men who stand highest on 
the scroll of history; they are not the tyrants and self- 
seekers, but the men who were most unselfish in the service 
of their fellowmen, their country and the race. The Neros 
and Caligulas are consigned to obloquy, while the Washing- 
tons and Lincolns have won deathless fame. A well-known 
president of the United States was wont to say to the 
people: "Do not call me your President; call me your 
Public Servant!" That was the true ideal of political and 
civic life. We continued to call him our president, but we 
loved him all the more because he made himself "the ser- 
vant of all." We need in our country less of officialdom 
and more official service; less "bossism" and more attend- 
ing to the just needs and wishes of the people. 

Secondly, the public officer should conscientiously carry 
out the terms and oath of his office. Sad to say, the oath 
among officials has largely become a perfunctory matter. 
Many functionaries take it with mental reservation, which 
is downright perjury, and then perform only such duties 
as suit their convenience. Some laws they will enforce; 
others they will simply ignore. Such practices simply lead 
to a spirit of general lawlessness and corruption, inculcat- 
ing disrespect for law as law. If officials would look upon 
their oaths as sacred obligations, to which they will be held 



256 A System of General Ethics 

to account by God and man, many more people would look 
upon obedience to law as a sacred duty. 

Third, public men should not toady to the moneyed in- 
terests, on the one hand, nor to the base elements of society, 
on the other, but should administer their duties in strict 
accord with the principles of equity and righteousness. 
This is a high ideal, but not too high ; it is the only way to 
conduct a government for the real well-being of the people. 
True, the official should have regard for the opinions of his 
constituents, and should carry them out as far as he con- 
scientiously can; but he should not be a servile bondsman; 
rather, a moulder of public sentiment; a leader, not a sub- 
altern and a truckler. Only too true is it that public men 
often bend the knee to the vile and lawless element, instead 
of considering the views of the better class of citizens. 
This is the peril of a popular form of government, and 
therefore good citizens must ever be on their guard. "Eter- 
nal vigilance is the price of liberty." Yes, and of a stable 
and righteous government, as well. 

Again, we must hold up the high ideal in another respect. 
For magistrates, sworn to do their duty to the best of their 
knowledge and ability, to count votes when a moral issue 
is at stake in the community or the State, and rule accord- 
ingly, regardless of the law and the right, is unethical and 
craven; nay, it is criminal; it is absolutely unpatriotic. 
We have known public men who were extremely anxious 
for re-election, and who would, therefore, truckle to the 
majority, or what they thought was the majority, without 
regard to the moral character of the issues at stake. That 
is moral cowardice, and also disloyalty to our republican 
institutions. Not all the traitors to our country have been 
dealt with as they deserve. Better a thousand times for a 
public man to be retired to private life for doing right and 



Man's Chief Duties 257 

obeying his conscience, than to continue in office by cater- 
ing to corruption. Then, we have known men who courted 
the baser elements of society in order to secure an office, 
in the hope that, when once elected, they would enforce the 
law and uphold righteousness; but we have never known 
such trimmers and time-servers to succeed, because, having 
secured the office by the suffrages of the unprincipled fac- 
tion, they were under obligation to carry out its corrupt 
policies. No ; a righteous cause is never advanced by com- 
promising with the wrong. The principle that "the end 
justifies the means" is absolutely unethical, whether in so- 
ciety, Church or State. 

We have set forth a high standard, but it is the only po- 
sition for practical morality to take. To sum up, true 
ethical principles applied to public life would prevent, on 
the one hand, all despotic rule ; and, on the other, all cring- 
ing to the corrupt elements of society, whether in high or 
low stations. 



CHAPTER XX 



III. MAN'S DUTIES TO HIS FELLOWMEN (continued). 
2. Specific relations (continued). 
(3) The Church. 

a. General Ethics and the Church. 

b. Duty of church membership. 

c. Duties of church members. 

d. Duties of ministers. 



III. MAN'S DUTIES TO HIS FELLOWMEN 
(continued). 

2. Specific relations (continued): 

(3) The Church: 

a. General Ethics and the Church: 

There are people who may think that man's relation to 
the Church should not be treated in a work on General 
Ethics. There is a sense in which this view might seem 
to be plausible, namely, that General Ethics deals with 
moral principles and practices only in the light of nature 
and reason, and not in the light of revelation. However, 
in a wider sense the above position is not correct. Surely 
it would not be scientific nor ethical for our discipline to 
ignore so great and outstanding a moral phenomena as 
Christianity, as taught by the Sacred Scriptures and rep- 
resented by the Christian Church. True science must take 
into account all the data. While it is true that General 
Ethics cannot take the Holy Scriptures as its chief or only 
norm, as Christian Ethics does, yet General Ethics should 
not ignore the moral teaching of Christianity. It must ex- 



Man's Chief Duties 259 

press its relation to it. There are certain great fundamen- 
tal principles relative to the Christian system which Gen- 
eral Ethics is in duty bound to recognize. 

b. The duty of church membership: 

General Ethics would not be justified in asserting that 
all people ought to unite with some branch of the Christian 
Church. It is the function of Christian Ethics to do that, 
and to make its argument as cogent as possible. However, 
our science has this duty to perform: Every person living 
in a land such as ours, where Christian teaching is so large 
a factor, especially so potent an ethical factor, is under ob- 
ligation to examine the Christian system thoroughly and 
judicially, without prejudice or rancor, to see whether it is 
true or not. If he is not willing to do this, he is not acting 
ethically; he is giving way to mental bias. Considering 
the historical character of Christianity, its extension far 
and wide in the world, its moral influence on millions of 
individuals and many nations, and its claim to give to man 
an ethical salvation — that is, salvation from sin unto right- 
eousness — surely no man can assume to be truly ethical or 
scientific until he has given such a stupendous moral phe- 
nomenon a frank, honest and thorough-going investigation. 

In his researches, the ethicist should take into account the 
testimony of millions of the best people in the world respect- 
ing the transforming and salutary influence of the Chris- 
tian religion upon their own experiences and lives. If he 
finds that every person who has truly experienced the sav- 
ing power of the gospel commends it, and declares it to be 
real, not fanciful, and that only those who have never had 
this experience, and have never seriously tried to secure it, 
are unbelievers and opponents — he should take these facts 
into earnest account. On the other hand, he must also 



260 A System of General Ethics 

consider the crimes and persecutions that have been perpe- 
trated in the name of religion and by the so-called Christian 
Church. Here he must try to balance his judgment. How- 
ever, regarding these evils, he should try to see whether 
they are inherent in Christianity itself, or are the outgrowth 
of the natural wickedness of the human heart and its tend- 
ency to pervert everything good. He should judicially look 
at the ethical teaching of Christ and His apostles, and see 
whether, if they were actually practiced by individuals, 
communities, social and economic organisms, nations, and 
international diplomacy, they would not imparadise the 
world. Would not the doctrine of the universal father- 
hood of God and the universal brotherhood of man, taught 
in the New Testament, solve all our ethical, social, indus- 
trial, political and international problems? A generous- 
minded ethicist will carefully examine all these points. 

If any man becomes thoroughly convinced of the truth 
of the Christian system, it will be his duty to join the Chris- 
tian Church, bear his testimony before his fellowmen, and 
help to promulgate the principles he has accepted. It 
would not be ethical for him to "hide his light under a 
bushel." However, let it be said, with all possible empha- 
sis, that no person should identify himself with the Chris- 
tian Church unless he is a sincere believer in the doctrines 
and principles for which it stands. There are already too 
many hypocrites within its pale; no more are needed or 
wanted. 

Still, the fact that there are false professors in the 
Church should not lead any man to condemn that institu- 
tion. There are frauds everywhere — in lodges, business, 
politics, all kinds of social organizations, and if a man will 
not belong to anything that has hypocrites in it, he would 
better get out of the world; and even then he might not 



Man's Chief Duties 261 

escape association with them! The vital question is this: 
Are dishonesty, fraud and hypocrisy inculcated in the New 
Testament, or are they categorically condemned there? 
Does the Christian Church stand for good principles and 
practices or not? Every informed person can answer these 
questions for himself. 

Some persons reject Christianity for moral reasons — that 
is, it rebukes their bad lives and sometimes their wicked 
business. As long as they do not want to amend their lives 
and change their business, they are only too glad to find, 
or manufacture, an excuse for rejecting the Christian faith 
and finding flaws in the Christian Church. The person 
outside of the Church should not be a mere fault-finder. 
That is an easy business, requiring no capital, no brains and 
no grace. It is purely destructive, not constructive. Every 
person ought to be able to give a good reason for the faith 
that is in him, whether he is inside or outside of the Chris- 
tian Communion. General Ethics demands that much, at 
least, of every member of the community where the Chris- 
tian Church exists and exercises any influence whatever. 

c. Duties of Church members: 

First, they should be sincere. Nothing is wickeder than 
pretension, than "wearing the livery of heaven to serve the 
devil in." Of all persons, none injure the cause of religion 
so much as the hypocritical church member. All the in- 
fidels of the world have never done half so much injury to 
the Church and the cause she represents as the inconsistent 
and dishonest people who openly profess the Christian 
faith. It is a mark of the virility, not to say the truth, of 
the Christian religion that she was not destroyed long ago 
by the many traitors within the walls of Zion. Church 
people ought to furnish the best translation of the teaching 



262 A System of General Ethics 

of the gospel. For this reason the apostle's injunction is 
very apropos: "For this is the will of God, that by well- 
doing ye should put to silence the ignorance of foolish men" 
(1 Pet. 2: 15) ; also: "Let none of you suffer as a mur- 
derer, or a thief, or an evil-doer, or as a meddler in other 
man's matters; but if a man suffer as a Christian, let him 
not be ashamed, but let him glorify God on this account" 
(1 Pet. 4:15,16). 

Second, the church member should not be a mere nominal 
Christian. If he intends to be a confessing Christian, he 
should be a regenerated man; he should have a clear and 
satisfactory religious experience. General Ethics must in- 
sist on this point in view of the fact that the Holy Scrip- 
tures, in which the church member confesses faith, posi- 
tively teaches that God's people must have the spiritual 
mind. We quote only two passages, and refer to others: 
"Verily, verily, I say unto you, Except one be born of 
water and the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of 
God" (John 3:5); "That which is born of the flesh is 
flesh; and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit" (John 
3:6; also John 14:25-27; 15:1-9; 16:7-14; Acts 2:38; 
Rom. 5:5; 8:1-17; 14:1; 1 Cor. 2:9-16, and many others). 

Third, church members should be faithful and earnest in 
promulgating their faith; and they will be so if they are 
thoroughly sincere. One trouble with the Church is, she 
has too many members who are only half-hearted, only 
nominal Christians; their names are on the church roll, 
but unlike their Master, they are not engaged in their 
Father's business. 

Fourth, it is the duty of church people to support the 
Church financially. The Scriptures say: "The liberal soul 
shall be made fat." Tithes and offerings are to be brought 
to the Lord's storehouse. Every person should "give as 



Man's Chief Duties 263 

the Lord has prospered him." A religion that does not 
open a man's purse-strings is not the genuine kind. The 
minister should not desire a "royal" salary; he should leave 
such motives to worldlings; but he must have a physical 
livelihood, if he is to devote himself to the work of the 
Church in the pulpit and in the pastoral office. Moreover, 
missionary work is to be done ; the cause of Christian edu- 
cation must be upheld ; and many eleemosynary institutions 
need fiscal support. 

d. Duties of ministers: 

Confesssing their belief in the Holy Scriptures as the 
divine Word, ministers should preach it faithfully, sin- 
cerely, earnestly. They have no ethical right to stand in 
an evangelical pulpit and preach a doctrine that undermines 
the very principles for which the Church stands. If they 
take ordination vows at all, they should take them sincerely. 
It is unethical, hypocritical, to take them with mental res- 
ervation; and if, after a minister has been ordained, his 
mind should undergo a change of conviction regarding the 
fundamental doctrines of the Church to which he belongs, 
he should not continue to draw his support from it, but 
should withdraw, and go where he belongs, and then he will 
have an ethical right to preach whatever he believes. This 
principle holds good, whatever the religious denomination 
to which the minister belongs. Above all men, the Chris- 
tian minister should practice Christian ethics. Even Gen- 
eral Ethics must insist on that principle. 

The minister's life should comport with the faith he con- 
fesses. An inconsistent minister may do more harm in a 
community, not only against religion, but also against mor- 
ality, than a dozen infidels, no matter how outspoken they 
may be. Why should a man want to enter the Christian 



264 A System of General Ethics 

ministry, or remain in it, if he does not intend to exemplify 
its ethical and spiritual teachings before the world? 

Good and helpful sermons should be proclaimed from the 
pulpit. No kind of performance is more repellent and 
malapropos than poor preaching. We say malapropos ad- 
visedly, for when one considers the exalted themes with 
which the minister deals in the pulpit, how utterly out of 
accord with them it is to set them forth in a dull, inane, 
apathetic and ineffective way ! To the end that we may 
have good sermons in our pulpits, ministers should be well 
trained for their vocation. Four years in a first-class cul- 
tural college and three years in a theological school of high 
order are none too much to equip men now-a-days men- 
tally, morally and spiritually for their work, considering all 
the demands that the age justly makes upon their powers. 

Conscientious training under a good instructor in public 
speaking is also essential; only care should be taken that 
such training does not make the preacher artificial and 
affected and over-ambitious to be a "pulpit orator." Every 
young man who desires to become a public speaker has 
faults of delivery that should be corrected, and virtues that 
need to be cultivated and enhanced. A good, sane instruc- 
tor in elocution will not efface or deface the native powers 
of his students, but will develop them, and faithfully cor- 
rect defects in delivery. A good many ministers — and other 
public speakers as well — mar the effectiveness of their 
messages by certain faults that divert attention and that 
might easily have been corrected by wise teaching in youth. 

But let all ministers remember that, after all, the matter, 
and not the manner, is the chief concern in their sermons. 
In these days trite sermons are inexcusable. The preacher 
should be a thinker; should have individuality; should 
have a vein of originality in him which indicates that what- 



Man's Chief Duties 265 

ever he presents has been worked through the laboratory 
of his own mind. He should not be a homiletic plagiarist 
— otherwise a thief. Lucidity is also a fine virtue in pulpit 
discourses. Ministers should have something to say, and 
should say it so that it can be understood. Most of the 
hazy preaching of the day is merely the result of hazy 
thinking. A preacher has no business to go into the pulpit 
with a theme which he has not first thought out clearly in 
his mind. Let him lay such a subject aside until he gets 
a clear-cut view of it. Reasonable brevity is also a virtue 
to be commended in pulpit ministrations. We do not be- 
lieve in little, lavender-hued essays fifteen minutes long, 
but we think the twenty-five or thirty minute limit is a good 
one. A great preacher wrote in his diary, "Not many con- 
versions after thirty minutes!" In the interest of spiritual 
effectiveness, sermonizers should remember that many 
people are so constituted by nature that they cannot long 
carry on consecutive processes of thought. Ministers 
should be wise enough to accommodate themselves to 
human limitations. 

Professedly believing that the gospel is the panacea for 
the evils of the world, the Christian minister should preach 
the gospel only in his pulpit. He should be a man of eru- 
dition, the more the better, but all his knowledge should be 
used, nor for its own sake nor for the sake of display, but 
only to enforce and illustrate the gospel message. In the 
pulpit he is a spiritual teacher, not a pedagogue in the class- 
room, not a lecturer on economics, civics, socialism, or pol- 
itics. He should have some knowledge of all these impor- 
tant matters, so that he may apply the solvent of the gospel 
to them ; but it is not his function to deal with them per se, 
or to make out detailed programs for workers along those 
lines. As a citizen, he should be interested in every civic 



266 A System of General Ethics 

and industrial problem, and should contribute his share to 
their solution; but in the pulpit his vocation is the procla- 
mation of the spiritual remedy for sin. In accord with 
this principle we quote a paragraph from one of the most 
incisive writers and thinkers of the day: 

"I am 'root and branch' a Single Taxer. I believe heart 
and soul in the social and economic philosophy of Henry 
George. . . . And I take every opportunity offered by the 
public press and platform to recommend and propagate, 
according to the best of my ability, this particular program 
of social righteousness. That is my privilege and duty as 
a man and a citizen, and also as one who has made some 
slight study of social and economic questions. 

"But I never preach Single Tax from any Christian pul- 
pit, and never shall. There I stand as a 'steward of the 
mysteries of God/ a prophet of the Word, a messenger and 
embassador of Christ. I do not find that the Single Tax, 
or any other particular economic program or social philos- 
ophy, is a part of the gospel, and I will not inject it into the 
gospel. ... In the pulpit I must deal, not with the acci- 
dental modes and methods of reform, but with the essential 
principles and motives of righteousness and justice." 

Too much emphasis cannot be laid upon the fact that 
ministers and their people should adhere strictly to the 
American principle of keeping the Church and State sep- 
arate. True, there are points where their functions come 
together. For example, the State should protect the Church 
in its property rights and in its right to worship God with- 
out molestation, so long as it does not encroach on civil 
matters, or teach any doctrines that are subversive of good 
morals, good citizenship and good government. On the 
other hand, the pulpit is in duty bound to preach social and 
civic righteousness. But the minister has no right in this 



Man's Chief Duties 267 

free land to lead his Church as an ecclesiastical organiza- 
tion into the realm of party politics, or to seek to secure 
political power and aggrandizement, or to try to manipulate 
civic matters in such a way as to force religion on unwilling 
people by legislative enactment. As has been said before, 
no man can be converted by coercion into a real Christian. 
Here the "mailed fist" is utterly out of its sphere. The 
only kind of influence the Christian Church should ever 
exert on the State is that of moral suasion. If the State 
and her magistrates will not accept and practice Christian 
principles voluntarily, the Church must not resort to force 
or intrigue to propagate them. The Church's chief office 
is the cure of souls, to proclaim the gospel of love and 
good-will and righteousness. 



CHAPTER XXI 



IV. MAN'S DUTIES TO GOD (Theistic Ethics). 

1. To believe in His existence. 

2. To recognize Him in the affairs of life. 

3. To trust and serve Him. 

4. To discover His purposes in the universe. 

5. To anticipate eternal fellowship with Him. 



Summary and concluding observations. 



IV. MAN'S DUTIES TO GOD (Theistic Ethics). 
1. To believe in His existence: 

It will be remembered that, in the theoretical part of this 
work, we proved that morality must be grounded in the 
holy nature and will of God; that is, unless we accept the 
theistic view of the universe, there is no true ground of 
right, no real basis for morality, and no rational foundation 
for moral distinctions. 

Now, if there is no basis for morality on any other view, 
it certainly becomes every man's duty to accept the fact of 
the divine existence. Either he must stand upon a theistic 
basis, or give up all thought of moral reality. But the lat- 
ter alternative surely must be untenable. Our own con- 
sciences bear indisputable witness to the distinction between 
right and wrong, and therefore morality must have a se- 
cure basis in the Moral Personality in and back of the uni- 
verse. 

If any doubt remains in the ethicist's mind as to the di- 
vine existence, he is in duty bound to study carefully, by 



Man's Chief Duties 269 

the help of some cogent work on the subject, the arguments 
for the being of God. In such a work he will become ac- 
quainted with the General, Teleological, Cosmological, On- 
tological, Moral and Esthetic proofs. These ought to con- 
vince him intellectually. If he still lacks assurance of the 
divine existence, we feel it to be only our duty as a teacher 
of Ethics, to refer him to the Christian revelation in the 
Bible, where he will find the method clearly set forth by 
which to gain a spiritual experience. The genuine ethicist 
will be thorough-going in his researches and experimenta- 
tion. He will be satisfied with nothing less than certitude 
of truth. Man's next duty to God is — 

2. To recognize Him in the affairs of life: 

Convinced of God's existence, it follows logically that 
man should recognize Him in the affairs of life, should 
thank Him for His benefactions, and ask Him for direc- 
tion in times of need. He is our heavenly Father, and, 
whether we can always understand His ways or not, He 
must love us and care for us. It is unreasonable to believe 
that He is, and that He is the fountain-head of righteous- 
ness and truth, and yet refuse to believe in His fatherly 
affection and solicitude. Suppose a son should live in his 
father's home, eat at his table, share his bounty, and yet 
would ignore him from day to day and year to year ; would 
never speak to him, nor show by any sign that he appreci- 
ated his paternal interest and care — would you call him a 
filial son? Would you not declare that his conduct was 
ungrateful and wicked? Apply the illustration to our re- 
lations to God, our heavenly Father. 

3. To trust and serve Him: 

There is something inherently beautiful and ethical about 
trusting God, just as, when you think of it fundamentally, 



270 A System of General Ethics 

there is something intrinsically wrong about refusing to 
trust Him. Somehow, the attitude of atheism is haughty, 
resentful and presumptuous. The position of agnosticism 
is not so bad; and yet agnostics are seldom real humble 
people, but quite assertive and arrogant, as if, with all their 
professed lack of knowledge, they knew more than most 
other people ; indeed, know so much as to be sure that God 
is unknowable, that He is only an "inscrutable power." It 
certainly requires vast knowledge of the universe to know 
that. Yes, atheism, materialism, and agnosticism are al- 
most always arrogant, bearing an air of intellectual super- 
ciliousness; seldom humble, contrite and docile in spirit. 

After all, we do not know that any person has ever been 
a worse husband, father, neighbor and citizen because he 
believed in God, especially a personal and holy God, and 
trusted in Him to make truth and righteousness finally pre- 
vail over error and sin, and to turn all our afflictions into 
a greater good. We have never found that a man who 
once had such a faith, and lost it, was made a better or a 
happier man through his unbelief. In truth, our observa- 
tion has invariably been that such a man deteriorated in 
moral quality, if he did not become an absolute moral 
wreck. The atheists of a community are never conspicu- 
ous for their elevated standards of morality, nor for their 
numerous philanthropic deeds. When Job was sorely 
afflicted, his wife lost faith, and said to him: "Curse God, 
and die!" But Job replied bravely: "Yea, though He slay 
me, yet will I trust in Him." Does any one think that Job's 
moral character would have been improved if he had 
heeded his wife's advice? No; then the great epic of Job 
would never have been written, and the world would have 
missed its valuable lesson of theistic faith. 

And if men lose faith in God, cui bono? In what, then, 



Man's Chief Duties 271 

will they put their trust? In a blind, inscrutable power? 
Will that give them more help, inspiration and comfort 
than to believe in a personal God of righteousness, who 
really cares for them ? Such have not been the history and 
experience of mankind. All in all, it is better to trust the 
Power back of the universe, and to trust Him, too, as the 
Absolute One, who is all-wise and beneficent, who will 
cause "all things to work together for good to them that 
love Him." 

To serve God is a plain ethical obligation. Reason 
teaches that, since God has given us a being in this wonder- 
ful universe, and has also made us in so marvellous a way, 
He must have placed us here for a wise purpose ; therefore 
we ought to discover His plan, and endeavor to serve Him 
in carrying it into effect. And since He must be wise and 
good, we may be sure that our willing and loving service 
will not be in vain ; will receive its proper recompense in 
some sphere of existence. At all events, such belief has a 
morally wholesome influence on those who accept it. 

4. To discover His purposes in the universe: 

The cosmos is here. It is a marvellous mechanism. 
Taking into account all its phenomena, including man, its 
only adequate explanation is that it was brought into exist- 
ence by an all-wise and all-powerful God, who is a personal 
being. That being true, it becomes our duty to inquire 
what His purposes may have been in making such a uni- 
verse, and giving human beings so prominent a place in it. 
True, some persons may enter the caveat that, if there is 
a good and all-wise God, He should have written His pur- 
pose very plainly on the universe, and not left us to puzzle 
our minds over so many problems. That is one way of 
reasoning, but not the best. Perhaps God's reason in leav- 



272 A System of General Ethics 

ing so much mystery in the universe has been twofold: 
first, to lead us to trust in His wisdom and love ; second, 
to develop our mental and moral powers by giving us prob- 
lems to solve. We may depend upon it, if God had seen 
that it was best for us for Him to make all the world as 
plain and simple as a primer, He would have done so; but 
the fact that He has not pursued that course is prima facie 
proof that such an economy would not have been best for 
moral beings and for His universe. Therefore, practical 
morality demands that we, as rational and moral agents, 
find out as far as possible what was God's great puropse in 
making the universe. 

To this end, it is encumbent upon us to study such a book 
as the Bible, to see whether His design may not be set forth 
there more clearly than anywhere else. Of course, this 
does not mean that we must accept any professed revela- 
tion in a credulous way, but simply that we should examine 
this system judicially, to see whether it does not give a 
rational explanation of the world and the divine purpose in 
it. Moreover, if God has given to the world a plan of sal- 
vation, it is our bounden duty to find out what it is, and 
when we find it, to accept it gratefully, and then proclaim it 
to others. Remember, we are not taking any program for 
granted here, but are simply pointing out the rational im- 
plications in our efforts to solve the problem of our lives 
and their purpose. Reason ought to convince us that the 
divine intention must be a noble and worthy one ; that we 
have not been placed here for a petty purpose, merely to be 
the football of an arbitrary, fatalistic and non-moral power. 
The immensity of the universe and its marvellous mechan- 
ism are an argument in favor of attributing a large, wise 
and beneficent plan to its Maker. Ethics requires that we 
seek to know what His plan is ; and we should not betray 



Mans Chief Duties 273 

so little moral earnestness as either to rest in ambiguity and 
indeterminateness, or prematurely to throw up our hands, 
give up the quest, and drop off into the abyss of agnosticism. 
The latter course would not be untying, but cutting, the 
Gordian knot. If there is a possible way to know the truth, 
we ought to find it. — A further duty to God is — 

5. To anticipate eternal fellowship with Him: 

Is there a goal for all our striving? Or, after all our 
seeking and marvelling and aspiring, are we doomed to sink 
into eternal oblivion? If we must choose the latter alter- 
native, we may well ask pessimistically, Cui bono? Life 
would then be full of mystery; nay, the mystery would be 
so appalling, that even the noble science of Ethics could 
scarcely say that life is worth living, or that all our moral 
striving and discipline are worth the effort. 

On the other hand, if Ethics may teach that God is good, 
that He desires us to serve Him in righteousness, to pro- 
mote His cause in the world, and so to discipline our moral 
and spiritual faculties that we may be fitted for eternal fel- 
lowship with Him in a state of purity and felicity — then, 
indeed, our science has an exalted mission, and may confi- 
dently urge men to continue their moral striving, finish their 
life's purpose, and anticipate a destiny that will be in accord 
with all their highest aspirations. 

Historically considered, the best ethical results have ac- 
companied belief in immortality. Very few men who have 
believed in the annihilation of the individual at death have 
achieved true nobility of character, or accomplished much 
for the moral uplift and betterment of the world. As a 
rule, they have sooner or later sunk into a cynical frame, 
and nil admirari has been their motto. However, the men 
who have had a sure, undaunted hope in personal immor- 



274 A System of General Ethics 

tality, an immortality of purity as well as of bliss, have been 
the men who have been of the greatest moral and spiritual 
service to the world. 

Therefore we maintain that a truly virile and earnest 
System of Rational Ethics demands that man shall so con- 
duct himself in the present life as to be able to anticipate 
with joy an eternal fellowship of blessedness with God. 



We have now come to the conclusion, albeit many topics 
might have been almost indefinitely expanded. No doubt 
there will be persons who will not be convinced by some 
parts of our reasoning; others may think we have used 
a priori methods too freely, and have delved too much into 
philosophy and speculation. We doubt not there are 
lacunae here and there in the rational processes, and some 
minor scientific and historical inaccuracies may occur. Yet, 
in the main, we have this contention to make in favor of 
our system: To find the ultimate ground of right in the 
holy being and will of God ; to establish the fact of an ob- 
jective moral law in the universe which holds its imperative 
over the conscience; to insist without evasion or compro- 
mise on the reality of moral distinctions ; to treat man 
as a responsible moral agent, with a will in liberty, and not 
a mere football of circumstance and environment ; to show 
him in a practical way how to pursue the straight road of 
virtue, turning neither to the right nor to the left; to set 
forth clearly his duties in the varied relations of life ; and, 
finally, to point him to the bright and happy eternal goal 
of his ethical faith and striving — to do all these things is, 
we maintain, to teach a virile ethic ; one which, if honestly 
and earnestly carried out into practice, will produce human 



Man's Chief Duties 275 

character of the noblest order; virtuous husbands and 
wives, parents and children, friends and neighbors, social 
communities and Christian congregations, and citizens and 
civilians of which our great Republic, with its manifest 
destiny in the world, need never be ashamed. While we 
have sought as far as possible for scientific principles and 
precision, our purpose has not been merely an academic 
one, but also, and perhaps it should be said primarily, an 
earnest and a practical one. Our prayer and hope are that 
this volume will bring cheer, suggestion and moral uplift 
to all who peruse its pages, and especially that it may prove 
helpful to the educators of our country and the youth who 
come under their tutelage. 

FINIS 



A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 



WORKS ON GENERAL ETHICS 



Plato: "Apology of Socrates," "Georgias," "Crito," "Phaedo," 

"Republic." 
Xenophon: "Memorabilia of Socrates." 
Aristotle: "Nichomachean Ethics," "Eudemian Ethics." 
Cudworth, R.: "Treatise on Eternal and Immutable Morality." 
Janet, P.: "The Theory of Morals." 
Martineau, James: "Types of Ethical Theory." 
Spencer, Herbert: "The Data of Ethics." 
Huxley, Thomas: "Evolution and Ethics and Other Essays." 
Calderwood, Henry: "Handbook of Moral Philosophy." 
Porter, Noah: "Moral Science." 
Wundt, W.: "Ethics." 

Hickok, L. P.: "A System of Moral Science." 
Hamilton, E. J.: "The Moral Law, or, The Theory and Practice 

of Duty." 
Davis, Noah K.: "Elements of Ethics." 
Paulsen, F.: "A System of Ethics." 
Westermarck, E.: "The Origin and Development of the Moral 

Ideas." 
Seth, J.: "A Study of Ethical Principles." 
Ladd, G.: "The Philosophy of Conduct." 
Moore, G. E.: "Ethics," "Principia Ethica." 
Rashdall, H.: "Ethics," "The Theory of Good and Evil." 
Read, C: "Natural and Social Morals." 

Watson, J.: "Hedonistic Theories from Aristippus to Spencer." 
Alexander, S.: "Moral Order and Progress." 
Bourne, B. P.: "The Principles of Ethics." 
Valentine, Milton: "Theoretical Ethics." 
Day, Henry N.: "The Science of Ethics." 



A Selected Bibliography 277 

James, IV.: "The Will to Believe." 

Green, T. H.: "Prolegomena to Ethics." 

Palmer, G. H.: "The Field of Ethics," "The Nature of Goodness." 

Irons, D.: "Psychology of Ethics." 

Mackenzie, J. S.: "A Manual of Ethics." 

Bradley, F.: "Ethical Studies." 

Dewey and Tufts: "Ethics." 

Stephen, L.: "The Science of Ethics." 

Robinson, E. G.: "Principles and Practice of Morality." 

Fite, W.: "Introductory Study of Ethics." 

Mezes, S. E.: "Ethics, Descriptive and Explanatory." 

Rogers, R. A. P.: "A Short History of Ethics, Greek and Modern." 

Perry, R. B.: "The Moral Economy." 

Hadley, A. T.: "Standards of Public Morality." 

Sidgwick, H.: "Methods of Ethics," "Practical Ethics," "Outlines 

of the History of Ethics." 
Rand, Benjamin: "The Classical Moralists." 
Dewey, J.: "Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics." 
Hobhouse, L. T.: "Morals in Evolution." 
Sorley, W. R.: "The Moral Life." 
Meyers, P. V. N.: "History as Past Ethics." 
Steele, Geo. M.: "Rudimentary Ethics." 
Mac Cunn, John: "The Making of Character." 
Muirhead, J. H.: "The Elements of Ethics." 
Bennett, IV.: "The Ethical Aspects of Evolution." 
Hyslop, J. H.: "Elements of Ethics." 
Stork, T. B.: "The Will in Ethics." 
Thilly, Frank: "Introduction to Ethics." 
Drake, Durant: "Problems of Conduct." 
De Laguna, Theodore: "Introduction to the Science of Ethics." 



II 
WORKS ON CHRISTIAN ETHICS 

Dorner, J. A.: "A System of Christian Ethics." 
Wuttke, Adolph: "Christian Ethics." 
Martensen, H.: "Christian Ethics." 
Harless, C. A.: "A System of Christian Ethics." 






278 A System of General Ethics 

Luthardt, C. E.: "History of Christian Ethics," "Moral Truths of 

Christianity," "Kompedium der Theologischen Ethik." 
Sartorius, E.: "The Doctrine of Divine Love." 
Haering, Theodore: "Ethics of the Christian Life." 
Weidner, R. F.: "Christian Ethics" (based on Martensen). 
Strong, T. B.: "Bampton Lectures on Christian Ethics." 
Robins, H. E.: "The Ethics of the Christian Life." 
Murray, J. C. "A Handbook of Christian Ethics." 
Gregory, D. S.: "Christian Ethics." 
Davidson, W. L. "Christian Ethics." 
D'Arcy, C. F.: "Christian Ethics and Modern Thought." 
Kendrick, A. C: "The Moral Conflict of Christianity." 
Keyser, L. S.: "A System of Christian Ethics." 
Stalker, James: "The Ethics of Jesus." 



INDEX 



Absolute Being, the, 44, 53, 58, 

59, 270. 
Absolutism, divine, 59. 
Abuse, sexual, 175. 
Academy, Plato's, 53, 54. 
Adjustment, the moral, 158. 
Adolescence, 245. 
Affability, 214. 
Affectation, 212, 231. 
Agency, moral treatment of, 79- 

120; definition, 79; constitu- 
ents, 82-120. 
Agent, moral (see man). 
Agassiz, 220. 
Agnosticism, 25, 152, 153, 270, 

272. 
Altruism, 61-63. 
Ambition, 196, 197, 212. 
Amusements, doubtful, 135, 136. 
Anarchy, 236, 244. 
Animals, treatment of, 221-223. 
Animalism, man's primitive, 152. 
Annihilation, 273. 
Antisthenes, 51, 57. 
Antithesis of Right (Sin), 121- 

160 (see Sin). 
Apologetics, 160. 
Appreciativeness, 231, 232. 
A priori, 31, 74, 169, 184. 
Arena, nature affords man an, 

76-78. 
Aristippus, 55. 
Aristocracy, 201. 
Aristotle, 22, 35, 44, 49, 51, 52, 

54, 55, 174. 
Art, Ethics as an, 32, 161 ; works 

of, 219. 
Asceticism, 3, 51, 58, 170, 178, 214. 
Astronomy, 24, 34. 
Atheism, 270. 
Athens, 53. 
Athletics, 174-176. 
Atonement, 158. 
Augsburg Confession, 192; 

Apology of, 192. 



Augustine, 156. 
Austerity, 3, 214. 
Authority, 60, 61, 243, 244. 
Autocracy, 226, 255. 
Automaton and automata, 104, 
107, 113, 142, 143, 148, 193, 202. 

Ballot, 252. 

Beauty, 186, 220-222. 

Beecher, 198. 

Bentham, Jeremy, 61. 

Beverages, 172, 174. 

Bible, the, quoted or referred to, 

35, 41, 60, 62, 100, 124-127, 140, 
147, 157-160, 164, 177-179, 182, 
183, 186, 187, 194, 195, 199-201, 
204, 209, 210, 213, 219, 220, 222- 
230, 233, 235, 236, 240, 243, 244, 
253, 255, 258, 260, 261, 263, 266, 
269, 270, 271, 272. 

Bibliography, 277-279. 

Biology, 30. 

Birds, 222. 

Bluntness, 215. 

Body, duties to, the, 170-179; 
its dignity, 179; its passions, 
177, 179. 

Book reviews, 231. 

Bossism, 255. 

Botany, 24, 30, 34. 

Brothel, 178. 

Brotherhood, universal, 260. 

Buddhism, 151. 

Bunyan, John, 136. 

Causality, law of, 34, 45, 68, 81, 

91, 92, 104, 186. 
Casuistry, 100, 133-138. 
Calisthenics, 176. 
Capitalism, 233-235. 
Categorical imperative, 27, 28. 
Chalmers, Thomas, 182. 
Chance, 67. 
Character, 19, 20, 34, 106, 143, 

149, 162, 215. 



280 



Index 



Chaos, 74, 75, 106. 
Charitableness, 229. 
Chemistry, 24, 30, 198. 
"Choir invisible, the," 195. 
Christ, 60, 115, 158, 178, 186, 209, 

213, 230, 253, 255, 260, 266. 
Christianity, 35, 41, 126, 160, 170, 

258, 259, 260, 261. 
Christian Ethics, 5, 36, 41, 80, 94, 

140, 141, 157-160. 
Christian experience, 159, 160, 

259, 269. 
Christian morality, 191. 
Christian religion, 156, 253, 254, 

261, 263. 

Church, the, 4, 60, 201, 207, 229, 

_252, 257, 258-267. 

Church-going, 88. 

Church members, 261-263. 

Cicero, 36, 57. 

Cigarettes, 175. 

Citizens, duties of, 251-254, 265, 
266, 275. 

Civic sphere, the, 235, 236. 

Civil righteousness, 156, 192. 

Colleges, 4, 5, 171-176, 198, 200, 
212, 229. 

Common people, the, 202. 

Conceit, 201. 

Conduct, 19, 20, 34, 106, 162. 

Conscience, 4, 22-24, 43, 63, 70, 
112, 133, 135, 149, 153; treat- 
ment of, 83-100; definition, 83 ; 
other terms, 83 ; etymology, 83 ; 
psychology of, 83-90; as per- 
ception, 84; as feeling, 85,86; 
origin of, 90, 91 ; a distinct fac- 
ulty, 92-95; not infallible, 97, 
98; supremacy of, 95-100; 
man's ethical guide, 98 - 100 ; 
other references, 185, 187, 190, 
194, 235, 237, 240, 257, 274. 

Conscientiousness, 214. 

Consciousness, 24, 25, 64, 70, 83, 
105, 126, 185. 

Conversion, 160, 191. 



Cosmos, the, 67, 69, 70, 72-74, 79- 
82, 110, 129, 143, 156, 220, 271. 

Country, our, 214, 226, Z43. 

Courage, 204, 206, 213. 

Cowardice, 206, 213, 256. 

Creation, 71, 178, 216, 272. 

Creator, 45, 54, 67, 68, 70, 71, 73, 
74, 80, 81, 111, 141, 145, 147, 
148, 157, 160, 170, 178, 179, 202, 
203, 216, 219, 220. 

Criticism, literary, 231, 292. 

Cruelty, 223. 

Culture, motives for securing, 
196-200. 

Cupid, 239. 

Cure of sin, 154-160; enigma to 
Rational Ethics, 154-157 ; meth- 
od of Christian Ethics, 157- 
160. 

Cynicism, 51, 57, 59, 186, 209, 
217, 219, 273. 

Davis, Noah K., 22, 47, 48, 49, 
168, 170, 237, 238. 

Data, Introductory of Theoret- 
ical Ethics, 18-41 ; of Practical 
Ethics, 161-167; Distinctive of 
Ethics, 23-25. 

Definitions, importance of, 18; 
of Ethics, 18; defective defi- 
nitions, 18-20; that of text 
justified, 20, 21 ; of the Ground 
of Right, 42; of the Highest 
Good, 47, 48; of moral agency, 
79; of a moral agent, 79; of 
Conscience, 83 ; of supremacy 
of Conscience, 95 ; of the Will, 
101; of sin, 122; of moral dis- 
tinctions, 124; of Practical 
Ethics, 161. 

Deism, 69. 

Design, 75, 76. 

De Laguna, Theodore, 21, 50, 51, 
52, 55. 

Deontology, 22, 23. 

Desdemona, 95, 133. 

Despondency, 209. 



Index 



281 



Despair, 209. 

Destiny, 4, 179, 273, 274, 275. 

Determinism, 4, 103-116, 107, 108, 
113, 114, 116. 

Dichotomy, 180. 

Diogenes, 51. 

Divorce, 239, 242. 

Drink, 170-173, 178. 

Duties, Man's chief, 20; treat- 
ment of, 165-274; classified, 
165; term, 166; rights and, 
167, 168; to self, 168-215; to 
nature, 216-223 ; to his fellow- 
men, 224-267; to God, 268-274. 

Ease, a life of, 197. 

Eccentricity, 212. 

Eden, 147. 

Education, motives for securing 
an, 196-200, 275. 

Ego, the, 110, 169, 210. 

Egoism, 62. 

Egotism, 185, 197, 243, 247. 

Egrets, 229. 

Emerson, 109. 

Emotions, 180-191, 240, 241. 

Employers and employes, 232-235. 

Enemies, 227, 228. 

Energism, 51. 

Epicureans, 36, 48, 55, 56, 58, 144. 

Environment, 103, 113-116. 

Epictetus, 36, 57. 

Epistemology, 39, 109. 

Erraticism, 212. 

Esthetics, 36, 46, 186, 214. 

Ethically necessary and ethically 
free, the, 46, 47. 

Ethics, definitions, 18-21 ; term 
defined, 22; sphere, 23-30; the 
word "ethics," 18, 28; as a 
science, 30 - 32 ; methodology, 
32, 33; Hebrew, 34, 35; Hea- 
then, 35; Theoretical, 17-160; 
Practical, 161-274; Individual, 
168-215 ; Nature, 216-223 ; So- 
cial, 224-267; Theistic, 268-274. 

Eudemonists, 56, 139. 



Eucher parties, 250, 251. 

Evolution, 34, 40, 46, 49, 64; 
naturalistic, 66-68, 70, 71, 81, 
90, 91 ; theistic, 68-72, 144. 

Evil thoughts, 199. 

Exercise, 173-177. 

Experience, 25, 102,108,123,155, 
159, 160, 168, 187. 

Ethnology, 126. 

Experiment, 105, 106, 112. 

Faculty (of the mind), the word 
explained, 82; Conscience a 
distinct, 92-95; all faculties 
fallible, 97, 98; use of, 125. 

Family, the, 237-246, 247, 251. 

Fanaticism, 178, 215, 253. 

Farmer, the, 200, 222. 

Fatherhood, human, 243 ; of God, 
260. 

Feelings, the, 189-191. 

Fellowship, eternal with God, 
273, 274. 

Fidelity, 214. 

Fiske, John, 43. 

Flint, 41, 151. 

Food and drink, 171-173, 178. 

Foolhardiness, 206, 213. 

Forests, waste of, 220. 

Forgiveness, 154, 155, 158. 

Fornication, 178. 

Freedom, 4; a sine qua non for 
morality, 103-105; proofs, 105- 
109; objections refuted, 109- 
116; limitations of, 117; sin a 
free act, 140-144; other refer- 
ences, 145, 150, 226, 244. 

Genesis of sin, 139-153. 

Genus homo, 227. 

General Ethics, defined, 18 - 21 

(see Ethics). 
Geology, 24. 
George, Henry, 266. 
Gnostics, 151, 170. 
Goal, the eternal, 274. 
Golden Rule, 225. 



282 



Index 



God, general references, 3, 20, 21, 
36, 41, 95-97, 105, 110, 111, 114, 
115, 130-133, 141-144, 146, 149, 
150, 152-154, 160, 163, 188, 193. 
194, 199, 214, 216, 220, 221, 232, 
235, 240, 256, 266; the Ground 
of Right, 43-47, 73, 80, 150, 268, 
274; His nature and will, 45- 
47, 59, 274 ; the Highest Good, 
48; our Prototype, 48; Source 
of good, 53-55, 58, 73, 269; 
obedience to, 60, 244; Creator, 
68-73, 80, 81, 90; our Judge, 
87; duties to, 268-274. 

Good, the word, 29, 44, 53-55, 58, 
73 ; the Highest, 47-49, 50, 54- 
57, 63. 159. 

Gospel, the, 259. 

Gormandizing, coarseness of, 172. 

Government, human, 107, 127, 
144, 187, 192, 200, 226, 235, 236, 
244, 252, 253, 254, 256. 

Graces flowing from love, 229- 
232. 

Grafters, 198, 254. 

Gratitude, 232, 269. 

Greeks, the, 36, 57, 155. 

Gregory, D. S., 20. 

Ground of Right, the, 3, 26, 33; 
treatment of, 42-72; meaning 
of, 42; definition, 43; ration- 
ale of, 43-47, 58; other refer- 
ences, 73, 74, 80, 121, 143, 146, 
147, 156, 268, 269, 274. 

Gruber, L. Franklin, 117. 

Gruffness, 230. 

Gymnasium, 173, 176. 

Habit, 194, 195. 
Hatred, 208. 
Haughtiness, 213. 
Health, bodily, 171-177. 
Heathen Ethics, 35, 50-59. 
Hebrew Ethics, 34, 35. 
Hedonism, 36, 48, 51, 55-57, 58, 

66. 
Heredity, 103, 113-116. 
Hibben, John G., 39. 



Higher and Lower Good, a, 132, 

133. 
Highest Good, the, 47-49 (see 

Good). 
Hinduism, 151. 
Hippias, 50. 

History, appeal to, 125, 126. 
Historical sketch of Ethics, 34- 

36. 
Hobbes, Thomas, 60, 61. 
Holy Spirit, 159, 160, 170, 187, 191. 
Home, the, 243, 245, 248-250. 
Hope, 209. 
Housewife, 200. 
Hugo, Victor, 112. 
Humility, 213. 

Husband and wife, 238-242, 275. 
Huxley, Thomas, 71. 
Hymeneal love, 240. 
Hyper-criticism, 231. 

Idealism, 185. 

Ihood, 169. 

Imitator, the, 211. 

Immortality, 20, 159, 179, 273, 274. 

Inanity, 211. 

Individual Ethics, 168-215. 

Individualism, 212. 

Individuality, 185, 210-212, 264. 

Induction, 30-32, 183. 

Industrial sphere, the, 232-235, 

266. 
Influence, 194, 195, 223. 
Intellect, the, 26, 37, 38, 82, 84, 

85, 96, 98, 180-189, 190, 191, 195. 
Intelligence, rational, 82, 83. 
Introductory data, 18-41, 161-167. 
Intuitionalists (Kantian), 49. 
Intuitions, the, 34, 38, 83, 85, 88. 

91, 95, 96, 98, 107, 126, 137. 

184-189. 

Jacobs, Henry E., 192. 
Jevons. 26. 
Job, 270. 
Judas, 209. 

Justice, divine, 157, 158, 232; 
human, 206, 232-236. 



Index 



283 



Kant, 28, 49, 103, 117, 170. 
Kirk, Harris E., 51, 52, 59. 
Knowledge, Socrates' view, 51, 
52; general reference, 198. 

Labor troubles, 232-235. 

Labor-saving machinery, 200. 

Lanier, Sidney, 218. 

Law, obedience to, 243, 244, 251, 
252, 254. 

Law of right, the, references, 3, 
20, 23, 27, 33, 63, 69, 70, 121- 
123, 156, 235; discussion of, 
73-120. 

Law, reign of, 74, 75. 

Lear, King, 232. 

Liberty, 144, 226, 236, 244, 251, 
252, 256. 

Lie, a, 136-138, 188. 

Lincoln, 202. 

Logic, study of, 36, 184. 

Logical faculty, 38, 183. 

Love, general references, 53, 97, 
207, 208; to fellowmen, 224- 
232; to neighbor, 224, 225; 
patriotic, 225, 226; philan- 
thropic, 227; for enemies, 227- 
229 ; other graces flowing from 
love, 229-232. 

Lowell, 218. 

Loyalty, 226, 251, 254, 256. 

Lyceum, Aristotle's, 54. 

Mackenzie, John S., 18, 31. 

"Mailed fist," the, 252, 253, 267. 

Man, a moral agent, 79-120, 143. 

Manicheans, 151. 

Marcus Aurelius, 36, 57. 

Marriage, 237-242. 

Martensen, 77. 

Martineau, James, 83, 132, 168. 

Materialism, 110, 145, 217, 270. 

Mathematics, 34, 129. 

Matter, Plato's view of, 53; 

Aristotle's view, 54, 55; not 

source of evil, 151. 
Memory, 37, 182, 183. 
Mercy, 157, 158, 222, 223. 



Metaphysics, 42. 

Methodology in Ethics, 9-15, 32, 
33. 

Micou, R. W., 41. 

Mills, Enos, 220. 

Mind, the human, outline of, 37- 
39; sub-conscious, 203; super- 
conscious. 203 ; culture of, 180- 
201 ; duties to, 180-201 ; an en- 
tity, 103, 180. 

Ministers, 164, 212, 263-267. 

Modus operandi, 43, 216. 

Monogamy, 237. 

Moral, the word, 22, 27, 28; or- 
der, 74-78; law, 43, 44, 74, 123; 
"morally indifferent sphere," 
130-132; discipline, 150, 174, 
219; imperative, 43; evil, 145. 

Moral agency and moral agents, 
treatment of, 79-120; defini- 
tions, 79; constituents of, 82- 
120; freedom of, 101-117; 
other references, 78, 142, 143, 
146, 147, 150, 274. 

Moral argument for the divine 
existence, 41. 

Moral distinctions, treatment of, 
124-138; definition, 124 ; proofs 
of, 124 - 130 ; general refer- 
ences, 3, 4, 23, 27, 33, 42, 47, 
84, 95, 98, 162, 163, 268, 274. 

Moral discipline, 150, 174, 219. 

Moral economy, the world a, 73- 
78, 157. 

Moral faculty (see Conscience). 

Moral judgment, the, 85, 93-95, 
98, 99, 187, 190, 207. 

Moral philosophy, 22. 

Moral science, 20, 22. 

Moral weaklings, 108, 144, 181, 
192, 193, 195. 

Motherhood, 243. 

Motives (or Intentions), 19, 65, 
86, 96, 138, 195, 233 ; influence 
but do not coerce the Will, 
111-113; treatment of, 118-120; 
definition, 118; of culture, 196- 
201. 



284 



Index 



Muir, John, 220. 
Muirhead, J. H., 47. 
Murray, J. C, 31, 134. 

Nature, duties to, 216-223. 
Nature- fakirs, 219. 
Nature-lovers, 219. 
Natural science, 39, 40. 
Necessitarianism, 103, 109. 
Neighbor love, 224, 225, 275. 
Nil admirari, 273. 
Normative sciences, 31, 32, 36. 
Noumena, 24. 

Oaths, official, 255, 256. 
Obsequiousness, 213, 230. 
Officials, public, 253-257. 
Opportunism, 65, 66, 139. 
Orr, James, 153. 

Ought, 20, 24, 28, 84, 94, 96, 110. 
Ovid, 52. 

Pantheism, 168, 169. 

Parents and children, 242-246. 

Park, public, 221, 222. 

Particles, ethical, 28, 29. 

Pascal, 93. 

Passions, bodily, 177-179. 

Patriotism, 60, 156, 225, 226, 253, 
254, 256, 275. 

Pedagogy, 5, 196. 

Perfectionists, 49. 

Perfidy, 214. 

Personality, 168-170, 185, 202- 
215 ; strong, 202, 203 ; symmet- 
rical, 203-205; virtuous, 205- 
215. 

Peripatetic School, 54. 

Pessimism, 59, 87, 151, 193, 209, 
217, 219. 

Peter, 210. 

Phenomena, 24, 31, 70, 216, 271. 

Phenomenalism, 185. 

Philanthropy, 227. 

Philosophy, 23, 26, 27, 39, 40, 
109, 128, 155, 274. 

Physiognomy, 179. 

Physiology, 88, 175. 



Plagiarist, the, 210. 

Plan of salvation, 157-160, 272. 

Plato, 35, 48, 49, 51, 53, 54, 55, 
61, 151, 155, 158, 170. 

Platonic love, 238. 

Politeness, 230. 

Politics, 267. 

Polyandry, 237. 

Polygamy, 237. 

Positivism, 185. 

Practical Ethics, definition, 18, 
161; treatment of, 161-274; 
relation to Theoretical Ethics, 
162-164; as an art and a sci- 
ence, 161. 

Pragmatism, 63, 162. 

Preaching, 264-267. 

Preserver, God as, 216. 

Pride, 196, 197, 213. 

Primordial material, the, 71. 

Pringle-Pattison, A. S., 117. 

Proofs, the theistic, 269. 

Protagoras, 51. 

Prudery, 242, 245. 

Psychology, 23, 24, 26, 30, 34; 
outline of system, 37-39, 80 ; of 
Conscience, 83-90; culture of 
psychical powers, 180-201, 240. 

Question, of Ethics, 25-27. 

Rational intelligence, 82, 83. 

Reason, 156, 157, 170, 190, 191, 
237, 238, 271, 272, 274. 

Reflection, 37, 181-183, 193. 

Regeneration, 158-160, 191. 

Relation of Ethics, treatment of, 
36-41; to Psychology, 37-39; 
to Philosophy, 39; to Natural 
Science, 39, 40; to Sociology, 
40; to Natural Theism, 41; to 
Christian Theology and Eth- 
ics, 41 ; of Theoretical and 
Practical Ethics, 162-164. 

Religion, 126, 215. 

Repentance, 154. 

Republic, Plato's, 35, 53, 61 ; our 
own, 226, 236, 251, 252, 255, 275. 



Index 



285 



Rest, 176, 177. 

Revenge, 228. 

Right and Wrong, 3, 4, 18-21, 23, 
25, 26, 28, 33, 42, 63, 66, 67, 79, 
84, 85, 91, 95, 96, 98, 104, 121- 
125, 128, 130-133, 146, 164, 187, 
268. 

Rigorism, 3, 51. 

Romans, 35, 57. 

Rousseau, 218. 

Saloons, 248, 249. 

Sanctification, 158, 159. 

Schmid, Heinrich, 192. 

Scholarship, 175, 176. 

Schurz, Carl, 226. 

Science, physical, 23, 24, 31, 32, 
39, 40, 80, 183; Ethics a sci- 
ence, 30-32; normative, 31, 32, 
36. 

Scientific faculty, 38, 183. 

Scientific study of nature, 217- 
220. 

Scotists, the, 59. 

Scotus, Duns, 59. 

Self-consciousness, 24, 38, 168, 
169, 186. 

Self-culture, 248. 

Self-denial, 214. 

Selfishness, 164, 211, 221, 229, 
230, 242, 247, 248. 

Seneca, 36, 57. 

Sense, the, 37, 180, 181. 

Sensibilities, the, 26, 38, 82, 85- 
87, 96, 98, 189-191, 195. 

Sentimentality, 208, 209, 217, 219, 
239, 249. 

Sermons, 264. 

Sheldon, Henry C, 151. 

Sexual love, 237, 238, 239, 241. 

Sex problem, 245. 

Sin, 3, 21; treatment of, 121-160: 
definition, 122 ; term, 122, 123 
fact of, 123, 124; genesis of 
139-153; a free act, 140-144 
an eternal possibility, 144-146 
erroneous views of its origin 
147-153; God not its author 



147-150; not eternal, 150; not 
in matter, 151 ; not a lapse of 
the Infinite, 151, 152; not due 
to man's primitive animalism, 
152; agnosticism not satisfac- 
tory, 152, 153; cure of sin, 
154-160. 

Single tax, 266. 

Sleep, 176, 177. 

Slums, 243. 

Social functions, 177. 

Socialism, 235. 

Social organism, the, 207, 247- 
251. 

Sociology, 40, 234. 

Socrates, 35, 51-53, 164. 

Sophists, the, 35, 36, 50, 51. 

Speculation (philosophical), 24, 
25, 102, 108, 128, 164, 168, 169, 
184, 237, 274. 

Speer, Robert E., 136. 

Spencer, Herbert, 29, 49, 66, 91, 
103, 104. 

Sphere, the ethical, 23-30, 146. 

Spirit, the Holy, 159, 160, 170, 
187, 191. 

Squeamishness, 214. 

State, the, Plato's view, 53, 54; 
Aristotle's view, 55; Hobbes' 
view, 60; modern view, 188, 
198, 207, 243, 251-257, 266, 267, 

Stoics, the, 36, 51, 56, 57-59. 

Strategy, legitimate, 137. 

Strikes, 233. 

Sunday piety, 204. 

Sycophancy, 215. 

Symmetry of character, 203-205. 

Summum Bonum, 48, 49. 

To Agathon, 48. 

Taxes, 188, 254. 

Temperament, 113-116, 211. 

Temperance, 53, 206. 

Test necessary for moral agency, 

146-149. 
Theism, 41, 71, 80, 151, 219. 
Theistic faith, 270. 
Theistic intuitions, 38, 188, 189. 



286 



Index 









Theistic world-view, 33, 53, 72, 

268. 
Theodicy, 144. 
Theology, 34, 36, 41, 80, 140, 153, 

156, 158, 160, 179. 
Theoretical Ethics, definition, 18 ; 

treatment of, 18-160; relation 

to Practical Ethics, 162-164. 
Theories of Ethics reviewed, 48, 

49, 50-72. 
Thilly, Frank, 21, 30, 53, 108. 
Thoreau, 218, 220. 
Thrasymachus, 51. 
Time and space, 38, 186. 
Traitor, 214. 
Trichotomy, 180. 
Trimmers and time-servers, 256, 

257. 
Trumbull, H. C, 136. 
Truth and error, 38, 186. 
Tyndal, John, 71. 

Understanding, the, 37, 38, 181- 

184. 
Universities, 4, 176, 198, 200, 201. 
Universe, the, 26, 70, 71, 73, 74, 

81, 143, 151, 157, 193, 194, 201, 

203, 268, 271, 272, 274. 
"Unconscious Intelligence," 151. 
"Unconscious Will," 151. 
Utilitarianism, 49, 63-66, 140, 

162, 163. 

Valentine, Milton, 21, 22, 23, 33, 
36, 41, 43, 60, 61, 74, 82, 93, 
125, 161. 



Via media, 54, 174, 215, 229, 231. 

Vile speech, 204, 205. 

Virile ethics, 3, 150, 274. 

Virtue and virtues, general ref- 
erences, 22, 29, 30, 56, 193, 204, 
230, 274, 275; Plato's list, 53, 
54, 206; virtuous personality, 
205-215; relation of virtue to 
character, 205 ; definitions, 205 ; 
classification, 205, 206; list of 
virtues, 206, 207 ; antitheses 
and perversions, 206-215. 

Vocabulary, ethical, 27-30. 

Votes, counting, 256. 

Wages, 233. 234. 

Walking, 173, 174. 

War, 207, 208. 

Weidner, R. R, 133, 134. 

Wesley, John, 171. 

Wife and husband, 238-242, 275. 

Will, the, 4, 26, 38, 39, 98, 142; 
treatment of, 100-117; defini- 
tion, 100; unique powers, 102- 
105 ; freedom of vindicated, 
105-117; limitations, 117; mo- 
tives and the Will, 111-113, 
118; in respect to sin, 140-146; 
equilibrate, 146; discipline of, 
191-195, 240, 274. 

Wisdom, 53, 206. 

Working men, 232-235. 

Wundt, W. 49. 

Zeno, 35, 51, 57. 



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